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Summary 
This thesis shall aim to contribute to the wider philosophical conversation a perspective 
on understanding the nature of rituals, many of which are rituals in an unspoken 
manner, which are carried out in a regular and commonplace context. 
In the first division of this thesis, I begin by examining the various concepts and 
terminologies that will be used throughout. After beginning with an examination of the 
basic concepts of performance, play, and ritual, I then move on to the concept of the 
theatrum mundi, and what performances look like within such a context. I place the 
theatrum mundi within my own model of the co-opticon, within which everyone is 
simultaneously observer of and observed by everyone. Having done so, I next examine 
the elements of such a performance: space, action, and utterance, and their interaction. 
Attention is given here to the role of the performative utterance as they key factor of 
efficacy within rituals occurring in the theatrum mundi. 
In the second division, I examine various examples of rituals which highlight the nature 
of performative rituals. These examples begin with studies of re-enactment broadly 
understood, beginning with historical re-enactment with focus on the American Civil 
War, followed by the nature of re-enactment within the US political system in the form 
of the Presidential debates. In the focus on the debates as re-enactments of the original 
Nixon vs Kennedy televised debate, I give special attention to the recent debates of the 
2016 election between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton with focus on the Her 
Opponent recreation of sections of the debates with the genders of the participants 
reversed, performed on stage shortly after Trump’s electoral victory. Re-enactment is 
closed off with a discussion of the role of re-enactment within academia. Following this 
I examine the concept of performance as first philosophy, in which I suggest that the 
manner in which philosophy, and arguments in general, is presented has an effect on the 
manner in which the argument is received and consequently factors on whether it is 
accepted or rejected independently of any actual truth value. In the final chapter I turn 
to the stage, discussing a proposed performance of two related plays and the didactic 
nature of such a performance. 
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Introduction 
 
Martin Puchner declares that “theatre and philosophy are intimately, if contentiously, 
related.”1 In this thesis I will work within a broadened version of this claim implicitly 
found in other thinkers (most notably to this thesis within the wider context of 
Performance Philosophy) asserting that philosophy is intimately related not only to 
theatre but to performance as a whole. Within this investigation it should be noted that 
this intimate relation is one which is in part created by its separation: Puchner later 
noted that “the two are fundamentally different types of endeavours that appear 
comparable only by virtue of having been brought into the same institutional context 
within the modern university; by virtue, that is, of having been turned into 
departments.”2 Puchner suggests then that the study of theatre and philosophy begins 
with the and: “It is the and that makes all the difference; it is the gap between theatre 
and philosophy that makes the study of their relation interesting, and even possible, in 
the first place.”3 While the theatre may make use of philosophy and philosophy may 
make use of theatre, whilst the two may bleed together, they remain two distinct and 
different media. An understanding of this gap may be assisted by drawing clearly the 
distinction between theatre and the theatrical, drama, and performance. The theatrical 
relates to the theatre and draws from that tradition. Performance is a broader concept 
which will be discussed in great detail in Chapter One, whilst drama can be understood 
as that which relates to performance. Thus it is that both theatre and philosophy may be 
understood, through a shared engagement in performance, as being dramatic. 
 
The dramatic in philosophy, of course, begins most obviously with Plato, and what 
Puchner calls “a most unusual form of philosophical drama”4 – the Socratic dialogue in 
which Plato played out “richly conceived scenarios paying minute attention to setting, 
character, and plot even as they deviated from all known forms of drama, combining 
characters and ideas, actions and arguments in curiously meandering, labyrinthine 
 
1 Martin Puchner, The Drama of Ideas: Platonic Provocations in Theater and Philosophy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), p. vii. 
2 Martin Puchner, ‘Please Mind the Gap between Theatre and Philosophy’, Modern Drama, 56.4 (2013), 
540–53 (p. 542). 
3 Puchner, ‘Please Mind the Gap between Theatre and Philosophy’, p. 543. 
4 Puchner, The Drama of Ideas, p. 4. 
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plots.”5 The dialogue made some limited recurrence within philosophy, for example in 
Kierkegaard’s Either/Or albeit with less of a theatrical element.  
 
The primary focus of this thesis will be performativity, a concept which refers directly 
not to performance theatrically understood but rather to a concept initially introduced as 
purely linguistic -a performative being a “speech act”: a word or phrase which causes a 
thing to occur – but which has since been expanded into “bodily acts” (notably in the 
works of Judith Butler, as is discussed in Chapter Two ⁋5). The thesis will thus focus on 
both performance and performativity. These two are not the same thing: something may 
be a performance but not performative and vice versa. My interest is in those behaviours 
which are both performance and performative, which for our purposes shall be dubbed 
rituals. Ritual for the purposes of this thesis is the performative performance.  
 
The thesis will be divided into two divisions, the first division being largely one of 
theory whilst the second shall be the practical implementation of this theory. More 
specifically, the theory of division one shall be centred on explaining the manner in 
which performance and performativity should be understood, whilst division two shall 
be a largely philosophical application. 
  
Performance in this sense must be understood in a particular manner. Peter Brook notes 
that “I can take any empty space and call it a bare stage”6, and such an understanding of 
a stage will apply here. The performance which interests us occurs with the Theatrum 
Mundi, the world-as-stage, in which just as “a man walks across this empty space whilst 
someone else is watching him, and this is all that is needed for an act of theatre to be 
engaged”7, so can any space in the world be transformed temporarily into an intimate 
space of performance. This observation is not, however, that one-way observation of 
performer by audience but rather one in which all observe all in a co-optical manner. 
The explanation and expansion of these concepts will be the role of the first division.  
These two concepts being of great importance to the thesis as a whole, I will outline 
them in brief. 
 
 
5 Puchner, The Drama of Ideas, p. 4. 
6 Peter Brook, The Empty Space (London: Penguin, 2008), p. 11. 
7 Brook, p. 11. 
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The Theatrum Mundi is, as previously stated, the concept of the world-as-stage. This 
may be found in a metaphysical sense throughout the history of philosophy, essentially 
presenting the world of humanity as taking place on a “stage” observed by some higher 
force such as God or the gods. Humans in this conception can be viewed as actors 
carrying out their roles, and whilst this does lend itself to an implication of determinism 
or fatalism (the actor, after all is generally acting out a script pre-written by the play’s 
“higher power”, that is the playwright), it is not necessarily required and indeed, for the 
concept of the theatrum mundi as I am using it, such a model is to be rejected. Rather 
the persons on the stage should be viewed not as actors but as performers in a wider 
sense. Further in the theatrum mundi discussed in this thesis, there is not a wider 
metaphysical view of the entire world as one singular performance, but rather one of 
many stages constantly created and uncreated, on which many short performances occur 
with an ever changing and rotating cast. 
 
The co-opticon is a concept which I have developed to build on the work of Michel 
Foucault, who proposed in his Discipline and Punish a model of societal control based 
upon Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon prison design. In the prison, a central guard tower 
allows the prisoners to be constantly under threat of observation whilst being denied a 
knowledge of when such observation is occurring. In this model of the few watching the 
many, prisoners are theoretically scared into behaviour due to their inability to know 
when rule breaking will be seen and the fear of a swift and immediate punishment at 
any time. Foucault suggests that this model of control can be transferred to society as a 
whole, a practice which seems to be put in practice through the use of closed circuit 
television and other governmental observation methods. Thomas Mathiesen in The 
Viewer Society attempts to turn this model on its head through his suggestion that 
societal control involves a synopticon8: the many observing the few. In the synopticon 
television and other mass media puts the focus of the world on particular individuals, 
allowing them to be used as exemplars to shape societal views and behaviours. The co-
opticon, meanwhile, is a model in which rather than the few watching the many, or the 
many watching the few, the many observe the many. Everyone is in a constant state of 
being both actor and spectator, both participating in and observing performances on the 
stage of the theatrum mundi. 
  
 
8 Thomas Mathiesen, ‘The Viewer Society: Michel Foucault’s “Panopticon” Revisited’, Theoretical 
Criminology: An Internatonal Journal, 1.2 (1997), 215–32 (p. 215). 
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To this end my approach throughout this thesis, with the exception of Chapter Five, will 
be a largely descriptive one. In this sense, I mean that rather than attempting to offer a 
clear and fixed definition of concepts such as performance, a task which I suggest 
cannot be satisfactorily performed without the intentional exclusion of valid 
counterexamples, I assume the terms to be both too nebulous to clearly define whilst 
clearly understood on some communicative level that it is possible to point to a given 
example and uncontroversially say “this is a performance”. Resultantly, the first 
division will draw upon various thinkers to describe key aspects and facets found within 
performance, in order to provide a working meaning for the sake of this thesis wherein 
“performance” becomes shorthand for a particular subset of performances, using where 
appropriate applied examples to highlight these concepts. In the second division, the 
examples will take the foreground in order to show how these ideas exhibit themselves 
in practice whilst narrowing down in focus first from cultural activity, then to the 
academy, and finally into philosophy itself, through an analysis of the concept of first 
philosophy, that is to say that which is primal within the undertaking of philosophical 
activity. 
 
Outline 
The first and second chapters constitute division one. Together, they aim to provide a 
theoretical framework. The third and fourth chapters comprise division two. Together, 
they aim to offer an application of the theory developed in division one. The fifth 
chapter provides an extended case study which draws together the threads of the 
previous four chapters into a potential future practical application. Additionally, each 
chapter will build upon the previous one, leading to the overall final conclusive 
argument. A rough synopsis of each of the chapters follows. 
 
Chapter one, Definitions, begins as an attempt to define the varied terminology of the 
thesis. Very quickly it becomes apparent that such a task is, although not necessarily 
impossible, difficult. Rather than attempt to offer strict definitions, the initial sections 
become an attempt to set out the practical meaning for the purposes of the thesis of 
performance, play, ritual. This leads to an understanding that, for our purposes, 
performance is to be understood as, for the most part, referring to very specific forms of 
improvised ritual; and that these rituals should be understood as referring to all, or 
almost all, of our everyday human behaviours. Following this, I use Puchner’s essay as 
a starting point to attempt to explain the concept of the theatrum mundi, which will act 
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as a framing element within which our concept of performance may be understood. I 
will further place the theatrum mundi within my own concept of the co-opticon, as 
discussed above. 
  
Chapter two is entitled Space, Action, and the Performative Utterance, and examines 
the three titular elements of ritual. Each of the elements is examined in detail with case 
studies demonstrating their importance and role, and then an analysis is made of how 
they fit together to form the essentials of ritual in the theatrum mundi. 
 
In division two, comprised of chapters three, four and five, the theoretical is made 
practical first in a broad and then in a narrow application.  
 
Chapter three, Re-enactment, begins this process by examining several real world 
scenarios, all of which are linked by the fact that they contain an element of ritual re-
enacting. These scenarios are: the pastime of historical re-enactment, the performances 
of various American Presidential candidates’ debates, and finally an introspective 
analysis of the re-enactments of academia. In this chapter it is proposed that re-
enactment is one of the primary forms of ritual within the theatrum mundi. 
 
Chapter four, First Philosophy, moves from academia as a whole to the specific subject 
of philosophy. In this chapter, I examine the concept of first philosophy as it has been 
understood by various major thinkers. This begins with Aristotle, for whom first 
philosophy was simply those basic principles from which all other philosophy is drawn. 
Aristotle’s first philosophy was subsequently named the Metaphysics by a compiler, 
thus forming the branch of philosophy which still carries that name. Following Husserl, 
first philosophy takes on a new meaning going from another name given to 
metaphysics, to a title granted to those things which are primal in philosophy. That is, to 
some extent they are still the “first things” which Aristotle sought, but those first things 
are not necessarily metaphysics. Descartes, meanwhile, in his Meditations in First 
Philosophy offers a new primality: that of epistemology. Rather than beginning with the 
metaphysical principles, Descartes chooses to doubt them and to rebuild only after 
establishing his ability to know and to trust his own judgment. Finally, Levinas offers a 
fourth view of first philosophy: he argues that first philosophy is ethics, an important 
movement of first philosophy from a purely theoretical position to a practical one, 
providing justification to the use in this thesis of a practical first philosophy. 
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Having examined and established what is meant by first philosophy, I make the 
argument that performance is first philosophy. This represents a logical rethinking of 
how philosophy is to be understood, by continuing to a further step along a pathway 
created by each of the previous re-thinkings that has been discussed. I then examine, 
through various examples and case studies, what exactly it means for performance to be 
first philosophy and propose some practical manners in which this understanding may 
potentially be used. 
  
The final chapter of the thesis is a culmination of the previous chapters in the form of a 
case study, of a theatrical variety. I examine two related plays, No Exit by Jean-Paul 
Sartre and The Upstairs Room by David K. O’Hara, in order to propose a theoretical 
joined performance of the two which will act to apply the concepts directly. In doing so 
I will take a brief foray through the work of Gilles Deleuze and conclude with a 
justification as to how this performance fits into the central thesis. 
 
Methodology 
The methodology I will be using, as much as I may be said to have a definable 
methodology, is a phenomenological approach. Given that the approach taken is one 
grounded in phenomenology we must be aware of an inherent danger of subjectivity. As 
I note in chapter one something as basic and overlooked as one's language may radically 
affect the phenomenological understanding in one's analysis. I would invite the reader 
therefore to judge this work not in terms of the success or failure of a particular method 
in its application but rather in a therapeutic ethic. In other words its value in revealing, 
however temporarily, a perspective that allows for the possibility of action. As shall be 
discussed later in this introduction, within the context of Performance Philosophy, this 
approach should be understood within particular frames of context. Primarily I will lean 
upon the Heideggerian tradition in my understanding of phenomenology, with 
Heidegger’s texts appealed to throughout. 
 
Sources 
In the first division, I draw great inspiration from the work of Richard Schechner. 
Largely for his understanding and explanation of certain ideas such as performance, 
play and ritual, but also in order to use some of his work as case studies and 
springboards for illustration purposes. The choice of Schechner as a focus was in many 
ways an obvious one as, being one of the founders of the field of performance studies, 
16 
Schechner’s influence is far-reaching and was referenced again and again in works read 
during the research phase of this thesis. Further to this, the approach taken in 
Schechner’s work on performance, that of an anthropologist’s perspective, is in-line 
with my own approach.  
 
In order to ground Schechner fully within a framework of philosophy rather than 
anthropology, I have also drawn upon overtly philosophical thinkers during the 
definition of terms found in chapter one: on the subject of ritual Schechner is seen 
alongside Rene Girard, whilst on play Miguel Sicart is turned to for an enlightening 
perspective. In Chapter Two Jon Foley Sherman’s writings on stage presence and 
attention play an important role. Meanwhile Martin Puchner’s writing on the theatrum 
mundi carries great importance, sitting alongside Schechner as a central writer for our 
understanding of performance. 
 
If Schechner and Puchner are central to the performance side of the thesis, central to the 
philosophical is Martin Heidegger. Although Heidegger is not referenced directly until 
the fourth chapter, and in that instance the discussion is limited to a single concept 
found in the first division of Being and Time, his spectre can be found in various places 
since the general approach taken can be said to be influenced by his own approach to 
philosophy. Many of the thinkers I examine are from the phenomenological or post-
phenomenological traditions and so were either influenced by or reacting to his work, 
and finally, whilst his appearance is not until relatively close to the end, it is then in 
relation to a crucial argument to which the previous three chapters may be viewed as 
having been built towards. Gilles Deleuze, meanwhile, whilst making a short and late 
appearance, offers an overt and valuable bridge between performance and philosophy. 
 
Whilst various other thinkers have been drawn upon, particular attention should be 
drawn to one specific group: in several chapters I have drawn from works related to the 
Performance Philosophy research network, which describes itself as “an international 
network open to all researchers concerned with the relationship between performance & 
philosophy”, and which is responsible for various publications including a book series 
and a journal. From Encounters in Performance Philosophy, one of the edited books in 
Palgrave MacMillan’s Performance Philosophy series, I draw on essays by Martin 
Puchner and Denis Guénoun in the first division, whilst in chapter four I reference 
Tawny Anderson’s paper from issue 2 of the Performance Philosophy journal.  
17 
 
On Performance Philosophy 
To conclude this introduction, I would like to spend a short time considering the field of 
Performance Philosophy, to which this thesis has been stated to contribute, and the 
place of such a contribution. The focus of this thesis was originally intended to be a 
treatise on improvisation and non-representational performances prior to a rethinking 
following my attendance of the 2015 Performance Philosophy conference in Chicago. It 
was at that time that a focus on the philosophy of performance became far less 
interesting than the relationships between philosophy and performance – a distinction 
which moves quickly towards Puchner’s aforementioned focus on the gap between 
philosophy and theatre.  
In discussing the field I shall draw largely on the series preface of the Performance 
Philosophy book series, as a pragmatic choice acknowledging the need to choose some 
grounding whilst also recognising the intentionally broad and, some might say, under-
defined nature of the field. 
[B]oth the field and this series specifically bring together all those 
scholars for whom the question of the relationship between 
performance and philosophy and, therefore, the nature of both 
performance and philosophy (including their definitions, but also their 
‘ontology’ or ‘essential conditions’), are of primary concern. However, 
in order to maintain its experimental and radical nature, Performance 
Philosophy must also be open to including those scholars who may 
challenge extant concepts of ‘performance’ and ‘philosophy’. In this 
sense, ‘What is Performance Philosophy?’ could be considered one of 
the field’s unifying (or at least, shared) questions, just as the question 
‘What is Philosophy?’ has been a shared question for philosophers for 
centuries.9 
That the question of “What is Performance Philosophy?” as a unifying question of the 
field (indeed it was the title of the first Performance Philosophy conference, held in 
2013) is an important point as it implies a lack of a definitive definition or agreement. 
This is a theme that will be echoed throughout this thesis when examining definitions of 
 
9 Laura Cull, Alice Lagaay, and Freddie Rokem, ‘Series Preface’, in Encounters in Performance 
Philosophy: Theatre, Performativity and the Practice of Theory, ed. by Laura Cull and Alice Lagaay 
(Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmaillan, 2014), pp. viii–x (pp. viii–ix). 
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subjects related to performance. Such an apparent lack of agreement should of course be 
seen not as a fault, but as a strength because, as is noted, the central question of “what is 
philosophy” has been similarly a unifying question, even if unspoken, for philosophers 
in general and it is the existence of such a source of unity that allows for a field to be 
identified as something other than a loosely connected series of largely unrelated 
thinkers. The preface proceeds to offer a “four-fold” argument for the “timeliness” of 
the field as follows: 
In the first instance, it coincides with a (self) re-evaluation of 
Performance Studies as having long since come of age as a discipline. 
Second, it takes place in the context of the increasing importance of the 
notion of ‘practice as research’ in the arts. Third, it reflects an 
increased engagement with Philosophy across performing arts 
scholarship. Finally, it is emerging simultaneously with an 
intensification of the questioning of what counts as Philosophy and 
what form philosophical thinking might take – for instance, in the 
context of new work emerging from object-oriented ontology (Harman, 
Brassier et al.) and non-philosophy (Laruelle, Mullarkey et al.). 
Specifically, philosophy is becoming increasingly interested in its own 
performance and performativity, and in looking to the arts as a source 
of models for itself as it moves away from traditional metaphysics.10 
How does this thesis relate to these threads? The field of Performance Studies and its 
self-evaluation, whilst treated as a serious source of ideas is not the primary context of 
this thesis, which rather is first and foremost a work in the field of Philosophy. Neither 
has “Practice as research” been a serious thread in terms of this thesis (although, as will 
be discussed in the general conclusion, opportunities for such practice are created), with 
the majority of the work being purely based in theory. The third thread is irrelevant as 
this thesis does not sit within the field of “performance arts scholarship”. The fourth 
track, then, is the one of immediate interest, especially as regards to the claim of 
philosophy “becoming increasingly interested in its own performance and 
performativity”: It is specifically this that is under discussion, and the model of 
performance as first philosophy should thus be viewed as one more approach to the 
question of philosophy’s performance. As far as a “move from traditional metaphysics” 
 
10 Cull, Lagaay, and Rokem, p. ix. 
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is concerned, this thesis can be said to stay firmly in the boundaries of metaphysics or 
ontology in the Heideggerian tradition, concentrating as it does on a phenomenological 
approach to performance. However it is my assertion that such an approach is 
necessitated at this stage by the nature of performance: performance being a thing which 
we do and should thus be examined from the perspective of what exactly it means for us 
to perform. 
  
The choice of a phenomenological approach is worthy of consideration within the 
context of the field. Stuart Grant notes that in relation to theatre and performance 
studies “there appears to be an increasing indeterminacy and uncertainty as to what is 
invoked, implied, and asserted, when somebody uses the term phenomenology, and 
consequently, very little systematic, rigorous application of the method to phenomena of 
theatre and performance.”11 In attempting to pin down exactly how phenomenology 
should be understood he explains that “the point of phenomenology is to examine 
specific instances of phenomena, perceptions, and inner intuitions, with the primary aim 
to explore how they have their roots in essences”12 wherein “essence” is understood to 
mean:  
[A] fundamental condition of being in the world. We carry essences 
with us and operate them at all times, bringing them to all situations. 
We know a house is a house because we bring the essence “house” to 
it. We build a house only because we already possess the essence, 
“house”. We know something about chairs which enables us to 
recognize something as a chair and not a table, and we can differentiate 
a stool from a chair…Yet if we begin to approach essences, we find that 
they are unclear, taken-for-granted categories.13 
In Grant’s view, this concentration on essence is essential to phenomenology. It is of 
course worthy of considering that even if this is the case, it is certainly not unique: the 
question of “essences” is of course found in Aristotle, who may be seen as developing 
from the base of a concept inherited from Plato. Understood thus, phenomenology takes 
for granted the Aristotelian metaphysic of essence such that an analysis of phenomena is 
able to take for granted the existence of some primal and objective stuff from which an 
understanding of the phenomena may arise. Grant continues: 
 
 
11 Stuart Grant, ‘The Essential Question: So What’s Phenomenological about Performance 
Phenomenology? [Unpublished Paper]’, p. 1. 
12 Grant, p. 2. 
13 Grant, p. 4. 
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A phenomenological investigation seeks the way in which the object of 
study gives itself, taking the terms of the study from the object itself. No 
phenomenologist would be naïve enough to assume that they were 
capable of an objective, presuppositionless approach to a phenomenon, 
but the primary impulse of the phenomenological approach, the 
dominant methodological tenet, is to suspend prejudice and 
presupposition, as far as is possible, while still remaining coherent and 
intelligible.14 
Following this viewpoint it would seem that the correct approach is to concentrate on 
the essence of performativity, in other words to study it as closely as possible to the 
manner in which it presents itself, whilst attempting to avoid the imposition of a pre-
supposed viewpoint. In drawing upon the commentaries on the performative made by 
other thinkers then it will be necessary to consider implicitly whether they talk about 
performativity as it is, or whether an abstraction is being made in order to talk about a 
theoretical performativity. At the same time, it must be considered that the manner in 
which performativity presents itself to a given individual may not be universal – that 
whilst it has an essence, that essence is unclear and difficult to pin down. This 
investigation therefore may be said to be one focused on an essential performativity in 
one or some, but not necessarily all, of its presentations as far as such an investigation 
may be done without claiming to be an unobtainable “true” objectivity. 
After such a phenomenological groundwork has been considered it is then possible to 
move into the practical-theoretical realm of Chapter Five, and from there towards the 
possibility of a more practice-led research, as well as a wider realm of theory-led 
research which moves outward from the phenomenological grounding. 
 
A further point must be raised: there is a tension to be found in the methodology used in 
this thesis and approaches that have been raised within the context of Performance 
Philosophy. Cull suggests that there is a problematic “tendency…merely to apply 
philosophy to performance”15 and that it is necessary for philosophy to be “willing to  
encounter performance as thinking, and as that which might extend what philosophy 
counts as thinking”.16 Wade Hollinghaus and Will Daddario, likewise, talk of “a new 
paradigm, one that no longer applies philosophical ideas”17 as well as highlighting an 
 
14 Grant, p. 6 Emphasis original. 
15 Laura Cull, ‘Performance as Philosophy: Responding to the Problem of “Application”’, Theatre 
Research International, 37.01 (2012), 20–27 (p. 21) <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0307883311000733>. 
16 Cull, ‘Performance as Philosophy’, p. 21. 
17 Wade Hollingshaus and Will Daddario, ‘Performance Philosophy: Arrived Just in Time?’, Theatre 
Topics, 25.1 (2015), 51–56 (p. 52) <https://doi.org/10.1353/tt.2015.0002>. 
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important debate within the field, representing a disagreement on methodology between 
Cull and Puchner: 
The Puchner/Cull argument indicates a difference of opinion regarding 
the potential disciplinary trajectory for performance philosophy. One 
way of framing that argument would be through the issue of use or 
application. Puchner’s approach to performance philosophy, to “mind 
the gap” between the two disciplines, results in, among other things, 
an encouragement for scholars to use philosophy to interpret sites of 
performance. Cull, on the other hand, opts for a performance 
philosophy in which philosophy is not used or applied, but rather 
recognized as inseparable from performance, asserting that to perform 
is to philosophize.18 
In Cull’s explanation of this issue, “application implies the subordination of the powers 
of one practice or process to the needs and goals of another, the instrumentalization of 
the example for the purposes of an argument which has little interest in the example 
itself beyond its value for that argument”19 leading to performance studies taking on a 
“parasitic nature [in which] we often look to philosophy for the next new method…with 
which to analyse performance”20 . Whilst likewise “philosophers…are arguably not 
averse to being parasitic on the arts”21, choosing examples from film and literature 
purely for their ability to highlight a particular concept rather than for their holistic 
value.  
 
My own methodology might be accused of this same parasitic behaviour: is it not the 
case that those specific examples of performances used throughout this thesis are 
selected for their having attributes which highlight the theories put forth? This criticism, 
if it is a criticism, is not groundless as in some cases it rings true: in particular, those 
examples which are taken from the works of other theorists, themselves selecting 
examples for their application, would seem to do exactly that. Further the fact that 
Puchner is the earliest cited author in this work might be seen to unconsciously set a 
firm grounding towards his side of the argument. Whilst these points do not lack merit, 
I would argue that they are not the full story: due to the phenomenological approach 
taken, many of the example performances (in particular those found in chapter 3-4) 
preceded the use of theory, with the ideas expressed drawing from a questioning as to 
how those rituals presented themselves. Indeed whilst the thesis is structured logically 
 
18 Hollingshaus and Daddario, p. 54. 
19 Cull, ‘Performance as Philosophy’, p. 21. 
20 Cull, ‘Performance as Philosophy’, p. 22. 
21 Cull, ‘Performance as Philosophy’, p. 22. 
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in order to present theory and then demonstrate its application, the subjects under 
application were initially explored prior to the laying out of the theory. It may be 
countered, however, that despite this the structure of the thesis is still one of application. 
 
Furthermore the reliance on a phenomenological paradigm may be seen as a wider 
application in itself: am I not, after all, choosing to apply a phenomenological model to 
the wider discussion? These are not easy questions with a clear solution. Certainly it 
may simply be the case that there is a need to accept that the target audience for this 
thesis is those scholars interested in performance phenomenology. Alternatively, it 
might be suggested that a level of application is necessary at this current stage in my 
research: that chapter five in particular offers the beginnings of a move towards a focus 
upon allowing a particular choreographed performance to engage in philosophy as 
itself. In such a reading it may be said that before application may be abandoned 
entirely, an element of application is required – the proverbial ladder to be kicked away 
as suggested by early Wittgenstein.     
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Chapter One 
 
In this chapter I will begin to develop the foundations of the thesis. Key concepts will 
be introduced and defined, specifically related to performance. The concept of ritual, 
which shall be the primary form of performance that is the focus of this thesis, will be 
introduced. This will lead into chapter 2’s discussion of the elements that make up the 
ritual performance that is our focus. 
 In §1 I will examine several major terms which will be used throughout the work:  first 
and most obviously, performance (¶1), and then the concepts of play (¶2) and ritual 
(¶3). Although they may seem on the surface to be unrelated, these concepts will be 
shown to be engaged in an interplay (¶4) crucial to my overall argument in this chapter. 
Following this, in §2 I will then define and examine one specific term: the concept of 
the theatrum mundi, or world theatre, which will be central to performance as it is 
understood in the thesis. After defining the theatrum mundi (¶5) I will explore the 
manner in which it is manifest, and what it means for performance as understood from 
§2 to occur within such a framework (¶6), before placing it into a larger context dubbed 
the co-opticon (¶7) through which the world may be understood as engaged in a process 
of all observing and being observed by all. 
 
§1 Definitions 
¶1. Performance 
The definition of performance is central to this thesis. Unfortunately, it is not a simple 
term to pin down – although most people will instinctively claim to be able to identify a 
performance, and the word itself is in common use throughout everyday life, it will not 
necessarily be the case that everyone will be able to give similar definitions, let alone 
academically rigorous ones. In fact, within the growing field of “performance 
philosophy” (to which this thesis hopes to add a useful contribution), the definition is 
largely left to the individual researcher with convenors Laura Cull and Alice Lagaay 
noting that:  
When working to establish a name for this increasingly vibrant field of 
activity, the term ‘performance’ was chosen deliberately for its 
openness, its indeterminate definition. That is, in this context, 
performance is understood as a broader term than theatre, rather than 
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the reverse, and hence the term Performance Philosophy incorporates 
music, dance and performance on screens, as well as the other kinds of 
social performance included in Richard Schechner’s broad-spectrum 
definition.22 
 
What then is a performance, for our purposes? The dictionary offers us various 
possibilities, all unsatisfactory: 
 The accomplishment or carrying out of something commanded or 
undertaken; the doing of an action or operation.; […]The quality of 
execution of such an action, operation, or process; the competence or 
effectiveness of a person or thing in performing an action;[…] an 
action, act, deed, or operation; […]The action of performing a play, 
piece of music, ceremony, etc.23 
This “indeterminate definition” must be approached head-on: it seems obvious when 
using the word performance that we innately know the meaning that we ascribe to it: we 
do not need to clarify that there is a difference between the performance of an actor on 
stage being reviewed in the arts pages of the local newspaper, and the performance of 
an office worker being reviewed by management at a performance review. In narrowing 
down our meaning we may at least begin by approaching the aforementioned Richard 
Schechner: in his system he allows for “performances in everyday life – greetings, 
displays of emotion, family scenes, professional roles, and so on”24 and in doing so 
implies that performance in this sense carries an element of what we might call an 
observed carrying out of actions – thus we may remove those definitions from play (so 
to speak) which revolve around a measured level of competence or effectiveness, and so 
on. Our definition of performance then will require the carrying out of actions or 
behaviour. We will allow for the carrying out of a particular job function as a 
performance as it can be seen as “playing a role” within a particular context. Questions 
may also arise as to the exact nature of performance in terms of requirements on 
 
22 Laura Cull and Alice Lagaay, ‘Introduction’, in Encounters in Performance Philosophy: Theatre, 
Performativity and the Practice of Theory, ed. by Laura Cull and Alice Lagaay (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmaillan, 2014), pp. 3–12 (p. 4). 
23 ‘Performance, N.’, OED Online (Oxford University Press) <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/140783> 
[accessed 4 July 2015]. 
24 Richard Schechner, Performance Studies: An Introduction (London ; New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 
xvii. 
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physicality, the existence or lack thereof of an audience, limitations upon the 
performance and so on. These are complicated issues, and we must beware the risk of 
attempting to address each definitively and thus creating a definition so rigid as to deny 
the right of certain performances to call themselves such due to failing to tick the 
correct boxes. Indeed Schechner would encourage our taking a much broader approach: 
after suggesting that “performances… are made of ‘twice behaved behaviours,’ 
‘restored behaviours,’ performed actions that people train to do, that they practice and 
rehearse”25 he then proclaims that “every action, no matter how small or encompassing, 
consists of twice-behaved behaviours.”26 In this case it might be said that every action is 
a performance, but in such a case it will also be seen that such a definition may be of 
limited use for academic purposes. The tricky nature of defining performance thus 
leaves us positioned to ask whether perhaps we should approach the matter from a new 
angle? Rather than ask, “what is performance” we may perhaps find a more interesting 
approach develops when we instead ask, “where is performance”, “how is 
performance”, or indeed “why is performance”? 
 
The question of why anything is a dangerous one: the risk exists that it might become a 
black hole from which we may be unable to escape, and so displace this entire thesis. 
Although such an investigation may well be fruitful it is one which we must, for now, 
pass over in silence as one which is out with the scope of these pages. Rather than ask 
why we perform, it will be enough for the present to accept that we do so, and to focus 
on what that means for our experience of the world. As for the other questions, the 
question “where is performance” is one that  will play an important role in Chapter 
Two, when we will look at the role of space in performance, looking in particular at 
Martin Puchner’s analysis of site-specific performance and analogies drawn therein to 
“site-centred philosophy”, drawing from the works of Heidegger. The question of 
“where” will also crucially focus on the concept of the theatrum mundi, discussed in §2 
of this chapter. This concept will allow us to justify the concept of all behaviour being 
to some extent ritual, performed on a stage with an audience of all, or even with the 
performer themselves as the sole spectator (a concept that will be discussed in relation 
to Boal’s idea of the spect-actor in ¶7). It will be seen that the underlying response to 
“where is performance” will be “everywhere”, or at least everywhere that human 
behaviour is actively occurring. A possible objection arises: if performance is 
 
25 Schechner, Performance Studies, p. 22. 
26 Schechner, Performance Studies, p. 23. 
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everywhere does this not result in the same uselessness as the claim that that “what” of 
performance is in essence everything so far as human behaviour is concerned? Perhaps 
it may seem like that, but as will be observed in the aforementioned upcoming chapters 
the “where” is far more open to analysis and to a valuable unpacking.  The question of 
“how” is of great importance and will be examined in the rest of this definition: more 
specifically, “how is performance manifest?” The answer, it will be seen, is that 
performance is manifest through ritual, through play, through improvisation. 
 
¶2. Play  
The subject of play will have an important role in this thesis, but what do we mean by 
it? Initial obvious impressions may seem on the surface unrelated: we may think of 
playing a game. The less charitable may be tempted to associate play with an element of 
frivolity or a lack of maturity – children playing in the street or at the park. The writing 
of this section could be seen as a type of play: aware of the sheer impossibility of 
defining the term I search for ways to describe it that will allow me to put off the 
inevitable. Is this endeavour doomed to fail? Schechner in his usual understated manner 
notes that “play is very hard to pin down or define”27, whilst Miguel Sicart states, with 
apparent pessimism, that he will “foolishly attempt to define what play is”28 with the 
expectation that the attempt “will fail”29.  
As with our attempt to define performance, an attempt to define play may simply 
require that we work in abstracts – we may discuss play in terms of the idea or the 
manner in which it manifests whilst it may still be found that we cannot give a hard and 
fast definition. As a basis, we will take Sicart’s assertion that “to play is to be in the 
world. Playing is a form of understanding what surrounds us and who we are, and a way 
of engaging with others. Playing is a mode of being human.”30 This can be seen to echo 
Frederick Schiller’s claim that “to speak out once for all, man only plays when in the 
full meaning of the word he is a man, and he is only completely a man when he 
plays.”31 To Schiller, play is a  “twofold experience in which [the individual] would 
have the consciousness of his freedom and the feeling of his existence together, in 
 
27 Schechner, Performance Studies, p. 79. 
28 Miguel Sicart, Play Matters, Playful Thinking (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2014), p. 6. 
29 Sicart, p. 6. 
30 Sicart, p. 1. 
31 Frederick Schiller, ‘Letters on the Aesthetical Education of Man’, in The Aesthetical Essays (Project 
Guteneberg, 2006) <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/6798/> [accessed 22 August 2018]. 
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which he would simultaneously feel as matter and know himself as spirit”32 and so 
carries a sense that it is the key to uniting a dualistic nature. In this sense then it is, as in 
Sicart’s view, a form of understanding … albeit in more strong terms it would seem to 
be the only authentic form of understanding made available. 
 
Particular attention should be given to this idea of play as “a mode of being human” – 
might we suggest that play can be seen as an existential state?   What sort of state might 
it be? There is certainly an element of a lack of seriousness (a thing which can be 
contrasted to playfulness) or perhaps of fun, and the relation to games which was 
previously mentioned. A crucial factor, I suggest, is that there is a suggestion of room 
for experimentation, for attempting new ideas within the safety of “just a game”. Play as 
an existential state may also tie into what Schechner calls “dark play” – a form of play 
in which some participants do not know they are engaged in play, and which “may be 
entirely private, known to the player alone [o]r it can erupt suddenly, a bit of microplay, 
seizing the player(s) and then quickly subsiding”33. To Schechner, dark play carries 
with it some level of risk, or danger, alongside the element of deception. Schechner’s 
dark play as linked intrinsically to a third form of play, deep play, developed by Jeremy 
Bentham and defined as “the kind of play in which the risks to the player outweigh the 
potential rewards.”34 Schechner notes that Clifford Geertz in his The Interpretation of 
Cultures suggests that these risks are taken not because the participant is irrational (as 
suggested by Bentham’s utilitarianism) but rather because “deep playing draws the 
whole person into what amounts to a life-and-death struggle expressing not only 
individual commitment…but cultural values”35. In my own formulation I will not be 
defining dark play as necessarily linked to deep play in the manner which Schechner 
suggests: as will be discussed in ¶4, whilst an element of risk which expresses cultural 
values, individual commitment, or other similar things may be involved. However, it is 
my suggestion that “playing in the dark” need not de facto involve risk. It is surely 
possible to imagine such scenarios in which there is no real risk occurring to any of the 
participants, whether or not they are aware that they are involved in a game of some 
sort. Further, I will depart from Schechner in the following essential manner: in 
Schechner’s dark play it is imagined that the participants may be divided into two 
 
32 Schiller, ‘Letters on the Aesthetical Education of Man’. 
33 Schechner, Performance Studies, p. 107. 
34 Schechner, Performance Studies, p. 82. 
35 Richard Schechner and Sara Brady, Performance Studies: An Introduction, 3rd ed (London ; New 
York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 218–19. 
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categories: the players and those that do not know that they are involved in play. I 
would suggest that it is possible during the game for these roles to take on a very fluid 
form, such that a participant may move from player to unaware and back, or vice versa, 
and further that it is possible for a participant to be both at once: playing whilst unaware 
that they are not still taking the entire thing completely seriously.    
Bringing back the element of improvisation which play allows, we may begin to suggest 
that improvisation brings in an opportunity to take risks, whilst justifying it within the 
state of play and experimentation. 
 
¶3. Ritual 
Ritual is a term often thought of in a religious sense. We may refer to rituals 
specifically, such as the ritual of the mass, or the Passover rituals; likewise we may refer 
to rituals in the abstract: so-called pagan rituals, the performance of a ritual prayer, 
ritual sacrifice. We might also associate them with groups which, whilst not 
conventionally “religious”, are associated with a sense of mystery or mysticism, for 
example the rituals used by the Freemasons to impart teachings to members. We may 
even see the use of ritual in a more informal manner referring to entirely secular 
occurrences: one might speak of their morning ritual, for instance. Like play, we may 
find it difficult to offer a definition of ritual which will satisfy everybody. Unlike play, 
we can see that most rituals have certain commonalities which can be pointed at in order 
to say “that is a ritual”. For the purposes of this thesis we will be taking these factors in 
a very specific direction: one which moves away from the religions sense of ritual (for 
instance whilst Girard’s analysis of ritual as the recreation of a past act of violence36 is a 
fascinating and useful one in the anthropology of religion, it will be of little use to our 
wider purpose in these pages) and takes ritual in its widest possible meaning.  
 
There is another factor of ritual, which we will return to in more detail in Chapter 
Three, to be considered: that of re-enactment. This may be seen illustrated for instance 
in Rene Girard’s claim that ritual is mimetic, a term which here means that “ritual is the 
imitation and re-enactment of spontaneous, unanimous violence”37 related to a past 
source of crisis in the community which was resolved through the violent death of a 
scapegoat figure – an individual within the community to whom responsibility was 
 
36 See René Girard, Violence and the Sacred, John Hopkins paperbacks ed., [Nachdr.] (Baltimore: 
Hopkins Univ. Press, 1979). 
37 Girard, p. 99. 
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assigned. It is possible that this element of sacrifice requires a definition of ritual more 
limiting than the one that I am offering here – Girard’s rituals are not merely mere re-
enactments, but rather re-enactments specifically of violence. My understanding of 
ritual does not require violence as a necessary component. Whilst for the present 
chapter Girard’s thoughts may be put aside, when they are later returned to emphasis 
will be put upon the element of re-enacting, whilst the scope of that which is re-enacted 
may be broadened. 
 
Rituals may be said to feature the following factors: they are a performance, they point 
to some meaning beyond themselves, they are generally choreographed, and their 
validity is in part dependent upon their being conducted by the correct person (an 
ordained priest, say). The issue of authority is one which we may need to abandon: does 
one’s “morning ritual” have a set authority conducting it? Certainly not in any formal 
manner. The other factors, thankfully, are less controversial: we may comfortably 
describe ritual as a choreographed set of actions. The astute reader will notice an 
immediate potential snare: previously we noted Schechner’s definition of ritual as 
action twice-behaved. What is a choreographed set of actions, if not behaviour twice-
behaved?  In other words the first factor of ritual is, at its heart, merely that it is a 
performance. The second factor of ritual is that it points to a meaning beyond itself, but 
is this not simply the definition of a sign? And if we take ritual to simply be a 
performance which acts as a sign then we must ask whether limits can be put upon what 
this sign might entail? This is hard to say.  
 
A further common observation in rituals is that they contain an element of liminality, a 
word taken from the Greek for “threshold” which can be said to signify ambiguity. In 
attempting to describe the “necessarily ambiguous”38 nature of liminality, Victor Turner 
notes that it “is frequently likened to death, to being in the womb, to invisiblity, to 
darkness, to bisexuality, to the wilderness, and to an eclipse of the sun or moon.”39 This 
period of ambiguity is illustrated in the discussion of rites of passage, which are stated 
to consist of three phases: “separation, margin (or limen), and aggregation”40. In such 
rituals the liminal period serves to act as the gap between the participant being removed 
 
38 Victor W. Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure, The Lewis Henry Morgan 
Lectures, 1966 (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1969), p. 95. 
39 Turner, p. 95. 
40 Turner, p. 94. 
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from their original position and their initiation into their new position. That the liminal 
is ambiguous both by definition and in its points of comparisons (the points of 
comparison noted by Turner are, after all, not ones to in which can easily see distinct 
shared characteristics) speaks to the core essence of ritual. Ritual asserts or remarks 
upon identity, but it does so in a manner that is beyond words. It is an experiential 
assertion. Erving Goffman seems to capture this element of ambiguity in a wider 
context, albeit not specifically referred to by that name. Goffman uses the example of 
the contrast between medical and surgical nursing staff observed in a study, wherein the 
surgical staff were observed by patients to be constantly engaged in “useful” work, 
whilst the medical staff were often believed to be wasting time due to the less “obvious” 
nature of their activities. He suggests that “if the individual’s activity is to become 
significant to others, he must mobilize his activity so that it will express during the 
interaction what he wishes to convey.”41 In this so-called “dramatic realisation”, it is the 
most visible actions of an activity which carry meaning: the “baseball umpire…must 
forgo the moment of thought which might make him sure of his judgment; he must give 
an instantaneous decision so that the audience will be sure that he is sure of his 
judgment”42 whilst “undertakers must…charge a great deal for their highly visible 
product – a coffin that has been transformed into a casket – because many of the other 
costs of conducting a funeral are ones that cannot be readily dramatized.”43 The Umpire 
it seems is carrying out a ritual of forgoing surety of judgment in order to cement his 
identity as a sure judge. The undertaker’s visible rituals regarding the coffin are those 
which identify them to the customer and the funeral-goers as undertakers. Liminality 
can, I propose, be found in those moments of dramatization: the viewer may not be able 
to easily identify the ambiguous factors that cause those particular things to carry 
meaning. Despite this, as with the actions of the surgical versus medical nurses, it is 
their presence or lack which cements within the viewer an impression.  
 
In Chapter Three we will examine the role that some forms of ritual play in the 
formation of a group identity. Whilst in Chapter Four I will suggest that ritual has a role 
in affecting the way an individual receives and responds to a particular argument or line 
of thinking. At this stage the previously abandoned third factor, that of the necessary 
 
41 Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Repr (London: Penguin, 1990), p. 40 
Emphasis in original. 
42 Goffman, p. 40. 
43 Goffman, pp. 41–42. 
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performer, returns. Rather than attempt to say that a ritual must be performed by 
persons with a set authority, however, let us say that, to be efficacious upon the persons 
involved, the individual participant must recognise the validity of the performer – in 
cases such as the morning ritual this will be implied in itself as there is only one 
participant. We will say then that in this case a ritual is a performance which acts to 
foster a sense of meaning or identity in the participants. In chapter 2 this will be 
expanded further: it will be seen that the ritual performance fosters such questions of 
meaning and identity because it is performative (See ¶7). 
 
As a final point it should be remembered that we previously expressed the concern that, 
under the definition of performance given, all behaviour could be described as a 
performance, thus making the defining of performance meaningless. In ¶4 we will build 
upon that concern, arguing that for the purposes of this discussion all (or almost all) 
behaviour may be viewed as a type of ritual.  
 
¶4. On the interplay of play and ritual 
Envisage the totality of one’s possible modes of Being44contained within an object 
boundary. They may be divided  into two camps: those which are playful, and those 
which are unplayful (rather than taking up Sicart’s assertion that playfulness is itself a 
mode, we will say it is simply a condition which a mode may or may not take on – that 
is to say modes of Being are generally either playful or unplayful modes). Within this 
area occurs ritual, which may happen in states both playful and non-playful, and may be 
conceived as an object floating to and fro. Visualise also areas in which occur “dark 
play”, that is play in which participants do not know that they are engaged in a game. 
One’s mode of being may fluctuate during dark play, as one moves from playfulness to 
non-playfulness, awareness and non-awareness of the game, and so on and so on.  
 
We may now begin to see that in at least some cases ritual is playful. Indeed under our 
model we can begin to realise that the same ritual may be performed in either a playful 
or an unplayful manner dependent upon the mode of Being in which the participant 
currently stands. When dark play occurs the ritual may even be both playful and 
unplayful as its perspective is different to different participants. We may understand 
 
44 N.B: in the fourth chapter of this thesis modes of Being shall be discussed in more detail from a 
Heideggerian perspective in which they are clearly linked to the concept of “attunement”, which is linked 
to emotions 
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then, I suggest, that ritual at its core contains an element of play – that when ritual is 
“alive” it asks of its participants an element of engagement, of exploring the 
possibilities of how its individual elements may be put forth in the most effective 
manner. Play meanwhile, according to this understanding, is bound up in ritual: if, as 
we have suggested, human behaviour is ritual then play is ritual performed in a playful 
manner. We will thus say that play, for our purposes, is a type of ritual based upon 
experimenting with established patterns and behaviour. A “ritual of improvisation” so to 
speak 
   
For the purposes of the rest of this thesis, from now on, we may assume that when I 
refer to “performance” I am, unless context suggests otherwise, referring specifically to 
rituals. These rituals compromise the majority of human behaviour in everyday life. 
 
Perhaps the most interesting performances are those which occur within the sphere of 
“dark play” – those rituals in which some of the participants are unaware of the element 
of playfulness, and which carry with them as a result some sort of risk. The nature of 
dark play rituals can be contrasted very simply with regular rituals, both playful and 
unplayful. If the regular form of the ritual is an assertion of identity, that is it makes the 
statement: “this is my identity”, or “this is the sort of person I am – this is a thing I 
believe, a thing which I habitually do”, then dark play rituals are the rituals of 
questioning. They are the rituals which, rather than making a statement of assertion, ask 
“is this my identity?” They are by far the most dangerous rituals, as they carry within 
them the risk that the answer to the unspoken question may not be the one which was 
expected; that the result may be a change within one’s identity which ripples across and 
changes the form of all of one’s rituals, resulting in a new form to and meaning of “this 
is my identity.” 
 
§2 Theatrum Mundi 
In this section I will discuss the concept of the theatrum mundi, which offers a theatrical 
analogy for the world. After examining the various ways that the concept has been put 
forward in western philosophy I will also discuss its appearance in Indian philosophy, 
before explaining my own version of the theatrum mundi analogy which will be central 
to understanding the overall content of my thesis. Following this I will examine the role 
played by performance within this analogy – this will be done through an examination 
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of Baudrillard’s concept of hyperreality as well as the concept of performativity as 
originated with Austin and developed by thinkers such as Butler, Derrida, and Lyotard. 
 
I will further discuss this in light of Schechner’s claims that there is a noticeable 
difference between ritual and entertainment showing that the important distinguishing 
characteristic of ritual is its performativity, which I will use to make the perhaps 
controversial claim that many of the performed rituals which we enact as a part of 
everyday life act in such a way as to cause a notable effect on one’s ontic status. From 
this a conclusion will be reached which shows that Being itself to some extent, or at 
least that form of Being which we might, to use Heidegger’s language, term Da-Sein 
(that is to say the expression of Being expressed by Humanity), is intrinsically 
intertwined with performance. Such a thesis will in essence claim that our general 
behaviour is tied up in rituals, some conscious but many unconscious, which cause 
visible changes to be made in status, relationships, perception of self and others, and so 
on. It will therefore cause such performances to be seen as ontological in nature. 
  
¶5 The Concept 
The concept of the theatrum mundi (lit. theatre of the world) is one which applies the 
analogy of the theatrical stage to the world in which we exist and act. It may be seen, as 
suggested by Puchner, to cause the world and the theatre to form a type of 
complementary mirror image – “not only [can the] theatre now represent the world…the 
world can now be seen as a theatre.” The exact manner in which the concept is 
presented is not a clearly defined one: Puchner recognises “four distinct varieties”45. 
 
Firstly, “the conception that the world is a theatre for the gods…keyed to a divine 
observer.”46 In this variety the world is simply being observed by the gods, as passive 
spectators.  
 
 
45 Martin Puchner, ‘The Problem of the Gound: Martin Heidegger and Site-Specific Performance’, in 
Encounters in Performance Philosophy: Theatre, Performativity and the Practice of Theory, ed. by Laura 
Cull and Alice Lagaay (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmaillan, 2014), 
pp. 65–86 (p. 70). 
46 Puchner, ‘The Problem of the Ground’, p. 70. 
 
35 
The second variety extends further by having the gods “start to intervene actively, thus 
becoming directors”47 in a tradition that can be traced back to Plato’s claim that 
“humans are ‘a plaything of god.’”48 This version becomes a somewhat more 
complicated variant in that it introduces questions of free will and divine intervention, 
issues which make it a mine of interesting theological discussion whilst making it 
(along with the first variant) of less value to our purposes for that same reason: the 
theological nature presupposes a higher power as observer.  
 
The third variant, characterised by placing “the emphasis not on the spectator or 
director, but on the actors”49 can be seen to in some way mitigate this by drawing 
attention away from the divine outside observer. This version is problematic in its own 
manner however, as it “describes a world of fixed roles from which there is, or should 
be, no escape.”50 Whilst this may not per se seem to be taking away the possibility of 
free will, it certainly seems to be arguing for a particularly fatalistic viewpoint in which 
one should conform to the societal expectation put in place by one’s station in life – 
emphasised by the quotation from Erasmus that “If someone should try to strip away the 
costumes and makeup from the actors performing a play on the stage, and to display 
them to the spectators in their own natural appearance, wouldn’t he ruin the whole 
play?”51Indeed, by encouraging a view of the world in such terms the question is raised 
as to whether we are not in fact enacting a form of social control – encouraging the 
individual to “know their place” and be happy with it.  
 
Puchner’s fourth version of theatrum mundi remains somewhat problematic – it “aims 
at characterising the ontological status of the world by describing it as mere theatre”52 
and thus cynically dismisses much of it as “nothing but spectacle”53. This model may 
seem popular to many of a more spiritual bent, or perhaps even to those armchair 
philosophers who prefer to look beyond the world of our experiences in favour of some 
more “real” metaphysical realm, however this dismissing of the real as unreal is a 
reason that we should treat such an approach with some caution.  
 
 
47 Puchner, ‘The Problem of the Ground’, p. 70. 
48 Puchner, ‘The Problem of the Ground’, p. 70 Citing Plato’s Laws 803c. 
49 Puchner, ‘The Problem of the Ground’, p. 71. 
50 Puchner, ‘The Problem of the Ground’, p. 71. 
51 Puchner, ‘The Problem of the Ground’, p. 71 Citing Erasmus’s Praise of Folly. 
52 Puchner, ‘The Problem of the Ground’, p. 71. 
53 Puchner, ‘The Problem of the Ground’, p. 71. 
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The running criticism that we may make of Puchner’s four varieties of the theatrum 
mundi is that they share a lack of emphasis on the world as we experience it – in the 
first two varieties because the emphasis is on the world as it is viewed by an outside 
spectator, in the fourth because the emphasis is on the unreality of that world, and in the 
third, whilst there may be space for such an emphasis, yet the aforementioned problem 
of societal control results in the world as a very strictly scripted and staged theatre, 
lacking a room for concepts of improvisation or exploration. 
 
 Richard Schechner meanwhile observes the concept of the theatrum mundi in only two 
“variants” – the “widely accepted opinion [in Renaissance Europe] that the world was a 
great theatre”54 in which “everyday life was theatrical [and] conversely theatre offered a 
working model of how life was to be lived”55 and a more recent version which “took 
shape with the convergence of a variety of approaches beginning shortly after the end of 
the Second World War and continuing to the present.”56  
This modern variant is not specifically defined by Schechner, however it can be seen to 
be tied up in the thought of various 20th century philosophers, beginning with J.L. 
Austin. The input of Austin can be found in the posthumously-published How To Do 
Things With Words, a transcript of Austin’s 1955 William James Lectures in which he 
examines the concept of the performative – that is those utterances which “do not 
‘describe’ or ‘report’ or constate anything at all… and.. [where] the uttering of the 
sentence is, or is part of, the doing of an action”57 – that is to say, sentences which are 
themselves actions. Such phrases, the naming of a ship, the placing of a bet, a vow of 
marriage, could be said to be those which symbolise a change in status on some level 
(be it ontic, semiotic, or legal). Lyotard observes that “the distinctive feature of [the] 
performative utterance is that its effect upon the referent coincides with its 
enunciation… That this is so is not subject to discussion or verification by the 
addressee, who is immediately placed within the new context created by the 
utterance.”58 In the tradition of Wittgenstein he dubs the performative one form of 
 
54 Schechner, Performance Studies, p. 8. 
55 Schechner, Performance Studies, p. 8. 
56 Schechner, Performance Studies, p. 10. 
57 J. L. Austin and J. O. Urmson, How to Do Things with Words, 2. ed., repr (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 
2009), p. 5. 
58 Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Theory and History of 
Literature, Repr (Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 2005), p. 9. 
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language game, that is “each of the various categories of utterance can be defined in 
terms of rules specifying their properties and the uses to which they can be put – in 
exactly the same way as the game of chess is defined by a set of rules determining the 
properties of each of the pieces, in other words, the proper way to move them.”59 
Lyotard then takes the bold step of linking such performatives to a wider everyday 
application:  
The production of proof, which is in principle only part of an 
augmentation process designed to win agreement from the addresses 
of scientific messages…falls under the control of another language 
game, in which the goal is no longer truth, but performativity – that is, 
the best possible input/output equation.60  
He argues that performatives are intrinsically linked with power, or rather that it is 
through the gathering of knowledge that power is gained, and that performatives act to 
create such knowledge such that “the performativity of an utterance…increases 
proportionally to the amount of information about its referent one has at one’s 
disposal”61- the more information one has, the more power the performative which 
declares that information. Thus it becomes that the value of a system becomes linked to 
its performance – the stronger the performance the more power and thus the greater 
value is created. Resultantly “research sectors that are unable to argue that they 
contribute even indirectly to the optimization of the system’s performance are 
abandoned by the flow of capital… The criterion of performance is explicitly invoked 
by the authorities to justify their refusal to subsidize certain research centres.”62  
 
This apparent semantic trick – the slide from the performative to the performance, 
allows us to illustrate one direction of the concept of the postmodern theatrum mundi, 
the world in which performativity creates reality, with the creation of new knowledge 
being a source of power (and thus availability of funding to create more knowledge etc) 
taking precedence over the simple observation of that which was already known.  
 
 
59 Lyotard, p. 10. 
60 Lyotard, p. 46. 
61 Lyotard, p. 47. 
62 Lyotard, p. 47. 
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Other thinkers have expressed the concept of performativity in modern life in other, 
equally interesting manners. Judith Butler offers a view which is helpful to the larger 
concept of the theatrum mundi, claiming that “performativity is not just about speech 
acts. It is about bodily acts.”63 She expands on this with the observation that “we say 
something, and mean something by what we say, but we also do something with our 
speech, and what we do, how we act upon another language, is not the same as the 
meaning we consciously convey.”64 The reference to bodily acts as performative here is 
interesting, as it implies that our behaviours act as a form of performance which causes 
something to be done: an imparting of meaning, just as that which is put forth by 
speech. In terms of Butler’s own writing this is perhaps most evident in her claim of the 
performativity of gender, that is to say that gender is comprised not by biological 
features or functions but rather by the carrying out of the behaviours which create a 
particular gender image – actions as creative performance. By focussing on these 
creative actions Butler, per Vicki Kirby, “maintains that a commitment to identity, one 
which considers the content of categories such as sex, gender and sexuality to be self-
evident and unambiguous, will inevitably deny the complex reality of people’s lives and 
the impure histories of political struggle.”65 In other words it might be said that Butler’s 
performatives acknowledge the participation of both the “performer” and the 
“audience” – the actions which cause an individual to be gendered in a particular way 
do so in part because of a shared understanding that this action is male gendered and 
that behaviour female.  This concept, viewed more broadly, ties into our idea of the 
theatrum mundi as we might claim that speech and action act in a performative manner, 
unconsciously creating a particular message or image of the performer to those who 
occupy nearby space in the world. This is a thread which will be picked up in much 
greater detail in the following chapter, whilst the more specific issue of gender will be 
discussed again in the third chapter. 
 
Whilst the concept of theatrum mundi has been concentrated on so far as a western 
phenomenon, it can be found also in Eastern philosophy albeit in a rather different form. 
In particular, a related concept is to be found in Indian philosophy under the heading of 
“Maya-Lila”. Schechner identifies the concept with that of play, offering it as a direct 
 
63 Judith Butler, Undoing Gender (New York ; London: Routledge, 2004), p. 198. 
64 Butler, Undoing Gender, p. 199. 
65 Vicki Kirby, Judith Butler: Live Theory, Live Theory (London ; New York: Continuum, 2006), p. 19. 
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contrast to the “western archetype of reality”.66 He notes that “maya and lila are hard 
words to translate because their meanings shift according to whether one is emphasising 
the delights of the world…or the desire to end all desire”67 and indeed that a wealth of 
scholarship has been written on the matter, however it is possible to pin down that the 
original meaning of “maya” was “real”, but that “it was not long before maya became 
identified with the creative force as such”68 and later on to also carry connotations of 
“illusion” and unreality – a paradoxical reversal in meaning, which can be seen in the 
largely Hindu concept that life is illusion. Meanwhile, “lila is a more ordinary word 
meaning play, sport, or drama.”69 The two combine into a single concept in which 
reality is created through play: “Gods in their lilas make maya, but so do ordinary 
people, each of whom shares in the indenticality of individual [Self] with the 
absolute”.70 Schechner identifies maya-lila not directly with actors performing upon the 
stage but with “the presence of the performer enacting the ‘not’ of her role: the Ophelia 
who is not there, who never was there. Ophelia can only exist in the playing field 
between rehearsal, performance, dramatic text, performance texts, spectators, and 
readers.”71 This can perhaps be seen to resonate most closely with the theatrum mundi 
identified by Puchner as centred upon the actor – but whereas the western theatrum 
mundi emphasises the actor playing out their role on the stage of the world, maya-lila 
concentrates on the metaphysics of the performance – the creation of an illusionary 
world on the stage which is created from the physical location. 
  
We see, then, two very different approaches emerging to the analogy of the world as a 
performance: the Western approach of the ritualised world and the Indian approach of 
the playful improvised world.  Rather than see these views as opposed, however, we 
will attempt to find a harmony within them. Carrying forward the previously stated 
thesis that play and ritual are in fact intrinsically part of the same activity and cannot be 
found mutually exclusively, we will take for our purposes a starting point of a 
“theatrum mundi” analogy in which the world can be viewed in terms of a staged 
performance, combining improvisation alongside essentially set roles and expectations 
(in other words the social constructs within which our society functions.) As this 
 
66 Richard Schechner, The Future of Ritual: Writings on Culture and Performance, 1. paperback ed 
(London: Routledge, 2004), p. 28. 
67 Schechner, The Future of Ritual, p. 28. 
68 Schechner, Performance Studies, p. 105. 
69 Schechner, The Future of Ritual, p. 29. 
70 Schechner, The Future of Ritual, p. 29. 
71 Schechner, The Future of Ritual, p. 30. 
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chapter continues we will seek to expand this analogy out into something new, a 
postmodern theatrum mundi so to speak which, whilst maintaining the classic aspects of 
the metaphor, adapts them to our modern times. 
 
¶6 Performance in the Theatrum mundi 
Richard Schechner offers the following observation, contrasting the performative power 
of a ritual performed by tribespeople to a theatrical “ritual” made by performance artists 
in the west: 
Performance artists created…home-made rituals where changes like 
those achieved [via a ritual performed with the intent of avoiding 
warfare between two groups] at Kurumugl are sought. But a 
contradiction undermines these efforts. At Kurumugl enough actual 
wealth and people could be assembled in one place so that what was 
done by means of performance effected definite economic, political, 
and social power. In contemporary western societies only a charade of 
power can be displayed at theatrical performances; or the actual 
changes played through by the performance artists affect very few 
people. When artists, or their audience, recognise that these staged 
‘rituals’ are mostly symbolic activities masquerading as effective acts, 
a feeling of helplessness overcomes them. The so-called ‘real events’ 
are revealed as metaphors. Governments can organise large-scale 
displays – parades of military hardware, for example –but far from 
effecting change these rituals are designed to forestall change.72 
 
Schechner refers here to two distinct performances: the ritual at Kurumugl in Papua 
New Guinea was one in which two rival tribes were brought together in a neutral 
ground selected by the government for “a ritual combat in which the guests assaulting 
Kurumugl in a modified war dance, armed with fighting spears, as the campers at 
Kurumugl defended their ground and the immense stack of meat piled in the centre of it. 
Instead of a secret raiding party there were dancers; instead of taking human victims, 
they took meat. And instead of doubt about the social outcome everyone knew what was 
 
72 Richard Schechner, Performance Theory, Routledge Classics (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 127–28. 
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going to happen.”73 The ritual featured an intermingling of the warriors from the two 
tribes and a transferral of prepared goat meat from the hosts to the visitors, and acted 
very clearly as a performative: “something had happened during the performance. The 
performance both symbolized and actualised the changed in status…Dancing and 
giving-taking the meat more than symbolised the changed relationship between hosts 
and invaders, it was the change itself.”74 Thus, “warfare has been transformed into 
dancing.”75 The second performance is the “home-made” ritual created by the 
performance artist, which unlike the ritual of the Kurumugl is not performative: it is a 
mere pretence.76 .A point that we must draw on is that in both cases the ritual is man-
made: the Kurumugl ritual was ordained by the government as a way to avoid conflict 
by changing the status of the rival tribes whilst the ‘false’ ritual was created by the 
performance artist to try and mimic the performative effect of the Kurumugl ritual and 
its ilk. The distinction is one which lies at the heart of the very concept of 
performativity: the Kurumugl ritual has its tangible effect because it brings together 
enough people in agreement with it to do so, whilst the home-made ritual has an effect 
on at most a limited number of people. This can be seen to tie in with Austin’s 
insistence that a performative requires a form of official recognition in order to be valid: 
Suppose, for example, I see a vessel on the stocks, walk up and smash 
the bottle at the stern, proclaim ‘I name this ship the Mr. Stalin’ and 
for good measure kick away the chocks: but the trouble is, I was not 
the person to name it (whether or not – an additional complication – 
Mr. Stalin was the destined name; perhaps in a way it is even more of 
a shame if it was). We can all agree 
(1) that the ship was not thereby named; 
(2) that it is an infernal shame.77 
In the case of the ship, despite the actions of the “ritual” of its naming being carried out, 
there has been no performative effect due to the one carrying out the actions lacking the 
 
73 Schechner, Performance Theory, p. 125. 
74 Schechner, Performance Theory, p. 127. 
75 Schechner, Performance Theory, p. 127. 
76 Is it possible to draw a link here to Plato’s criticism of the artist, as creating a work which is a shadow 
of the real world which is itself a shadow of the forms, just as the western performance artist creates 
rituals which are shadows of the real rituals which themselves are at heart representations e.g. with 
dancing representing warfare 
77 Austin and Urmson, p. 23. 
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authority to do so: an authority which stems not from some strange ethereal power 
within the ritual but from the common consent of those involved to allow it to be 
performative. Similarly in the home-made “ritual” it is a lack of common consent from 
the wider society within which the performance artist is acting, and the recognition by 
the audience of that lack, that prevents any true performativity. 
  
The ritual at Kurumugl itself is an area which is potentially ripe for analysis. Schechner 
was present for the entirety of the ritual, at times interacting with the tribespeople 
between stages, and so was able to see first-hand some of the more interesting issues 
which arose, for instance the man who he watched applying makeup: 
He set out a mirror and some tins of pigment (bought from a trading 
store run by Japanese). Then he applied blue, red, and black to his 
torso, shoulders, arms, and face. He painted half his nose red and the 
other half blue. I asked him what the patterns meant. He said he chose 
them because he liked the way they looked. The Australian Aborigines, 
by contrast, adorn their bodies with patterns each detail of which is 
linked to ancestral or Dreamtime beings, sexual magic, or recent 
events. Aborigine body painting is map-making and story-telling.78 
Whilst without further information it would be a mistake to assume that the tribal war 
paint would, at one stage in the past, have had meaning similar to that of the Australian 
Aborigines, there are certainly other related factors worthy of attention: the makeup was 
purchased at a trading store, and further the store was run not by members of the tribe, 
but “by Japanese” – denizens of another country on another continent. Already then the 
ritual has been contaminated by influences from outside the original tribal culture, in 
some sense taking on an element of what we might dub postmodernism in that it allows 
for the collapse of a traditional structure of sorts – an intermingling of cultures. 
 
Schechner notes that this sense of outside influence has caused a relationship with 
technology to emerge within the tribes which is very different to if they had developed 
such things themselves: 
As these people become “technified” (they already have planes before 
cars, TV before newspapers), they will leap not into the twentieth 
 
78 Schechner, Performance Theory, p. 123. 
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century but beyond, going directly from preindustrial tribalism to 
postmodern tribalism. The big difference between the two is that pre-
industrial tribalism scatters power among large numbers of competing 
local leaders; postmodern tribalism can easily become collective, 
mass, megapolitical. I mean by tribalism the shaping of social roles not 
through individual choices but by collective formation…Postmodern 
tribalism is medievalism under the auspices of technology.79 
Under the auspices of technology in what sense? Is it that technology in some way 
changes the manner in which social roles are collectively formed? This would seem to 
be obvious from the fact that power has gone from being held by “competing local 
leaders” to being “collective”: if social roles were previously in some way dictated in 
relation to the few power holders, they are now dictated in relation to the group. And it 
is indeed an emphasis on the group which separates Schechner’s tribalism from other, 
non-tribal, cultures, as emphasised by his observation that it (tribalism) features “the 
disappearance of solitude and one-to-one intimacy as these have developed in the west 
since the Renaissance.”80 The influences of other cultures are seen throughout the 
costumes of the ritual participants, who wore “amalgams of traditional and imported 
stuff; sunglasses and bones stuck through the spectrum [septum?]; cigarette holders and 
home-made tobacco pipes; khaki shorts and grass skirts”81 but yet the culture is still 
decidedly separate, it is “medievalism under the auspices of technology”: through 
making them a part of the performance of an established ritual the tribespeople make 
these things all a part of the tribal identity, integrating them into the group as a whole (a 
marked irony: in western culture such trinkets might be used as an outward signifier of 
the individual identity, a method of showing separateness from the group which can 
give rise to the solidarity which Schechner observes is missing in postmodern 
tribalism.) 
 
Are we in the west also to some extent under the auspices of technology? Schechner notes 
that the ever-present eye of the television camera influences our behaviour: 
 
79 Schechner, Performance Theory, pp. 123–24. 
80 Schechner, Performance Theory, p. 124. 
81 Schechner, Performance Theory, p. 124. 
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Many guerrilla theatre events, terrorist acts, kidnappings, assassinations, and street 
demonstrations – not to mention more banal happenings such as press conferences, 
dedications of public buildings, parades – are theatricalized in order to catch the TV 
eye… apparently two-person exchanges between activist and authority are actually three-
person interactions, with the invisible spectator being the addressee of last resort.82 
On one level this is simply an obvious comment on the power of the media, and the 
knowledge of those who wish to get the eye of the public that they can use it to their 
advantage (could the events of September 11th 2001 have occurred in a time before 
global news structures as we have today? Perhaps, but surely not with the same impact) 
but in the age of the internet, with every phone a potential vector to transmit an 
everyday encounter to a million desktops via Youtube things become more complicated. 
Every activist could be filming, and indeed so might every authority (with body-worn 
cameras for police officers becoming more accepted as a method of protection both for 
the officer and the member of the public with whom they interact). Every individual is a 
potential reporter with a potential character, and resultantly every raised voice becomes 
the potential activist, or indeed the potential authority.  
Perhaps then, as this attitude to technology becomes further intertwined in our lives, it 
reflects our actions. Could it be that the observer in our theatrum mundi analogy can 
become quite literally the whole world in potentia? As we become more used to the 
concept that everybody could be a potential viewer of our behaviour, our identity 
becomes tied in with how we present ourselves to that everybody – even the ritual 
performed in private becomes one which is enacted as though the world at its computer 
is the possible viewer. We will return to this point shortly, after the following detour. 
Schechner places a distinction between ritual and entertainment, highlighted by the 
distinction between the Kurumugl ritual and the “theatrical” ritual in the passage above 
– we can say that the distinction, at least to an extent, is that ritual is performative whilst 
entertainment is not. Following this we might perhaps say that the difference is variable 
to the individual: the ritual which to the individuals in one community causes a change 
in the ontic status of the individuals involved may to outsiders seem frivolous and 
insensible. Consider for example the ordainment of an individual to the office of Pope: 
this can be seen as performative on multiple levels. On one level, the ceremony results 
in his becoming Pope: this is an objective occurrence that for the most part will be 
 
82 Schechner, Performance Theory, p. 123. 
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commonly accepted by everyone, even those who do not accept the teachings of the 
Roman Catholic Church (although of course there may be exceptions – see for instance 
those groups who whilst nominally Catholic do not consider a particular Pope to have 
validly held his office), whilst on another level there will be certain performative 
elements which are only recognised by Roman Catholics (such as his being appointed a 
successor to St. Peter, a status explicitly rejected by most other Christian denominations 
as well as implicitly by anybody who does not hold to the religious tenets of the Roman 
Catholic Church.) What will be the effect if we scale back this example to a smaller 
scale? 
  
Consider a hypothetical religious group of small size, say less than a thousand members 
most of whom are concentrated into one small area. Within this group a very ornate and 
public ritual is performed which anoints one individual into an almost-messianic 
position. To the members of the group this ritual has had the performative aspect of 
causing the person to become specially set out as an important figure, perhaps a 
representative of God, perhaps even, in their opinion, someone granted with special 
powers of prophecy or miracle granting. From that internal perspective the ritual has 
caused these things to happen, regardless of whether any such thing is objectively the 
case. However, what is the performative value to those outside the group? Unlike the 
Pope, this individual does not have such a large level of support from followers or 
worldwide renown to be particularly notable outside of the community of believers. In 
fact even those outsiders who observed the ritual will undoubtedly not recognise any 
significant change to have occurred as a result of it; the performative element will be 
practically non-existent to them. However, it may well be that to such individuals the 
ritual has taken on a value of entertainment: it is an ornate public display filled with 
pomp and ceremony and so acts as an enjoyable way to spend a few hours, but offers 
them no more substance than an entertaining cartoon. For a rather morbid real-life 
example consider the popular cultural phrase applied to describe the attitude of people 
who have adopted beliefs considered to be egregiously incorrect or foolish without 
giving any critical thought to the matter: “drinking the Kool-Aid”. This is a reference to 
the 1978 “Jonestown Massacre”, in which 909 members of the People’s Temple 
commune died after consuming poisoned Flavour Aid: a very real, very serious event 
reduced to spectacle and sarcasm lacking any implied understanding of the gravity of 
that which is referenced. 
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“Rituals”, of the sort we are discussing, may not always be as overt as those scripted 
and structured rituals which are found within organised groups, however. They may 
also be unconscious: I propose that many everyday behaviours are unconscious rituals 
which act to cause a reinforcement or creation of elements of personal identity. In the 
manner, we might say, that the performances occurring in the theatrum mundi are for 
the most part internalised ritual performances. Consider within this context the example 
of Zarathustra’s Ape: “Here...a frothing fool with hands outstretched sprang at him and 
blocked his path. But this was the fool the people called ‘Zarathustra’s Ape‘: for he had 
learned something of the composition and syntax of language and perhaps also liked to 
borrow from his store of wisdom.”83 In Nietzsche’s writing, Zarathustra’s ape is a man 
who attempts to mimic the words used by Zarathustra, but who does not in fact 
understand the rationale behind him. In his short appearance he advises Zarathustra to 
avoid entering “the great city”, calling down condemnation upon it. Yet, although 
Zarathustra notes that the criticism is true, he notes also that the reasoning behind it is 
missing, and thus the fool belongs to the city that he will so avoid.  Can we apply this 
metaphor to the general rituals performed within the theatrum mundi? We might say 
that we are constantly performing various rituals which have a performative role in 
presenting our identity, but that there is often either a lack of awareness as to the nature 
of said ritual, or perhaps of the fact that any ritual is occurring at all (thus their 
unconscious nature.) We are all thusly Zarathustra’s ape! 
 
Returning to our metaphor, let us propose the following: just as postmodern tribalism is 
medievalism under the auspices of technology, so too the postmodern theatrum mundi 
is defined by ritual under the auspices of technology. As we have already said, the 
reality of possible mass surveillance not by some strange government entity but rather 
by the completely unrelated masses, combined with the ability for any surveillance 
footage to be transmitted worldwide at the click of a thousand retweet buttons, causes 
every person to be at all times a performer for the world in potentia; but let us add to 
this two things:  
 
Firstly, the effect of technology directly upon ritual: as the Kurumugl ritual sees an 
influx of cultural adaptation and appropriation as a result of technology’s influence, so 
too has technology changed the way in which many western “rituals” occur, from the 
 
83 Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche and R. J. Hollingsworth, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone 
and No One, Penguin Classics (London: Penguin, 1961), p. 195. 
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ability to broadcast their recording in order to allow detached viewers to vicariously 
participate to the adoption of audio or visual amplifiers, visual aids such as PowerPoint, 
and other such augmentations into the performing of centuries old activities.  
 
Secondly, let us consider Jean Baudrillard’s concept of hyperreality – “the generation 
by models of a real without origin or reality.”84 To Baudrillard the world we inhabit is 
essentially false – drawing upon Borges’s illustration of an empire which so prized the 
practice of cartography that it created a perfectly scaled map the exact size of the empire 
itself, he suggests that a distinction between the real and the representation of the real 
has become lost: that we exist within and seek after a continuation of a simulation 
disconnected from the original source reality. In the original Borges story, the “Map of 
the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, and which coincided point for point with 
it”85 is seen by those who came later as useless, and allowed to be destroyed, yet parts 
of it remain: “In the Deserts of the West, still today, there are Tattered Ruins of that 
Map, inhabited by Animals and Beggars”.86 The inhabiting of the scraps of map by the 
animals and beggars leads to an interesting image – if the map was a perfect replica of 
the land beneath it, do they live on scraps aligned to the ground they cover? Further if 
there are now scraps being inhabited was it the case that previously the entire map was 
inhabited by its own creators? The map has become Baudrillard’s simulacra covering 
the real, but with its exacting scale resulting perhaps in the distinction between the two 
being so slight that it can serve as a habitat. 
 
To Baudrillard those things which are plainly not real can be seen to exist in order to 
hide the general unreality of the world – he points to Disneyland, a theme park set up to 
purposefully present a world separate from that which exists outside, such that “the 
contrast with the absolute solitude of the park lot…is total.”87 When in the Disneyland 
park one is constantly aware that one is in an environment that is invented to provide 
enjoyment in a fantasy world; but to Baudrillard in doing so it “make[s] us believe that 
 
84 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, The Body, in Theory (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1994), p. 1. 
85 Jorge Luis Borges, ‘On Exactitude in Science’, trans. by Andrew Hurley 
<https://www.sccs.swarthmore.edu/users/08/bblonder/phys120/docs/borges.pdf> [accessed 20 January 
2016]. 
86 Borges. 
87 Baudrillard, p. 12. 
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the rest is real, whereas all of Los Angeles and the America that surrounds it are no 
longer real, but belong to the hyperreal order”.88 
 
Does the theme of technology show up in the account of hyperreality? Certainly in the 
case of the Borges text, that is used as illustration, the heart of the simulacra is a 
technology, that of the map which perfectly replicates the actual world. Likewise the 
created environment of Disneyland may be seen as a form of technology created to 
distract from the real world, drawing the visitor instead into “the happiest place on 
Earth” – a land where all of the inhabitants (or at least the staff members, 
euphemistically referred to as the ‘cast’) are performers carrying out proscribed roles in 
order to enhance the illusion (indeed their title as cast members helps to push forward 
this idea, by viewing them in theatrical terms). 
  
Hyperreality adds a new layer to our postmodern theatrum mundi. If the world can be 
seen in terms of a simulacra then we can see the idea that the performance is not “real” 
– it creates a fictional representation which distracts from the real world, just as the 
performance watched in the real theatre acts as an entertaining distraction. The rituals of 
the theatrum mundi are therefore rituals which, whilst being performatives and so 
reinforcing (and even creating) an ontic status for the participants (and indeed the 
observers, who themselves become indirect participants) do so in a manner which is 
detached from the “real”: these ontic statuses are not things which we may necessarily 
point directly to, but rather they exist only by the common consent of, those direct and 
indirect participants. 
  
It is in this context that we return to the final lines of Schechner’s statement, most 
notably the claim that: “Governments can organise large-scale displays…but far from 
effecting change these rituals are designed to forestall change.” What exactly does 
Schechner mean by this and how does it apply? It comes of course in the context of the 
non-working nature of the home-made ritual created by the performance artist, the 
“symbolic activities masquerading as effective acts”. These acts lack the powers which 
are given to performatives, but why? And in what way is it that the government display 
forestalls change rather than effecting it? It is not that they are mere spectacle provided 
for entertainment, as the prevention of change indicates some active effect. Rather, the 
 
88 Baudrillard, p. 12. 
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display of power in the hands of the government acts to prevent opposition precisely by 
displaying crudely and overtly that power, including the power to enact change, to grant 
performatives with their validity, rests with those putting on the display and not with the 
people. The government display may well in a sense create a form of hyperreality, and 
indeed could be seen as a type of ritual in the manner that we have ascribed, but rather 
than a ritual which affects the individual ontically it is one which merely causes the 
status quo to be seen and internalised, reinforced. We see that in this way, contrary to 
the impression Schechner, with his emphasis on the distinction between ritual and 
theatre, may give it is in fact the case that ritual and entertainment/theatre are closely 
intertwined; both on some level having an effect, albeit in different ways, the one with 
an active participation which can cause the participant to express and mould their 
ontology whilst the latter holds the spectator passive, dictating that ontology to them. 
  
Before we continue there is one further, potentially very interesting, question which is 
in need of some clarification: the nature of the audience in our theatrum mundi, 
especially in those occasions where the performance may be described as “anonymous”. 
I have already suggested that under the auspices of technology the postmodern theatrum 
mundi is one in which there is a sense of constant observation. Such a scenario, as will 
be discussed in detail in ¶7, may lead us to an understanding of a world-stage in which 
all become the audience-spectator to all. What, though, of those performances in which 
the performer is unknown? 
  
Such performances fall into several categories. For perhaps the most high-profile 
example of recent times we might point to the graffiti artist Banksy. Perhaps the most 
famous graffiti artist in the world, Banksy has left art in many different countries, had 
work displayed both officially and unofficially in various art galleries, much of his work 
is instantly recognisable, and yet his true identity has been kept a secret from the 
general public for almost 30 years. We might say that the true identity of Banksy is 
unimportant or irrelevant: Banksy has been interviewed on several occasions, and we 
have gained insight into his personality, political leanings, sense of humour, etc., 
through reading such interviews, through his art, and through other methods of 
communication. We know for instance, thanks to “the Pest control Office” website, that 
allegedly “many Banksy pieces are created in an advanced state of intoxication”89), thus 
 
89 ‘What Is Pest Control?’ <http://www.pestcontroloffice.com/whatispco.html> [accessed 6 November 
2017]. 
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giving an apparent insight into his artistic process. The power of anonymity is that none 
of these things need necessarily be genuine. The key to such a performance is that the 
truth value of such things does not matter: they are true of the character known as 
“Banksy” even if they are not true of any real person. Through their combining to create 
a wider picture, the character of Banksy comes to eclipse the real individual behind the 
graffiti. The character becomes the focus and the actor is forgotten just as on the 
theatrical stage. 
  
An alternative anonymous performance would be one in which the performer is not only 
unidentified, but lacks any identifying presence whatsoever. In a case where the 
perpetrator is unknown – for example in the recent incident in which “anonymous 
evangelical Anglicans posted a 95 Theses-style complaint on the doors of five British 
cathedrals”90 – the anonymity may be said to have a disruptive effect. In the example of 
the notice on the cathedrals, a clear parallel can be drawn (especially given the timing 
on the week of the 500th anniversary of the Reformation) to the traditional image of 
Martin Luther pinning his complaints to the door of the cathedral in Wittenberg. As will 
be discussed in Chapter 3, such a parallel is one which is standard within rituals. 
However there is a subversion in effect as, whereas Luther is pictured to have 
performed his act of defiance in plain view (the truth behind this picture being largely 
irrelevant – whilst it is largely recognised by scholars today that Luther’s nailing his 
theses to the door is a later invention, the maxim holds true that “when the legend 
becomes fact, print the legend”91), the initial anonymity of the Anglicans could be seen 
as lacking a vital element (and it is perhaps for this reason that the perpetrator would 
later reveal his identity and motives). This then is a performance in which the 
anonymity of the performer becomes an unavoidable issue in itself. Without a performer 
the audience is split into two: those who are aware of the performer (which will include 
the performer themselves) and those who are not. In the former group the ritual will 
include a demonstration of identity, whilst in the latter it will take on new and different 
meaning, with the ritual occurring largely being in reaction to the visible results of the 
performance after the event, rather than to the performance itself. 
  
 
90 Tyler O’Neil November 2 and 2017 Chat 86 Comments, ‘Anglicans Pin 95 Theses-Style Complaint on 
LGBT Issues to Doors of 5 UK Cathedrals’, Faith <https://pjmedia.com/faith/anglicans-pin-95-theses-
style-complaint-on-lgbt-issues-to-doors-of-5-uk-cathedrals/> [accessed 6 November 2017]. 
91 John Ford, The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance, 1962. 
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Another type of ritual may be said to bridge the two. This may be found best in the 
realm of political protest, in which an individual engaging in a particular action might 
disguise their identity, such that whilst they will be known to (some of) their co-actors, 
those who they are protesting against will see them as anonymous (or in the case of the 
most famous example of current times, in which protestors dress in Guy Fawkes masks, 
Anonymous). In such a case anonymity allows the individual to become not a character 
but rather a faceless representative of a concept larger than themselves.  
 
In these three examples we see that the nature of the audience-spectator relationship in 
the theatrum mundi continues to some extent to be understood within the theatrical 
model. In the first, the performer becomes almost irrelevant, replaced by the character 
who they represent. In the third likewise the individual performer fades into the 
background for the spectator, allowing a larger concept to use them as a placeholder. 
The second scenario is likewise somewhat similar with the performer, in at least some 
of the cases, fading into the background; but the reasoning is to some extent different – 
whilst it is allowing the focus to become that of a larger character or concept this is not 
because of the actor’s visible performance but rather because of the lack of it. We will 
return to the implications of this at the end of ¶7. 
 
¶7. The Theatrum Mundi and the Co-Opticon 
Michel Foucault, in his 1975 work Discipline & Punish, examines Jeremy Bentham’s 
prison design known as the panopticon, which he argues can be viewed as a model for 
societal control. The prison is described as follows: 
At the periphery, an annular building; at the centre, a tower; this tower 
is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; 
the peripheric building is divided into cells, each of which extends the 
whole length of the building; they have two windows, one on the inside, 
corresponding to the windows of the tower; the other, on the outside, 
allows the light to cross the cell from one end to the other. All that is 
needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up 
in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a 
schoolboy. By the effect of backlighting, one can observe from the 
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tower, standing out precisely against the light, the small captive 
shadows in the cells of the periphery.92 
The design of the panopticon is set up so that the prisoner “is seen, but he does not see; 
he is the object of information, never a subject in communication”93 and so the 
panopticon “induce[s] in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility”94 and 
so “arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is 
discontinuous in its action.”95 The Panopticon then is a state of the few observing the 
many in order to cause behaviour to become self-regulated. This model is one which 
may be said to describe the current state of affairs in much of the western world – the 
ubiquity of CCTV creating a panoptical effect of constant surveillance of the masses by 
the government.  
 
There are alternative theories however: Thomas Mathiesen notes that Foucault’s model 
is “a concept which strongly needs to be supplemented”96 and that “as a striking parallel 
to the panoptical process, and concurring in detail with its historical development, we 
have seen the development of a unique and enormously extensive system enabling the 
many to see and contemplate the few, so that the tendency for the few to see and 
supervise the many is contextualised by a highly significant counterpart”97, which is to 
say the mass media. This model of the many observing the few, which Mathiesen terms 
the synopticon, is deemed an extension of the ancient practice of spectacle: whereas in 
previous times the people would gather together in one place to observe an event, now 
they gather in their own houses to watch the event on the television, or view it on the 
internet, or perhaps even read about it in their newspapers. To Mathiesen, Foucault has 
made the mistake of believing that the synoptical system has been replaced by a 
panoptical one during the development of new forms of societal control and the prison 
system; however he proposes that, instead, the two have evolved in parallel and work 
together. With our understanding of the world as theatrum mundi, however, we can now 
add a third element to the model which I will dub the co-opticon, and which is 
characterised by the many observing the many.  
 
92 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Penguin Social Sciences, Reprint 
(London: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 200. 
93 Foucault, p. 200. 
94 Foucault, p. 201. 
95 Foucault, p. 201. 
96 Thomas Mathiesen, ‘The Viewer Society: Michel Foucault’s “Panopticon” Revisited’, Theoretical 
Criminology: An Internatonal Journal, 1.2 (1997), 215–32 (p. 216). 
97 Mathiesen, p. 219. 
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Under co-opticism everyday behaviour can be understood in the context of behaviour, 
which is ritual, occurring on the stage of a theatrum mundi in which everyone is both 
spectator and actor – paralleling perhaps Boal’s discussion of the spect-actor in his 
theatre of the oppressed. At this point we will return to our previous discussion on the 
relationship between actor and audience.  
 
Boal wishes to argue for “the liberation of the spectator”98 such that “he too must be a 
subject, an actor on an equal plane with those generally accepted as actors, who must 
also be spectators.”99 This sentiment, that the actor is also spectator places the actor-
spectator relationship into a circular position wherein all participants are the one and the 
other at the same time. The many watching the many means that all are both watchers 
and watched at once. The relationship may even take on a personal dimension: the 
spect-actor in the co-opticon is watching him-or-herself. Thus it is that a ritual involving 
only a single individual in private may be said to retain an audience of one. This also 
means that there can be no such thing as a truly “anonymous” ritual – merely that the 
identity of the spect-actor may be known, unknown, relevant, or irrelevant at different 
levels at different times to different spect-actors. 
 
Two questions may be raised about the co-optical model: the first is whether it is 
necessary, and the second is whether it relies on too shallow a reading of Foucault and 
Mathiesen. In the first case the question is based on the existence of the pan-and-syn-
optical systems. If we are to understand the two as occurring concurrently, why should 
we require a third which may appear to simply encompass both? If this is the case then 
it seems that the first question is simply an extension of the second as it is implied that 
the necessity of the co-opticon is based on a shallow reading in which the differing 
models are merely opposing analogies. The second question is further heightened by the 
fact that both Foucault and Mathiesen concentrate in their analysis on the role of power 
and its application, an element which the co-opticon does not cover. 
 
Drawing the threads together that we have so far discussed, we see a coherent whole 
created for a theatrum mundi  model which will form a spine for the rest of this thesis. 
We have seen that the concept of the theatrum mundi is one in which the metaphor of 
 
98 Augusto Boal, Theater of the Oppressed (London: Pluto Press, 1998), p. 155. 
99 Boal, p. 155. 
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the theatrical stage is used to describe the human condition of existing and acting in the 
world. The theory was compared and contrasted with the philosophy found in Indian 
philosophy of maya-lila, in which the world we experience is an illusion created by 
play. These two models can be said to have merged together as we moved into the more 
theoretical section of this chapter, in which a postmodern theatrum mundi was 
discussed. The idea of illusion can be seen in the “hyperreality” of Baudrillard’s 
concept of simulation: that the world is obscured by a fabricated world which we 
inhabit. We proposed that in the postmodern sense the theatrum mundi should be seen 
through a lens of the effects upon behaviour by technology: that in the age of mass 
surveillance and mass-voyeurism (with the few who are observed by the masses being 
observed in every tiny accessible detail of their private end personal lives, thanks to 
reporters leaving no stone unturned in their search for gossip) the world can be seen not 
as a stage on which the people perform for an unseen outside observer but rather one on 
which they perform for one another, acting as both observer and observed, archivist and 
archived.  
The question we then must ask is, what is the nature of the performance in this 
postmodern theatrum mundi? We examined the power of rituals, which act as 
performatives – that is actions which cause an actual change in ontic status to occur – 
and suggested that the important actions which occur in the postmodern theatrum mundi 
are those which take on a level of ritual, either consciously or subconsciously, in order 
to state, reinforce, or emphasise our ontic position on the world stage. 
 
§3 Methodological considerations 
¶8. On anthropology 
Within several chapters of this thesis I will take an anthropological approach to 
discussing certain behaviours of performance, in particular examining particular rituals 
performed by various people. This approach will be in part as a result of the sources 
from whom I will be drawing – Richard Schechner, for instance, as well as being one of 
the founders of the field of performance studies is primarily an anthropologist – whilst 
in part it will be simply as a matter of choice. To some this may be seen as a point of 
criticism. Consider for example that Husserl is alleged to have accused Heidegger of 
writing “mere anthropology”, implying perhaps that to the philosopher the field of 
anthropology is one which is beneath us, and offers little value. In response to this, let 
us ask what exactly is anthropology? It is taken from the Greek anthropos, meaning man 
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or mankind and of course logia, a word requiring little introduction and which is now 
taken to refer to a branch of study. Anthropology then is the study of mankind, or of 
humanity. It is a field which draws many from other fields to further its reaches, 
including the field of philosophy. And if the field of anthropology can draw from 
philosophy, cannot philosophy draw back from anthropology, taking advantage of the 
new perspective put upon it through exposure to the other areas of the humanities? 
Certainly with its attempts to have a hand in every corner anthropology is broad enough 
to be covered within philosophical investigation in places where we might draw upon 
history, literary studies, ethnography, or the natural sciences. More specifically within 
the field of anthropology we will largely be drawing from what is known as cultural 
anthropology, described by Keesing and Strathern as “a narrower field concerned with 
the study of human customs – that is, the comparative study of cultures and society.”100 
 
¶9. Answering potential criticism 
some criticisms of the approach being taken in this thesis may be made. The first is 
directly related to a reliance on the methods of social anthropology: is it possible that 
these methods might lead to a misleading picture of human behaviours? Keesing and 
Strathern note that, in the past, the “fieldwork tradition, in which one studied a village 
or cluster of local communities to document ‘a culture,’ has produced a very misleading 
stereotype of some cultures, depicting each one as an integrated, unique experiment in 
human possibility […] that had been there for centuries before the anthropologist 
arrived.”101 An accidental reliance on stereotypes, it may be argued, could result in a 
misleading analysis of behaviour in general. Further, it may be suggested that the 
approach being taken, especially when drawing on sources such as Schechner in order 
to highlight rituals from various foreign cultures and draw parallels to the rituals 
performed back home in the west, implies some sort of innate cultural essence shared by 
all of humankind. The critic may suggest that in doing so I am committing some form 
of intellectual or academic colonialism, attempting to impose my own experiences and 
values onto other cultures and in doing so erasing their individual realities and 
differences. Such concerns are legitimate, but should be considered within the important 
context that this thesis is concentrating on the nature of performativity, a concept tied up 
in language. Heidegger when discussing his conversations with Japanese philosopher 
 
100 Roger M. Keesing and Andrew Strathern, Cultural Anthropology: A Contemporary Perspective, 3rd 
ed (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1998), p. 4. 
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Shuzo Kuki suggests that the root differences between Japanese and German resulted in 
a danger in the communication of ideas: “He could say in European languages whatever 
was under discussion. But we were discussing Iki; and here it was I to whom the spirit 
of the Japanese language remained closed – as it is to this day.”102 Further he suggests a 
criticism of Kuki’s attempts to apply European philosophical concepts to Japanese 
thinking, noting that “the name “aesthetics” and what it names grow out of European 
thinking, out of philosophy. Consequently, aesthetic consideration must ultimately 
remain alien to Eastasian thinking.”103 To Heidegger then, the differences in Japanese 
(or “Eastasian”) and European cultures and crucially the degree of difference in their 
languages was enough that one could not fruitfully apply the concepts from one to 
another. 
   
Whilst such a strong division between cultures may be unwise, creating as it does the 
risk of arbitrarily labelling persons whose native language has different roots to one’s 
own as Other, it is certainly true that one’s phenomenological experience will be filtered 
through one’s language and culture. Performativity then is being examined in a context 
of the European philosophical tradition and it is from a “European” (albeit including the 
primarily European-influenced cultures in some non-European countries such as the 
USA) perspective that most examples are drawn. In those cases when non-European 
sources have been selected it is necessary to note that they have been presented in the 
concept of an existing European interpretation and that consequently such case studies 
should be viewed as studies not of the performance in itself (if such a thing exists) but 
rather of the interpretation of the performance given by an observer. 
 
 
  
 
102 Martin Heidegger, ‘A Dialogue on Language’, in On the Way to Language, trans. by Peter D. Hertz, 
1st Harper & Row pbk. ed (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1982), p. 4. 
103 Heidegger, ‘A Dialogue on Language’, p. 2. 
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Chapter Two: Space, Action, and the Performative Utterance 
Having spent the previous chapter examining the question of “what is performance”, 
and in doing so having reached an understanding that for our specific purposes 
“performance” should be seen as referring to specific type of ritualised behaviours, we 
shall now seek a deeper understanding of these behaviours through an analysis of their 
essential components. In particular we shall examine three elements which are common 
within all performances: those of space, action, and what we shall dub utterance. This 
analysis shall draw on several thinkers in the area including Martin Puchner and Michel 
de Certeau, and on the recent work of Jon Foley Sherman on the nature of “stage 
presence. We shall offer a model in which space is seen to be a virtual area104 created 
within a physical place by the conjoining of various factors, and within which the 
performance that is the object of our study occurs. Action shall be seen as the backbone 
of the performance and, within the context of the model presented in the previous 
chapter, we shall further divide action into a number of different types, which can each 
be seen as a different form of ritual, each with its own particular effect. 
 
Finally, the performative utterance shall be seen as a “highlight” to the action. Though a 
potential point of criticism arises here: the performative, generally understood, is a 
speech act. Consequently it may be said that a performative is an action, and that a 
separation between performative and action is an incorrect one. In reply, the response 
will be this: that the role of the performative utterance in this model is to highlight the 
action such, that rather than a simple “dead” action, it takes on the power of having a 
ritual effect. This chapter will give a wider context to the concept of theatrum mundi put 
forth in the previous chapter, which will itself act as the central foundation for the 
second division of the thesis, and it is thus important that the concepts discussed within, 
and their implications, are articulated and developed as fully as possible.  
 
In §1 I will examine the concept of space. This will be followed by action in §2 and 
utterance in §3. Having given each of these concepts a clear meaning and explanation of 
its role in performance, including case studies intended to highlight the more nuanced or 
unusual aspects of each. I shall put forth in §4 a demonstration of the manner in which 
the three can be seen to interact and intertwine within the theatrum mundi.  
 
 
104 That is to say, an area which is and which acts, whilst not being present in a physical sense 
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§1. Space 
Before examining the nature of space, it should be remembered that the specific space 
of performance has been given a name in the previous chapter: it is the theatrum mundi, 
the world-as-stage. Just as we drew upon Puchner when discussing the theatrum mundi, 
so now shall we begin with his analysis of space. 
Puchner declares that “for the theatre, the ground is an existential problem: theatre must 
take place somewhere.”105 As it is for theatre, so it is for performance/rituals. A 
performance must take place somewhere, whether that place be physical or, thanks to 
modern uses of technology to mediate communication and interactions between people 
at great physical distances, ethereal.  
What though does it mean for our performance to take place in a particular space? We 
shall first examine Puchner’s description of theatre’s usage of space, in order to 
determine if it may be applied more widely. “The theatre takes over existing ground and 
installs itself there, or else it creates its own grounds, laying the foundation for 
specifically designed theatrical spaces.”106 We may say that this is obvious enough, if 
we consider any theatrical performance that we have seen. The classic image may be of 
the specifically designed theatrical space, bluntly put the building that we call the 
theatre, but most of us will have seen a performance put on at a community centre, a 
school, a church hall say. The power of the theatre is its ability to turn any suitable 
venue into a temporary stage. Puchner notes, significantly, that the theatre changes the 
nature of the venue, by causing it to be removed during the performance from its 
existing context: 
Greek tragedy originated in religious sites, around the altars to the 
God Dionysus. Japanese Kabuki theatre, by contrast, originated in the 
dry riverbeds of Kyoto, a place of disrepute. In London, the Globe 
Theatre, along with most other theatres, was forced to take residence 
outside the City of London on the South Side of the Thames. At the same 
time, the theatre has struggled to emancipate itself from these charged 
locales. Through this emancipation it managed to gain something 
invaluable: the ability to represent any place at will.107 
 
105 Puchner, ‘The Problem of the Ground’, p. 65. 
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This “emancipation” seems obvious: during the performance of a scene we can find 
ourselves believing that the theatrical stage is a room, a field, a boat, in Scotland, 
Denmark, Verona; that the floor of the school gym is the forest home of Snow White 
and the dwarves; that the church is a humble cottage.  
In contrast to the emancipation is the site-centred performance, which Puchner sees as 
performances through which “theatres not only took place in particular locations but 
these locations, and their histories, became the primary subject matter of 
performance”.108 This can be seen as very closely aligning to many of the most common 
rituals in our everyday lives, such as those of religion. For example the church and the 
temple are buildings created with the specific rituals of the faith in mind: the altar, the 
baptistery, the holy of holies. The “morning ritual” will be centred around the specific 
rooms in the participant’s house. And what of the fluctuation in Puchner’s theatre? Just 
as our everyday performances may be site-specific, can they also be site-emancipated?  
Before we may answer this question we must first ask: what exactly does it mean for 
our everyday performances to be site-emancipated? As we have said in the context of 
the theatrical space, emancipation from the ground is the ability of the stage to represent 
any place: as Puchner says: “the emancipation of the theatre from the ground and the 
construction of specifically theatrical (i.e. hollowed) places mean…that the theatre can 
now represent the world.”109 The contrast must be with the site-specific theatre, which 
cannot be made to represent whatever it wishes, as the site itself is an integral part of the 
performance. We might then say that the site-emancipated performance is one in which 
the space of performance is not integral, and so may be allowed to represent whatever it 
will. However, it would in fact seem to be the case that this is not entirely the correct 
dichotomy. After all, the nature of the theatre as being emancipated from the ground is 
not necessarily the same as being emancipated from the site. Often the theatrical 
practitioner will be seen to intentionally manipulate the stage in order to further allow 
representing: the “hollowed” place may be filled in with stage dressing, props, and 
suchlike in order to make it that place which is represented. Thus for theatre the 
opposition to site-specific is not site-emancipated but rather we may say site-adaptive. 
The site-emancipated performance, on the other hand, does not cause the space in which 
it occurs to be made to represent some other space. Rather we might say that an 
emancipation not from the ground, but from site entirely would imply be this: that the 
performance does not rely upon occurring in a space which may be appropriated and 
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made to represent whichever other space it requires. Rather the site-emancipated 
performance relies on no space, but at the same time is able to warp whatever space it 
might occur in, in order to make it the site of a performance. This should be seen as 
subtly different to the nature of the theatre, as the theatrical performance relies on a 
hollow space whereas the site-emancipated performance can appropriate any space to its 
needs. 
 
So can our everyday performances indeed be site-emancipated? The answer we might 
say is yes: when the priest delivers home communion does not the living room become, 
temporarily, the church sanctuary just as the theatrical performance made the sanctuary 
represent temporarily a living room? Likewise the living room may become a classroom 
(for more on the ritual of academia see chapter 6), the street a gym or pub (especially 
perhaps for those underage drinkers who are barred from entering those spaces actually 
designated for such a purpose), and so on. Our performances are thus, like those of the 
theatre, found in a fluctuation: in this case between site-specificity and emancipation 
from the site, in the case of the theatre emancipation from the ground. 
Moving on from Puchner, let us consider the poetic words of de Certeau: 
The ordinary practitioners of the city live “down below,” below the 
thresholds at which visibility begins. They walk – an elementary form 
of this experience of the city; they are walkers, Wandersmänner, whose 
bodies follow the thicks and thins of an urban “text” they write without 
being able to read it. These practitioners make spaces that cannot be 
seen: their knowledge of them is as blind as that of lovers in each 
other’s arms. The paths that correspond in this intertwining, 
unrecognized poems in which each body is an element signed by many 
others, elude legibility. It is as though the practices organizing a 
bustling city were characterized by their blindness. The networks of 
these moving, intersecting writings compose a manifold story that has 
neither author nor spectator, shaped out of fragments of trajectories 
and alterations of spaces: in relation to representations, it remains 
daily and indefinitely other.110 
 
110 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. by Steven Rendall, Nachdr. (Berkeley: Univ. 
of California Press, 20), p. 93. 
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The “down below” in question is the city as it exists, contrasted to the bird’s-eye view 
seen from above (“where visibility begins”). De Certeau is discussing the city as it is 
lived in, directly experienced. The idea of the “walkers” creating a text suggests to us a 
performance that may be “read”, and further we are given a stark reading of the 
performance’s relation to space. De Certeau compares it to lovers’ bodies intertwined: 
space and the performance occurring in the space cannot be separated easily; they are 
intimately linked at the deepest levels. The space is more ethereal than the physical 
location however: de Certeau saying that, “the space is a practiced place. Thus the street 
geometrically defined by urban planning is transformed into a space by walkers.”111 
This can be seen to conform to the theatrical space: the stage itself is merely a marked 
off area, even in the site-specific performance. By performing upon it we cause it to 
become more, it becomes the theatrical space in which the actions of the performers 
take on new and special meaning. Likewise our ritual performance by its nature as a 
performance causes the physical place in which it occurs to become a ritual space, the 
performed space. The performance occurring within this space is “blind”: for our 
purposes we may say that the performance space is fluid.  In part due to most rituals 
being entirely unseen to participants moving in and out of their particular performances 
passing, through participation, in those of others even whilst enacting their own. The 
“blind knowledge” may be understood as a familiarity: that the rituals are so well 
accepted, practiced, familiar; that they occur without any required conscious thought or 
awareness. They simply are.   
 
Also of interest is the vantage point from which de Certeau is able to speak of this 
“down below”, for it is not any hypothetical city that is under analysis but rather 
“Manhattan from the 110th floor of the World Trade Centre.”112 At the time of his 
writing the account, this would have been a vantage from the top of one of the tallest 
buildings in the world – the highest possible vantage in New York. This vantage point is 
one which we may no longer speak from: because of course in 2001 the building was 
destroyed in a terrorist attack. Just as the vantage point is no longer reachable, so is de 
Certeau’s criticism of the WTC vantage point, and yet as we shall see new and similar 
criticisms may be applied. The criticism made may be seen to be applied largely to the 
space created by the WTC, which is different to the space of the street. The criticism is 
that from that vantage point one is no longer a “walker” – a participant in the 
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performance of the street-level rituals, but rather a “voyeur” who watches that 
performance in a detached manner: “when one goes up there, he leaves behind the mass 
that carries off and mixes up in itself any identity of authors or spectators.”113 He claims 
that “the World Trade Centre is only the most monumental figure of Western urban 
development”114 which allows the viewer, from their high vantage point, to become not 
merely voyeurs but “voyeur-gods.”115 This space that is the high vantage point allows 
the so-called voyeur-god to “read” the performance of the city down below, as was 
previously discussed, and with this apparent ability comes an implication of 
condemnation: Certeau uses the language of Icarus, of voyeurs, of gods, implications of 
hubris abounding.  
 
The WTC is representative then of a space which brings forward negative traits of 
humanity which bring with them the risk of a terrible fall. We might suggest that the 
space of the WTC complex continued to carry on this implication right up until the end, 
when just such a fall was enacted at the hands of those who wished to strike at a societal 
attitude related to that against which Certeau levels his condemnation. Is the terrorist 
attack, perhaps even especially that which intentionally costs the terrorist his own life, 
perhaps a shining example of just the sort of performance that we are discussing in these 
pages? This question is no doubt tendentious and controversial, but the taking of 
innocent lives and the spreading of fear, terror, hatred amongst the victim’s population 
in a manner which raises the profile of the attacking ideology is surely a very firm 
cementing of identity on behalf of the terrorist. In the case of the suicide attack it is 
perhaps the ultimate ritual: final and concrete in a manner which states an identity 
which may no longer have any hope of changing. Fittingly the collapse of the towers 
and later demolition of the rest of the complex as a result of damage caused during the 
attacks did not end the role of the WTC as a space for important rituals which might be 
seen to bring out much that is wrong with the participants, even to the extent of blotting 
out an opportunity for good. 
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Consider for instance the case of the ground zero cross116. The “cross” was simply a 
steel cross-beam found in the wreckage of the buildings, yet became to many a symbol 
of hope in the midst of a great tragedy. More interestingly, however, is that to some it 
would have an opposite effect, one which highlights the space of Ground Zero as being 
one that highlights rituals of division and conflict: one organisation, American Atheists, 
attempted to have the cross removed as they felt that it violated the separation of church 
and state. Compare this to the so-called “Ground Zero Mosque,”117 an Islamic 
community centre planned for development a few blocks away from the site of the 
WTC. In the several years following the events of 11th September 2001, the community 
centre made headlines multiple times as various groups campaigned, ultimately 
successfully, to have it shut down on the grounds that somehow the presence of an 
Islamic community in the vicinity represented a victory for the terrorists due to a shared 
religion.  
The space of the WTC, creating grounds for the performance of man as God, a modern 
day tower of babel if we will, became the space of Ground Zero, where the performance 
of man-against-God or man-against-false-God is played out, an ideological battleground 
in which identities, as followers of a particular religion, cement their faith as the one 
true path, casting out all presence of others as some sort of demon.118  
This intimate space is arguably a factor in Sherman’s philosophy of stage presence.  He 
observes that “the space of performance can appear to radiate from attendants as much 
as from performers”119 and that, further, “attendants are never outside spaces of 
performance for the simple reason that the act of attending gives sense and meaning to 
performance”120 as a result of a process through which “it is attending to the action of 
others in a particular way that constitutes the manifestation of a space for theatrical 
 
116 See ‘9/11 Memorials: The Story of the Cross at Ground Zero’, Washington Post 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/911-memorials-the-story-of-the-cross-at-ground-
zero/2011/09/07/gIQA2mMXDK_story.html> [accessed 28 October 2016] for further infomation. 
117 See The Awl, ‘The Sad, True Story of the Ground Zero Mosque’, The Awl, 2015 
<https://theawl.com/the-sad-true-story-of-the-ground-zero-mosque-dc222bd2c02f> [accessed 28 October 
2016]. 
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Western phase, the ideologies which typified late Western civilisation decline, and their place is taken by 
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Clash of Civilizations (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), p. 54. 
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performance.”121  In this we find a very interesting idea, as the performance space is no 
longer delineated to the stage upon which the performers act, but rather stretches to fill 
the entire area of the theatre, encompassing the observers. 
  
This is perhaps a contentious claim – Alva Noë for instance argues that whilst it is 
possible to view theatrical presence in a manner such that “audience and performer are 
together; they share a space and they are both present to each other”122. This is generally 
not the case and consequently “modern theatre denies real presence”123 so that “actors 
no longer share a space with an audience; they reside in a symbolic space.”124 – this 
would imply that contrary to Sherman’s assertion, attendance does not necessarily 
create any sort of sense or meaning for the performance. Indeed it may seem that neither 
of the two models put forward by Noë would agree with Sherman: in the former model 
the audience are “eyewitnesses to the spectacle”125whilst in the latter they “read them, 
or interpret them, or try to understand the story.”126  
Whilst Noë implies that the second scenario is in fact a sham, noting that “when 
something goes wrong and the stagecraft comes undone…we are embarrassed”127, 
which he believes demonstrates that “the theatrical denial of real presence was always 
just a pretence. We had been averting our gaze the whole time, pretending not to notice 
the actors’ makeup, or our own forbidden desire to get up and visit the toilets.”128 This 
may seem to imply that even in the model in which the audience is apparently a 
reader/interpreter as opposed to a spectator, there is an actual spectating presence. Is this 
presence the passive one which the language used may indicate? Surely not, for even in 
Sherman’s discussion of presence it is not in fact the case that the audience take an 
active role in the performance. Yet it is by being a spectator that they cause the 
performance space to be as it is – the performers do not exist in a vacuum irrespective 
of the audience, but rather the performance exists in part for the onlookers. This is 
distinct from say the pages of a book (or PhD thesis…) or the performance occurring on 
a tv show or cinematic film, which exist independent of any theoretical reader (and 
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indeed this is at the heart of the distinction between the two versions of theatrical 
presence put forth by Noë.)  
Puchner would seem to touch upon this point in his discussion of the Globe Theatre. His 
analysis of the groundlings as “in the most debased position imaginable”129, positioned 
below the stage whilst both the actors and the more respectable audience members in 
the stalls tower above them, implies what we might deem an architectural performance 
(a theme we shall return to in Chapter Four). The overt performance enacted by the 
professional actors is only a smaller part of the larger ritual taken part in by every 
person in the immediate area, acting to reinforce social roles and positions within 
society.  
 
Consider this in light of de Certeau’s city space: the “intertwining, unrecognised 
poems” here are the interplay between the architectural performance, the performances 
of the spectatorsand the performance of the actors on the stage. And yet even as all 
these things come together, we might say that the possessor of “presence” within the 
performance is the actor upon the stage. The central ritual amongst rituals is the 
choreographed play being acted out, and all focus is drawn to its component actors. The 
other rituals act merely as an aside which bring the main stage, so to speak, into its most 
extreme focus.  
 
Can we say that this is the case in the space of other performances also? Shifting focus 
now from theatre to religious ritual we might say that it is also the case: the focus may 
be upon the priest who carries out the holy rites, but yet there are many rituals orbiting 
the ritual which enlighten and help to create specific meaning for the spectators who 
participate at its fringes – the congregation members may choose to sit in their usual 
pew, to supply their children with a particular sweet in order to keep them 
concentrating, and so on. The architecture of the venue often likewise adds a layer of 
performance, drawing attention to the priest, or to the emblems, or away from such 
things as the case may be, depending upon the architectural and liturgical setting. These 
rituals combine and intertwine intimately, linking together in a manner which allows for 
the larger ritual, made up of smaller rituals, to be enacted in its fullest Even as it 
becomes a challenge to tell one ritual from another, a level of structural integrity 
maintained by the focussing presence of the central performer. 
 
129 Puchner, ‘The Problem of the Ground’, p. 69. 
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We may summarise then as follows: whilst a performance may occur within the 
boundaries of a particular physical place, the act of performing occurs rather in a virtual 
space which is created from the physical grounds, the main performers, and the 
performances of the spectators. Space both transcends the physical in order to allow its 
nature to be dictated not by those things as they actually exist but rather by the context 
in which they are all performed, and transforms these things into a site-emancipated 
virtuality. Space in this sense may be seen from now on as synonymous with the word 
“stage”, a linguistic decision which should be understood within the context of the 
theatrum mundi, the world as stage. 
 
§2. Action 
The concept of action is one which many may more immediately associate with 
performance: “what is a performance,” they might ask, “but a series of actions 
choreographed in a particular manner?” Certainly it is tempting to say that most 
performances can be best discussed and described in terms of the actions that occurred, 
and analysis may well concentrate on said actions. This is a double-edged sword: on the 
one hand it may feel as though we are working in familiar territory in which the 
concepts are all well accepted. On the other, this familiarity may risk falling into the 
trap of assuming those things we believe we understand as a given. In discussing the 
role of action in performance, therefore, we must attempt to rid ourselves of any 
preconceived notion of action, what it is, the role it plays, how it carries out its effects 
through its role in rituals.  
We shall begin with the simple question: what is action? The dictionary tells us that 
action is “something that is done”130 or “the process or action of doing something”131. 
Never mind the problems inherent in including a word in its own definition, we find that 
reducing action to simply “doing something” we are given a definition so broad as to 
cover nearly everything (a familiar problem by this stage) and so we must work to bring 
it down to within the confines of our own definition. We have suggested that 
performance has three elements, of which action is one. Therefore we may say that 
whilst there may be speech actions, they are not actions. Are we then separating speech 
 
130 ‘Action, N.’, OED Online (Oxford University Press) <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/1938> 
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from physical actions? We have suggested that space can in some way “act” according 
to the most basic definition – that the performance space has a role comparable to 
effect, in the role of the performance upon the participants. The actions of the space, we 
might say, are physical. We then have two options: we might suggest that space and 
action are so deeply intertwined that in this section we are merely expanding upon and 
further illuminating those things which we discussed in the previous section whilst 
adding in those actions performed by the participants. Alternatively we might suggest 
that the “action” under consideration here is something else. It is not merely a case of 
physical action, and indeed it may be something very much other than “doing 
something” – after all the performance itself does something. It may perhaps help to 
describe action simply in a negative: it is those areas of performance which are not 
space or utterance. This however would require clear borders between the elements, 
something which we may be uncomfortable about declaring (and about which we 
certainly should be wary). 
  
Thus, instead, we shall begin by attempting to define action as follows: when we say 
action, we shall refer to those physical actions performed specifically by the participants 
in the performance, be they the main performers, or the implied audience. Is the 
inclusion of the audience necessary? We shall begin by rephrasing our terms: the 
hitherto-called “main performers” shall be deemed the “active participants”, whilst the 
so-called audience are the “passive participants”. Why are the actions of the passive 
participants important? On the most basic ground there is a simple action that makes the 
entire performance of value: the giving of attention to the active participants. If the 
passive participants choose to look the other way then the magic is broken. Further the 
reactions of the passive participants can be important – comedy relies on the laughter of 
the audience, whilst tragedy requires the creation of dramatic tension within the room. 
Within some rituals the passive participants may be called active for a set length of time 
(hence the insufficiency of the term): the congregation moving to take the communion 
elements from the priest, or standing when requested during a baptism in order to affirm 
their willingness to accept the new member. Although they remain “passive”, for they 
are not the primary drivers of the performance, still they take on a role in which their 
actions cannot be discounted as part of the wider ritual. Consider the words of Rancière: 
Viewing is also an action that confirms or transforms this distribution 
of positions. The spectator also acts, like the pupil or scholar. She 
observes, selects, compares, interprets. She links what she sees to a 
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host of other things that she has seen on other stages in other kinds of 
place. She composes her own poem with the elements of the poem 
before her. She participates in the performance by refashioning it in 
her own way – by drawing back, for example, from the vital energy that 
it is supposed to transmit in order to make it a pure image and associate 
this image with a story which she has read or dreamt, experienced or 
invented. They are thus both distant spectators and active interpreters 
of the spectacle offered to them.132 
The concept of the “passive participant” as actually passive becomes here even more 
problematic: if Rancière is to be taken seriously in this claim, then the observer is 
certainly active in a sense: the “refashioning” being an “active interpretation” such that 
there is more occurring than simply the “giving attention” which I previously asserted to 
be of such importance. The claim, it seems, is that attention itself contains an active 
performance of sorts. 
 
Having now examined who it is that acts we shall ask, what role does this action hold in 
performance? To answer that “it is what the participants do” is true but unhelpful. It 
may be that the most reliable way to discuss the subject is to return to that of presence, 
however Denis Guénoun disagrees in his approach to the matter: declaring that 
“presence is the naked act of manifesting on stage, thanks to the stage”133 and that 
further, “presence is what is left of the event of the stage when the actor’s delivery to 
the audience is retracted or withheld”.134 We might say that in fact we are 
misunderstanding, that presence is in fact a fourth factor not yet considered. Guénoun 
would have us believe that “presence and action [are] a heterogeneous team”135 and that 
“it is easy to see what constitutes their difference.”136 He elucidates that presence is 
linked to being, whilst action is linked to acting, but that “there is often a tendency – or 
temptation- to equate the two terms [acting and being]”137 – if this mistake is truly one 
then it is one that we are making. Is it a mistake? To Guénoun, “considering action as 
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134 Guénoun, p. 94. 
135 Guénoun, p. 96. 
136 Guénoun, p. 96. 
137 Guénoun, p. 96. 
 
69 
presence…or presence as action… is to deconstitute the stage itself, to reduce its status 
to that of a display stand or an altar”.138 But why should we not reduce it so?  
In our previous discussion of space we have implied perhaps that the “stage”, or the 
space in which the performance occurs is just that. We may try to argue in fact that, like 
the display stand, the stage vanishes into the background when action occurs upon it, 
allowing the performance to be foregrounded whilst the space merely is. In this sense, 
action and presence must be intertwined as it would seem to be presence which allows 
the space to become integrated and out of sight – becoming in Heideggerian terms 
ready-to-hand139 as a part of the performance. 
We might then choose to discuss action as follows: where Space is the background of 
the performance, the area that is created, that which comes first in the performance, 
action is the immediate performance as it is most obviously observed; it is that which is 
contingent upon the space. Despite its contingency, action is of central importance to 
performance. It is within action that the power of the ritual to effect change or reinforce 
identity is found: we shall say that the ritual is composed largely of actions, behaviours, 
things that are done in a certain manner, and that their being carried out in certain 
circumstances (that is, on the ritual’s stage) is what gives them their power. 
  
Does this seem a stretch? Consider that in the previous chapter our attempts to define 
performance largely included the word “action”: performances are largely actions, 
occurring in space, and including speech. Let us consider also that we have previously 
discussed the moods in which rituals occur in our previous chapter. Mood must then 
take a central role within our understanding of action: focussing on the simplest 
observation that we have previously made, we shall say that actions in performance are 
either playful or unplayful. Let us say that to some strange extent one defining 
difference between the two may be that play empowers action: the action performed in 
an unplayful manner is stale. It insists on following the prescribed form and manner of 
the existing ritual. It is reinforcing action, whereas the playful action is otherwise. It 
departs from the prescribed in order to allow a different, new, perhaps less reverential 
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70 
perspective. It may allow for what Hobsbawm refers to as invented traditions: “a set of 
practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or 
symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by 
repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past.”140 These defining 
actions break out of the existing ritual to create new rituals in potentia: although the 
ritual may not take a hold and become permanently repeated in reinforcing actions: a 
subset will be the questioning actions which we have previously discussed as dark play 
and which may never again be repeated if the answer that comes back is “no, this is not 
who I am”.  
 
Does the defining action have other subsets? Consider the action which alters the 
manner in which the existing ritual is conducted without overtly moving beyond it to 
the point of inventing something wholly new – we might call this the expanding action, 
as it expands the ritual into new territories. There is also the question of the action 
which intentionally subverts the existing ritual in order to say, in a sense, “this is no 
longer who I am” – we may see it as the rejecting action, and this may be seen as the 
polar opposite of the reinforcing action.   
  
§3. Utterance 
An understanding of utterance must begin with JL Austin and his work on speech act 
theory (see Chapter One). To Austin, performatives are initially confined to those 
utterances which form speech acts, creating a dichotomy of performative and constative 
utterances – that is speech acts, and statements of proposition. However he later moves 
on from this position, noting that statements can carry the risk of being proven false or 
invalid as performatives and that “once we realise that what we have to study is not the 
sentence but the issuing of an utterance in a speech situation, there can hardly be any 
longer a possibility of not seeing that stating is performing an act.”141 Austin, it seems 
then, is moving speech act from performative utterance to any spoken utterance. If we 
are to follow in this vein then the role of utterance in our model would seem to follow 
an obvious structure: we would simply seek to explore the utterances used in rituals, the 
manner in which the sentences uttered serve as speech acts and the role that those acts 
serve in enforcing identity, their effect on the ritual, and so on. 
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I would suggest, however, that this approach would be a mistake, and that rather it is 
necessary to explore more fully the nature of utterance. This is for several reasons: 
firstly, this approach to utterance risks concentrating on speech, and yet language is not 
speech but is rather a separate category with which it has some overlap. Language can 
in fact exist in non-spoken forms: it may for instance be written or, escaping from the 
boundaries entirely of a word-based approach, actions may also be a form of language. 
Secondly, as our interest in performance is in presence, we may find that our interest in 
speech is not in the words said, but rather on factors relating to how they are said: 
inflection, volume, speed, and so on. Thirdly, both of these factors highlight the issue 
that our focus is on something which is related to but is neither speech nor volume. To 
utter is generally accepted to be a vocalisation, but the word stems from the Middle 
Dutch ūteren, meaning to make known. Taking the term utterance to refer to a making 
known is useful as it allows us to extend the concept to a wider field: to 
communications through various means: spoken, written, drawn, signed.142 Compare 
the utterance in general to the very specific concept of the proposition, which as we 
have seen Austin gives consideration to in the development of his concept of speech 
acts. In making known, the utterance acts similarly to the proposition in that it 
communicates an idea which may have a truth value. However, unlike the proposition, 
this truth value does not come from a direct correlation between what is stated and the 
facts of reality, but rather it is a value which is created through the ritual being 
performed: utterance is the making known of that which the ritual states and, further, 
the utterance is performative - it may be said to not only state the concept, but to play a 
role in creating the related truth value. 
 
At this stage I will address an issue arising from Judith Butler’s important body of 
work. In her 1997 text on the subject of hate speech and censorship, Excitable Speech, 
Butler declares that “when we claim to have been injured by language…we ascribe an 
 
142 Compare Wittgenstein’s observation that ‘We don’t want to refine or complete the system of rules for 
the use of our words in unheard-of [unerhörter] ways …. The real discovery is the one that enables me to 
break off philosophising when I want to. – The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer 
tormented by questions which bring itself in question. – Instead, a method is now demonstrated by 
examples, and the series of examples can be broken off. – Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), 
not a single problem. There is not a single philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, 
different therapies, as it were’ in Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. by G. E. M. 
Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte, Rev. 4th ed (Chichester, West Sussex, U.K. ; Malden, 
MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp. 56–57. 
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agency to language, a power to injure, and position ourselves as the objects of its 
injurious trajectory.”143 This is a continuation of the simple claim that utterance “does 
something” – in this case causes injury of some sort. Indeed, Butler is keen to explain 
that she is writing within the context of Austin’s theories, as well as Althusser’s concept 
of interpellation. In other writing she expands beyond the realm of speech, noting that 
“performativity is not just about speech acts. It is about bodily acts.”144 She expands on 
this further with the assertion that “we say something, and mean something by what we 
say, but we also do something with our speech, and what we do, how we act upon 
another language, is not the same as the meaning we consciously convey.”145 The 
reference to bodily acts as performatives in this case is also interesting, as it implies that 
our behaviours act as a form of performance which causes something to be done: an 
imparting of meaning, just as that which is put forth by speech. If we are to take this 
stance seriously, then we might run into a potential pitfall: that any distinction between 
action and utterance is at risk of being blurred. If actions are performatives then are they 
not simply a form of utterance? The solution can be found in the understanding that, as 
Vicki Kirby notes, “[Butler’s] understanding of ‘language’ [is] arguably the key to her 
entire oeuvre.”146 This is clarified by noting that, according to Butler “language and 
representation are fluid structures whose internal complexities allow different outcomes 
and possibilities…language and culture are mutually implicated – indeed, some would 
say they are one and the same.”147  
 
This conflation of language and culture can perhaps be seen to resonate with 
Heidegger’s concerns discussed in the previous chapter regarding the difficulties of 
applying concepts from one language/culture within another. More immediately, this 
proposed equivalence between culture and language again moves performativity outside 
of the realm of “mere” speech, recognising that speech is simply one manner in which 
language manifests. As shall be discussed in more detail in the following chapter, Butler 
is perhaps most famous for her claims about the performative nature of gender, in which 
her view of bodily acts as being performative is extended such as to claim that the 
concept of gender is one which is constituted through the carrying out of particular 
“gendered” behaviours – that is to say an individual is recognised as a particular gender 
 
143 Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 1. 
144 Judith Butler, Undoing Gender (New York ; London: Routledge, 2004), p. 198. 
145 Butler, Undoing Gender, p. 199. 
146 Kirby, p. 45. 
147 Kirby, p. 68. 
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not through purely biological facets but rather through their conformity to those 
performative behaviours which constitute the gender they present.  Can we thus view 
gender as language, in some sense? Certainly if gender is understood to be a particular 
collection of performatives then this would seem to make sense. Further that gender 
roles and expectations may vary by culture would seem to support the previously 
discussed conflation of gender and language. These issues will be returned to in the 
following chapter. 
 
Several questions will arise as we ask what place utterance has in our framework: as 
space gives the display case for the action of the performance, what of utterance? Does 
utterance provide a backup to the action in our analogy, a spotlight which causes an 
enlightening and emphasising? Does it sit upon the stage alongside action? A possibility 
that presents itself is that we are mistaken in our creating such a barrier and that 
utterance may be seen as a subset of action. However I suggest that even if this were the 
case it is still important enough an action to uniquely require its own separate analysis. 
We shall say that yes, utterance is a thing which occurs upon the stage alongside action. 
And yet the manner in which it does so is different: utterance is a making known. What 
is made known? The meaning of the action. More specifically, utterance makes known 
the meaning of a specific subset of actions. We have implied previously that the actions 
of the passive performers still have value in their creation of the space, however 
utterance comes after space and has no such role. Rather, utterance is in the domain 
only of the active performers: it is itself highly active and its existence in the passive 
sphere serves only to disrupt the space and damage the ritual (consider the wrath that 
befalls those who answer their phone in the theatre audience.) The utterance of the ritual 
is often paradoxically both the most set within stone and the most open for the influence 
of play: in many examples of rituals we see the exact wording will be previously written 
down and prepared, to be taught to the participants in order to allow for a conformity of 
experience148.  
 
Even in the rituals of everyday life particular language and words will be required, for 
the self-evident point that the ritual is intended to reinforce a specific identity, and if the 
language of the ritual did not relate directly to the identity being reinforced, then the 
ritual would be failing to do its job. Despite this, the area for play and improvisation is 
 
148 For example the liturgy books used in some religious services, or in a more humorous and secular vein 
the availability of scripts for “audience participation” at screenings of The Rocky Horror Picture Show 
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ripe. One might modulate the delivery of the language, to put a different emphasis on 
particular areas of the ritual, to question or state the relative importance of column A to 
column B, to subversively reject a factor of an identity by presenting it in a way that 
implies mockery, satire, cynicism. If space gives action a stage then utterance grants it 
context, an explanation, an addition of the proposition to the action.  
 
We shall say then that for our purposes utterance may be understood is follows: it is a 
communicative gesture, either verbal or non-verbal, which serves to complement the 
action occurring on the stage in order to communicate, or make known, the meaning the 
action carries for the active performer’s identity. In doing so the utterance acts partly as 
a proposition, in that it attaches to the action a concept (in this case “this is a facet of the 
performer’s identity”) which contains a truth value (“this is/is not a facet”), but also acts 
unlike the proposition in that it is performative, causing the statement to be made true or 
false in the moment of utterance and so helping to enact the ontical effect of the ritual.  
 
It may be asked, “in what sense is action distinct from utterance?” after all, it may seem 
that utterance is simply a sub-category of action (the performative in Austin’s 
formulation is after all a speech act). The question that is central here is whether, if 
utterance is a form of action, it is a form which can be viewed as distinct enough to be 
given its own category. I contend that it is: that if utterance is an action, then its role is 
different to that of non-utterant action. Thus for the sake of this discussion it is valuable 
to keep an action/utterance distinction.  
 
We have suggested that utterances may be verbal or non-verbal. There is another, more 
subtle category that is not considered therein: sign languages may be seen as gestures 
which are verbal (inasmuch as they are expressing “words”, and indeed often verbs) but 
which are non-spoken, at least in the sense that such a concept is understood by hearing 
people. 
  
In Nicolas Philbert’s 1992 film Le Pays des sourds (released in English as “In the Land 
of the Deaf”) we are given an insight into the culture of France’s deaf community. 
Before the film even begins, the introduction by the director included on the DVD 
offers us an insight into exactly why this subject might be relevant to this discussion 
when he declares that “with sign language you could say that deaf people have their 
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own…universal culture. Even if their language is different deaf people from different 
countries can understand each other very quickly, much faster than us.”149 We must be 
careful when approaching such a discussion: in discussing D/deaf150 culture as different 
to the culture of hearing people, we should not allow the language of us and them to 
result in a thinking of deaf people as “the Other”. The opening minute of the film 
presents us with a group signed performance, fast-paced synchronised signing, reading 
from sheet music. Whilst there are no subtitles and so the meaning is inaccessible to 
those who do not speak French Sign Language (FSL), one can recognise the hallmarks 
of a sung performance: there is an obvious rhythm, there is cadence, at some points 
there is even harmony. What is missing, however, is a musical accompaniment: the film 
is not silent, for the director has not removed the background noise, but the performance 
itself lacks sound151.  
 
Let us consider what this tells us about language: although there are no words involved 
in the performance there is still language, indeed FSL is as much a language as French 
or English. The signs are just as much symbolic of particular concepts as collections of 
spoken words are. It is however a very different language: although it has grammar, it 
lacks concepts of tone and inflection in the way that a hearing person would understand 
them. When JL Austin published his book on performativity he entitled it How to Do 
Things With Words. Might we suggest that, paraphrasing Wittgenstein, the limits of 
Austin’s language are the limits of his philosophy? Signed languages may allow 
utterance that is performative and yet does things not through words but through a 
movement of the hand, a facial expression, sometimes perhaps a mouthing of a word 
even if the word itself is missing. A further point of interest that arises from the film is 
this: for viewers who are unfamiliar with FSL, much of the film is incomprehensible 
due to a lack of any sort of translation. Further for the non-French speaker, subtitles 
must be relied upon for sections in which voice is used. We are thus receiving not the 
spoken message itself but rather a translation. In some sections there is signed 
monologue to the camera, and this does have subtitles, but the nature of the subtitles is 
not indicated - are we being given a direct interpretation, or is it an English translation 
 
149 Nicolas Philbert, Le Pays des sourds (Second Run DVD, 1992). 
150 A discussion of the D/deaf distinction can be found at Caroline O’Neill, ‘D or D? Who’s Deaf and 
Who’s Deaf?’, 2003 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/ouch/opinion/d_or_d_whos_deaf_and_whos_deaf.shtml>. 
151 A similar scene occurs in the opening minute of Code inconnu(2000), when we are presented with 
video of a young girl pressing fearfully against a wall in what is soon revealed to be a game of charades 
played by D/deaf children. Similarly to Le pays de sourds there is no non-diegetic sound. In a noticeable 
difference, however, subtitles are supplied and thus the language barrier is removed. 
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of original French subtitles, a translation of an interpretation? This distinction should be 
given due consideration, as translation/interpretation might be seen itself as utterance. 
 
To translate/interpret is, on one level, to mediate. To act as a transfer mechanism of 
information between two parties, ensuring that each receives the other’s message in a 
form that they understand. We might also say however that it has a strongly 
performative aspect: to interpret/translate is to give meaning: the receiving party 
experiences what would to them otherwise be meaningless gibberish, now become a 
meaningful message. Further an interpretation is not a direct translation of meaning. 
This may seem obvious if we consider it – a person born deaf will not have a language 
which is full of idiom dependant on the sensual experience that a person born hearing 
will be familiar with. The interpreter must take this into account when acting as a 
medium between the two. Further the interpreter must behave in a manner which causes 
them to become a natural part of the communication – as the medium of understanding, 
they must attempt to be, whilst not invisible, also not an obvious artificial aid added to 
the conversation which would highlight the otherness of the participants to one another. 
 
Can the interpreter’s utterances make statements beyond giving meaning to words? 
Consider the case of Thamsanqa Jantjie, the sign language interpreter at the funeral of 
Nelson Mandela in 2013, who in what he would later claim to be an attack of 
schizophrenia did not give an interpretation of the speeches made, but rather waved his 
hands around in a meaningless manner. As Slavoj Žižek observes, “Jantjie's 
performance was not meaningless – precisely because it delivered no particular meaning 
(the gestures were meaningless), it directly rendered meaning as such – the pretence of 
meaning. Those of us who hear well and do not understand sign language assumed that 
his gestures had meaning, although we were not able to understand them.”152 To Žižek 
the performance is clear: Jantjie utters that the hearing audience has little compassion or 
interest in the D/deaf audience, that rather the role of the interpreter at these occasions is 
to allow the hearing audience to believe that something is being done and so to uphold a 
pretence of compassion. Although his hand waves have no actual meaning, for the 
hearing audience they utter the words that are allegedly being interpreted. For the deaf 
audience they utter, “you are not important.”  
 
152 ‘The “fake” Mandela Memorial Interpreter Said It All’, The Guardian, 16 December 2013, section 
Opinion <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/dec/16/fake-mandela-memorial-interpreter-
schizophrenia-signing> [accessed 20 January 2017]. 
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In a sense the first of these utterances is implicit in all interpretation: when a speaker 
sees the interpreter speak to the receiver, there is an implicit message. The ritual of 
interpretation not only tells the receiver what the speaker is trying to communicate, but 
tells the speaker that the apparent gibberish passing from interpreter to receiver contains 
the meaning that they have just spoken. It should of course be noted that such a 
situation should be condemned: for the deaf person, being told they are unimportant is 
incredibly offensive, reinforcing the concept that they are unwelcome in an 
auralnormative society. Thus the dual ritual occurring is one which both insults and 
belittles the apparent audience whilst making the actual audience, that is those who do 
not require interpretation, feel that inclusivity is being achieved.   
 
§4. Demonstration 
In The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt discusses a concept she refers to as the space 
of appearance, which “comes into being whenever men are together in the manner of 
speech and action, and therefore pre-dates and precedes all formal constitution of the 
public realm”153 and which “does not survive the actuality of the movement which 
brought it into being”154. When we refer back to our earlier discussion of space we may 
well begin to see a similarity with the space which Arendt is describing: one in which “I 
appear to others as others appear to me, where men exist not merely like other living or 
inanimate things but make their appearance explicitly”155. True, Arendt’s space is 
nuanced in that it exists largely within a political context: her space of appearance is one 
which is created solely for the purpose of the bringing together of the polis as a political 
unit, but nonetheless we may see this space to be a subset of the space we have 
discussed: it is arguably site-emancipated, as its coming-into-being occurs whenever the 
correct circumstances are there, yet it precedes formal constitution. Further, Arendt 
appears to associate the space of appearance with the public realm, that is to say the 
political sphere of society as opposed to the individual’s private life, going so far as to 
specifically declare the public realm to be “the potential space of appearance between 
acting and speaking men.”156 That the activities of the men in the public sphere are 
those of acting and speaking will immediately jump to our attention.  
 
153 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd ed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 199. 
154 Arendt, p. 199. 
155 Arendt, pp. 198–99. 
156 Arendt, p. 200. 
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We shall now take Arendt’s drawing of attention to this factor to attempt to demonstrate 
the workings of the elements of performance through the example of the public realm. 
  
Our first factor is space. The space, we have said, is site-emancipated in that it does not 
have an attachment to the physical space in which it exists but rather represents in some 
way the foundations of the public realm’s constitution – the public realm itself being 
decidedly non-corporeal, we should feel comfortable saying that the space is virtual. 
This virtual, temporary space brings together various factors: the organisation together 
of the polis, as well as the land that they occupy and over which the polis implicitly 
claims ownership, and acts as a stage on which the rituals which shall follow will occur. 
Now enter the factors of action and speech, subtly different and yet acting in harmony 
to bring about the actual power of the ritual. 
  
Arendt discusses these two factors in a similar manner to our own observations: 
“through [speech and action] men distinguish themselves instead of being merely 
distinct; they are the modes in which human beings appear to each other, not indeed as 
physical objects, but qua men.”157 Actions are the doings of all the participants in the 
ritual, occurring within the space of appearance which creates the public realm through 
cementing themselves both as individuals and, crucially, through a shared identity as a 
part of the polis. Through their actions a polis is formed and created, whilst the activity 
of speech allows this to be emphasised and reinforced. If the activity says “we are the 
polis”, through speech members of the polis take an active role upon the stage that is the 
space of appearance, drawing attention to themselves both to clearly say “I should be 
acknowledged as a part, and as an individual”, but to shape the ritual which says “this is 
what the polis is, what it does, how it does or should function.”   
  
Consider as a practical example the political revolution.  In July 1776, delegates of the 
British colonies in North America gathered together in the Philadelphia colonial 
legislature building to discuss a way to prevent the furtherance of hostilities which had 
broken out between the people and the King’s army, a performance occurred which 
resulted in an incredibly significant ontic effect: the transformation of the colonies into 
an entirely new country independent of its former government. The space in which the 
Second Continental Congress operated was created by the bringing together of various 
 
157 Arendt, p. 176. 
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factors: the delegates, the official status as a seat of local government held by the 
building in which they met, the context of the meeting. We might then claim that the 
ultimate drafting of the Declaration of Independence and its signing by the delegates 
was an action whose ritual created a new identity for the participants: an identity as 
citizens of the newly formed United States of America, but also an identity as traitors to 
the government of the lands that formed their new nation.  
 
Under this model, the words exchanged in the discussions and debates leading to the 
drafting and signing of the document would serve to reinforce and emphasise these new 
identities, the reasons to create them and the strength of the belief in said identities. This 
may, however, be too simplistic. In his short talk Declarations of Independence, Derrida 
discusses the act of the signing of the declaration, focussing on the question of “who 
signs, and with what so-called proper name, the declarative act which founds an 
institution?”158 Derrida begins this analysis with an explanation of the perceived 
relationship between the text and its signatory:  
The declaration which founds an institution, a constitution or a State 
requires that a signer engage him- or herself. The signature maintains 
a link with the instituting act as an act of language and of writing, a 
link which has absolutely nothing of the empirical accident about it.159 
If this is correct, then the signing of the declaration is itself an integral part of the action 
of the declaration. This claim would seem so far obvious and uncontroversial in regards 
to the previous claim that the drafting and signing was a ritualistic action. However in 
examining the implications of his wider question Derrida draws upon more subtle 
nuances than have originally been considered. It is of course tempting to say that the 
signatories of the declaration are those persons whose names are written at the bottom – 
the literal signatories. This is not Derrida’s immediate thought, however, rather he first 
notes that Jefferson, the writer of the declaration, is not the signer (and indeed “no-one 
would take him for the true signer”160) as “he was not responsible for writing, in the 
productive or initiating sense of the term, only for drawing up, as one says of a 
secretary that he or she draws up a letter of which the spirit has been breathed into him 
 
158 Jacques Derrida, ‘Declarations of Independence’, New Political Science, 1986, 7–15 (p. 8). 
159 Derrida, p. 8. 
160 Derrida, p. 8. 
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or her, or even the content dictated.”161 The representatives may, as I have said, seem 
the obvious choice however, but Derrida disagrees, as “they sign for themselves but also 
“for” others”162 – they are representatives and sign on behalf of the people of America. 
As such “by right, the signer is thus the people, the “good” people.”163  
At this point an interesting problem is raised: Derrida notes that it is unclear whether the 
signing of independence acts to free the good people, or whether it is simply stating that 
they have already freed themselves.164 The question is thus raised as to the nature of the 
performative action – does it change an ontic status or merely recognise one?165  He 
argues however that this lack of clarity “is not a question of a difficult analysis which 
would fail in the face of the structure of the acts involved and the overdetermined 
temporality of the events. This obscurity, this undecidability between, let’s say, a 
performative structure and a constative structure, is required in order to produce the 
sought-after effect.”166  This effect is of importance, says Derrida, because “this people 
does not exist. They do not exist as an entity, it does not exist, before this declaration, 
not as such”167.  And as such “the signature invents the signer”168. The signing on behalf 
of a people who did not exist until the signing highlights then the unusual nature of the 
performative utterance: that its effectiveness comes not from some actual discernible 
and empirical source but rather from a level of common consent, with its effects being 
based upon agreement that those are the effects. Derrida introduces also a 
countersignature to the signing by “the good people” who did not exist until they 
signed: he notes that the declaration of independence appeals to the laws of nature and 
nature’s god, and to the supreme judge of the universe. Thus, “for this declaration to 
have a meaning and an effect, there must be a last instance. God is the name, the best 
one, for this instance and this ultimate signature.”169 The implication to be drawn here, I 
propose, is that such a major ritual as the creation of a State occurs by necessity within a 
context which assumes, whether overtly or implicitly, a God entity which grants the 
 
161 Derrida, pp. 8–9. 
162 Derrida, p. 9. 
163 Derrida, p. 9. 
164 A third option is of course that it merely specified an intention towards freedom – that no actual status 
change came about until its legitimacy was recognised by Britain. This however would go against the 
intention of the Declaration and so shall be disregarded. 
165 There is an echo here of the question concerning concepts of “rights” found in many constitutions, 
human rights declarations, and so on – are the documents recognising the existence of pre-existing rights, 
or are they causing them to be granted?  
166 Derrida, p. 9. 
167 Derrida, p. 10. 
168 Derrida, p. 10. 
169 Derrida, p. 12. 
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authority for the ritual to take place – indeed the a-temporality of God protects from the 
paradox of the a-temporal relation between the signer and the declaration which grants 
the signer his or her authority. Returning to the original discussion of the signing of the 
Declaration as one which created an identity, we now find ourselves admitting that it is 
more subtle: that the ritual was one which reinforced and defined identities, but that the 
actual creation was one which occurs in an a-temporal common consent. We are 
however justified in continuing on the claim that the signing of the Declaration did 
cause to come into being a new relationship between the people of America and the 
British rulers. 
 
In chapter 1 ¶6 I discussed briefly the relation between performer and audience in the 
Theatrum Mundi and its implications more generally within ritual. Let us now return to 
this subject in light of our examination of performance’s elements. Dan Rebellato in his 
essay “When We Talk of Horses” offers a useful place for exploration when he states an 
“interest…in trying to understand…what it is we do when we watch a play.”170  His 
essay is not immediately apparent as readily applicable: he asserts that his scope “is 
representational theatre, by which [is meant] the sort of event in which people and 
things on stage represent other people and things”171 and that his examples used will 
largely be plays, although his “comments may well have much wider application.”172 
This wider application will be of importance as, whilst our study is of ritual and does 
not occur generally on a stage in a theatrical sense, it is certainly representational: the 
participants and their actions may be said to represent other things in some sense if not 
in a directly theatrical manner still in that they point to larger issues of identity and so 
on. 
   
Rebellato’s interest is in “the relation between stage and fiction”173 and suggests that the 
key to this relation can be found in metaphor: “actors give performances that become 
metaphors for the characters, the stage becomes a metaphor for indeterminate imaginary 
worlds or determinate real ones.”174 Key to this concept is that the performance presents 
 
170 Dan Rebellato, ‘When We Talk of Horses: Or, What Do We See When We See a Play?’, Performance 
Research, 14.1 (2009), 17–28 (p. 18) <https://doi.org/10.1080/13528160903113155>. 
171 Rebellato, p. 18. 
172 Rebellato, p. 18. 
173 Rebellato, p. 24. 
174 Rebellato, p. 27. 
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to the audience a representation of ideas, or of concepts, which are distinct from the 
things which act as the representation. Noë touches on this when he remarks on the 
Eucharist: “does the wine symbolise blood? Or is it blood? Are you believers? Or are 
you actors? There is always leakage between these different stances.”175 With Rebellato 
we may ask whether to say “the wine is blood” is best understood as a literal statement 
or in some metaphoric manner? Likewise can referring to the believers as actors also be 
a metaphor?  
 
Conclusion 
In the preceding paragraphs we explored the way space, action, and speech come 
together to allow rituals to be performed. Space was seen to be both separated from 
physical place, in the same manner as the stage traditionally emancipates itself from the 
ground upon which it was built, and paradoxically also linked to the site which it 
transforms from physical to virtual. We have seen that space is intertwined with 
presence, bringing together both active and passive participants alongside the physical 
grounds which they inhabit. Crucially it was seen that space, rather than being 
composed of these things per se, is defined by the context in which they come together 
and interact. In doing so it acts as the “stage” of the ritual, a display upon which the 
action and speech occur.  
 
Action meanwhile was seen to relate specifically to the participants in the performance, 
be they active or passive. Dependent upon the mood of the performer and the context in 
which the action is formed these actions may be one of several categories: questioning, 
defining, rejecting, or reinforcing. This can be seen to strongly relate back to our 
discussion in the previous chapter of different types of ritual and can be seen as the 
main active force of the rituals. Finally, speech was seen as the domain of only the 
active participants. It acts to cement the context of the actions performed by these 
participants, and whilst separated from language still is seen to have overlap. Like 
action, speech was seen to have the potential for subversion through the imposing of a 
playful or unplayful mood.  
 
The thread of presence runs through all three elements: space we may say is made to 
comprise the physical objects of the ritual, and to set a context in which presence exists. 
 
175 Noë, p. 6. 
83 
Action meanwhile is the manner in which the participants cause presence to radiate 
from themselves, thus helping to create and preserve the ritual space. Finally, we may 
say that it is through speech that the active participants are able to focus the presence 
specifically upon themselves. In our fourth section was saw how these elements may be 
seen to come together in the context of the bringing together of the polis in a newly 
defined public space. It is this element of presence which gives the actions discussed 
(the discussion of options, the drafting of the founding document, its signing by the 
congress) their power as ritual, causing them to change from being merely a set of 
actions which a set of people carried out, to rather a living and breathing event, a 
performance, a ritual which created a new identity.  
 
In the previous chapter we discussed the concept of the theatrum mundi, which I have 
already determined to be the “space” of the performance which this thesis focuses upon. 
Such a declaration may now require re-visiting in light of the analysis of performance’s 
elements. If the theatrum mundi is the space of performance, then it would seem to be 
synonymous with the public space, but the reality is less simple. The space that we have 
discussed is one which is given its legitimacy through the combination of space, action, 
utterance, and presence. Further it would seem that in this analysis a space is intrinsic to 
the performance that is ongoing. The theatrum mundi, however, was previously said to 
be a metaphor which “describe[s] the human condition of existing and acting in the 
world”. The theatrum mundi is more than simply the space of the performance, but 
rather it is an all-encompassing environment which encompasses all possible spaces. It 
is the theatrum mundi acting as co-opticon which allows for the transformation of any 
given place into performative space. 
 
As we now reach the end of the first division of this thesis, the tone shifts from one of 
analysis to one of application. Having explained what is meant by performance, what 
that performance consists of in its theoretical state, and the individual elements which 
contribute to it, we will next ask the question of what these performances look like in 
the world, by concentrating on several notable examples.  
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Chapter Three: Re-enactment: Culture, Politics, Academia 
 
In the previous chapters I discussed key concepts of performance, ritual, and 
performativity. In this chapter, I will examine the concept of “re-enactment”. The first 
step in this will be an examination of the role played by myth and ritual in public life 
and identity. This will be carried out initially by examining specific examples of such 
rituals. In §1 I will explore exactly what is meant by re-enactment, its link to and 
purpose within the performances which previous chapters have established as our focus 
and so on (¶1). I will then examine this model as it is seen in one of the most literal 
forms (¶2): the practice of historical-re-enactment, in which participants attempt to 
replicate historical practices or events for both educational and entertainment uses. This 
re-enactment will be seen to involve an element of what we might call “practiced 
myth”, or re-clamation of a fictional history. In focussing in on the practices in 
particular of American Civil War Re-Enactment we shall see the ways in which this 
reclamation can be highly politically charged, an issue which will be further seen 
through an examining of broader related performances(¶3).  
 
Recognising the role of politics in re-enactment, §2 will show a second angle, which is 
the role of re-enactment in politics. I will examine the role of the political debate, 
focussing on the American Presidential debate which I propose in its modern form can 
be viewed as quadrennial re-enactment of an original debate held between Kennedy and 
Nixon (¶4 and ¶5), before examining specifically the fascinating rituals that occurred in 
the most recent US election, of 2016, one, which in the eyes of many, led to an 
unprecedented and unexpected result, and yet within which we can see the continuation 
of many of the basic principles under discussion (¶6). Finally my focus in §3 will be 
turned inward to academia. It will be shown that threads found in the previous two 
sections extend also to this area, and further that elements which are evident in 
academia may also cast their shadow back. In taking these three together we shall see an 
establishment of re-enactment as being one of the primary and major expressions of 
performance within the theatrum mundi.  
It would seem to be a relatively uncontroversial claim that every people group has its 
myths – most often they will be thought of in terms of religious folklore and stories: 
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origin myths detailing the creation of the world, for instance176. Indeed a supernatural 
element may well be considered an essential portion of myth even in those stories which 
appear to predominantly cover the acts of humans – consider the epic Greek myths 
attributed to Homer in which an active role is played by the gods in events which may 
have in fact happened in some manner177. It is undoubtedly still uncontroversial to 
describe these myths as having value of some form in the creation of an identity for that 
people group: for a quintessential example we need simply look at the tale of Moses and 
the Exodus of the Israelites from Egypt, and its centralised importance within the 
modern Jewish calendar, likewise the stories of Esther, Judas Maccabeus, and others. 
Following on from the given examples it is trivial to observe that rituals are often used 
to assist in the continuance of these myths and their place in reinforcing identity: the 
performed myth so to speak.  
 
There is another meaning of myth, however, perhaps with less overtly religious 
significance, which we use to refer to a particular popular cultural representation of an 
individual or event which may be said to “whitewash” the manner in which they or it is 
perceived – we may talk of “the myth of Churchill” as a great leader and statesman, 
ignoring the flaws and troubles in his political career, or the “myth of the great war”, in 
which the events of 1914-1918 are presented in a particularly over-glorified and 
patriotic light. Over the course of this chapter I will examine the manner in which these 
two concepts of myth are closely intertwined, the (mis)representation of a situation or 
person and the performed “rituals” which allow the narrative of the myth to shape 
identities.  I shall begin with what may seem a clear cut example: the re-enactment of 
history performed by amateur historians, concentrating primarily on the United States 
Civil War. This “historical re-enactment” will be seen to be a more overt example of 
everyday rituals, which following Girard’s thesis that rituals re-enacting an original 
event, may be claimed to be themselves re-enactments of a sort. From there I shall 
discuss the re-enactment found in the American political campaign process in the age of 
the mass media, and then the role of re-enactment within academia.  
 
 
176 We should perhaps at this point be careful to note that our usage of the word “myth” is not intended to 
suggest a judgment on the factual basis of any such stories: there are still those who would consider such 
tales to have their basis in fact, whether partially or in their entirety, and no disrespect to those beliefs is 
intended. 
177 As no authoritative source exists to confirm the truth or falsehood of, for example, the Trojan war, it 
may well be of value to consider such texts within a context of “historic fiction”, allowing for at least a 
basis in truth. 
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The question may be asked at this point, why choose these specific examples? On an 
initial glance it may seem that historical re-enactment, presidential election 
campaigning, and the so-called academic ‘Ivory Tower’ have little in common with 
which to create a connecting narrative. Is this the case however? Consider for instance 
that both the historical re-enactments on which this chapter largely focuses (those 
relating to the American Civil War) and many areas of academia are overtly political: 
the former explores the relation between American citizens and historical figures who 
attempted to abandon that same citizenship, whilst academia could be said to be at its 
heart political both in the obvious sense of competing theories and ideas, relations 
between the education and government sectors and so on, and in the sense of an 
ongoing dialogue. Indeed the latter concept, of dialogue, may be that which links all 
these things.  As such we see in this analysis a definite progression: we begin with that 
which is political but which is also re-enactment at its most literal, move through the 
most literal politics which is also re-enactment, and finally reach academia which is 
both re-enactment and politics in their less overt forms and which will act as the final 
set-up for chapter IV, in which we shall apply the theoretical framework thus far 
developed to one final and very specific area within academia: philosophy. 
 
As political issues go there is one which risks overshadowing the analysis to follow. 
The American Civil War was an event intrinsically linked to the institution of slavery, a 
practice which is rightly looked on with distaste in the modern day. There may be a 
tendency to think that in re-enacting the activities of those involved in the actions of the 
Confederacy there is an extent of “honouring” or “endorsing” the historic slaveholders, 
and as shall be seen the activities of some of the more loyal descendants of the 
Confederates veer directly into the territory of apologetics and outright 
misrepresentation into a more positive light of the more horrific atrocities of the time. 
So that despite these activities being overtly political, and indeed because they are 
political in rather a distasteful manner, it is important that this analysis attempts, as far 
as is reasonable, to be an apolitical and non-judgmental one in order to avoid obscuring 
the points that are of greatest interest to this analysis.  
 
As shall be seen the culture around the Civil War results in various re-enactments and 
rituals which allow for the creation of a cultural identity based around a mythologised 
view of the past. As such what is most interesting is not the nature or detail of either 
that past or its relation to the real past on which it is based, but rather the manner in 
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which these myths and rituals form, and most crucially the manner in which they act to 
reinforce a sense of identity, as discussed in chapter I. Indeed, one crucial point which 
should draw us towards these things is that mythologizing of a past. This is especially 
the case insofar as this past is one which, compared to many founding myths, is a 
relatively recent one and further is heavily documented to an extent that we can view 
the myths precisely alongside their origin in a way we cannot for, say, the Trojan War. 
 
§1 Re-enactment 
As discussed briefly in chapter I, René Girard claims that ritual is re-enacted violence. 
More specifically he claims that, “the objective of ritual is the proper re-enactment of 
surrogate-victim mechanism; its function is to perpetrate or renew the effects of this 
mechanism; that is, to keep violence outside the community.”178 In other words the 
ritual in Girard’s view is one which keeps the community safe from the taint of violence 
through the transference of the entire community’s violent urges or need for vengeance 
onto the scapegoat. This may certainly be true of certain forms of rituals; the ritual at 
Kurumugl discussed by Schechner for instance, acting as it does to divert the need for 
war between two tribes with the violence that occurs being, aside from the slaughter of 
animals, enacted in an entirely metaphorical sense. Likewise, the Christian ritual of the 
Eucharist has long been associated in a very overt sense with the idea of Christ taking 
the role of scapegoat (a concept which itself can be found in a ritual prescribed in the 
Hebrew Scriptures). On the other hand, our definition of ritual, as discussed in detail in 
the first chapter, is a much broader one than that favoured by Girard, who wishes to link 
the concept very specifically to that of sacrificial ritual. The challenge to follow then is 
this: through an examination of the rituals of historic re-enactment, it must be 
demonstrated that re-enacting can be found in a similar manner throughout our new, 
wider definition of ritual and that as such re-enacting is found throughout other 
examples of ritual relevant to this study.   
¶1. Historical Re-enactment 
For the purposes of this chapter I shall define historical re-enactment as being, in its 
most basic terms, a staged performance recreating either an established historical event 
or a fictionalised version of life during a specific historical period, often but not always 
involving scenes of conflict. These re-enactments can generally be said to carry the 
hallmarks of a theatrical performance, albeit an improvised one - they involve actors 
 
178 Girard, p. 92. 
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performing the roles of fictional or fictionalised historical characters, communicating 
lines and ideas, engaging in performed actions (either improvised or choreographed) 
and they may be said to occur upon a "stage" - there will tend to be a marked-off area in 
which the re-enactment will occur, in some cases representing a general "historical 
space" so to speak, whereas in others the ground may be that of an actual historical 
battle, resulting in a form of site-specific performance (consider the mock-battles held at 
the anniversary celebrations for Bannockburn in 2014, or the annual festival 
commemorating the Battle of Tewksbury179.) 
¶2. The American Civil War 
The re-enactment of the American Civil War may be one of the most interesting 
examples to be found, in part because, as Cullen notes, it can be traced back to a time 
very close to the original source, and indeed the first reenactors were veterans of the 
actual events: 
The first reenactments were staged by Civil War veterans, especially 
those who were members of the Grand Army of the Republic, a fraternal 
organisation that attained considerable clout in the closing decades of 
the nineteenth century. Individual GAR chapters ("posts") would hold 
"encampments" where members would wear old uniforms, sleep in 
tents, and recreate the trappings of their soldier days. In 1878, 1881, 
and 1883, a New Jersey encampment of Union veterans engaged in 
sham battles with the state's National Guard unit. Such activities 
became increasingly frequent as the GAR grew in size and commanded 
more attention in government, community life, and the press.180 
These re-enactments were particularly interesting as they united together veterans who 
had been fighting on both sides of the war, with many Confederate veterans who 
“would appear at such events and would be treated with growing respect as the century 
wore on.”181 The reason for this can perhaps be attributed, as Cullen suggests, to a need 
for a sense of community transcending that in which the veterans found themselves 
living – “if the enemy had mistaken principles, he understood a soldier’s situation far 
more easily than women, children, or mere civilians could.”182 Can we argue then that 
 
179 See http://www.tewkesburymedievalfestival.org/ (accessed 18/09/2015) 
180 Jim Cullen, The Civil War in Popular Culture: A Reusable Past (Washington: Smithsonian Institution 
Press, 1995), p. 182. 
181 Cullen, p. 182. 
182 Cullen, p. 182. 
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the veterans identified to some extent through their experiences as soldiers first and 
foremost? The re-enactment of camp life becomes a ritual by which that identity is 
reinforced even in a time of peace, when the soldier is not needed to carry out his 
practice of soldiering. 
 
In its current day form Civil War re-enactment is still to some extent based on those 
original veteran gatherings. Some even attempt to take the performance to the highest 
possible point of historical fidelity, such as the "hardcores" discussed by Tony Horwitz: 
Hardcores didn't just dress up and shoot blanks. They sought absolute 
fidelity to the 1860's: its homespun clothing, antique speech patterns, 
sparse diet and simple utensils... In the field [they] ate only food that 
Civil War soldiers consumed, such as hardtack and salt pork. And they 
limited their speech to mid-nineteenth century dialect and topics."183 
Although representative of the most extreme end of the re-enactment community, the 
"hardcores" present a continuation of the "powerful impulse for meticulously re-
creating the particulars of camp life"184 highlighted by Cullen. This behaviour, whilst 
highlighting a noble goal (that of absolute period authenticity in presentation) can be 
said to fall foul of a problem which Peter Brook observes to exist within more 
traditional theatre: 
Inevitably, someone calls for tragedy to be played once again 'the way 
it is written'. This is fair enough, but unfortunately all the printed word 
can tell us is what was written on paper, not how it was once brought 
to life. There are no records, no tapes - only experts, but not one of 
them, of course, has firsthand knowledge. The real antiques have all 
gone - only some imitations have survived, in the shape of traditional 
actors, who continue to play in a traditional way, drawing their 
inspiration not from real sources, but from imaginary ones, such as the 
memory of the sound an older actor once made - a sound that in turn 
was a memory of a predecessor's way.185 
 
 
183 Tony Horwitz, Confederates in the Attic (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), p. 7. 
184 Cullen, p. 182. 
185 Brook, p. 14. 
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This may for example be seen in the apparent paradox of the hardcore attempt to 
achieve complete historical fidelity: even in limiting themselves to exactly the same 
clothing, speech, and behaviours of the people of the time, if it were possible to exactly 
match those things, still the re-enactment would not be a truly accurate representation: 
for one thing, the reenactor has the advantage of hindsight, knowing the outcome of the 
historical battles and their significance to the later development of society in a way that 
the people of the time could not. 
 
Due to the Civil War being closer in time to our present day than the medieval or 
renaissance periods, some of Brook’s criticisms may not necessarily be directly 
applicable in the same way as they would be to reenactors of earlier times (for instance 
we do in fact have the availability of audio and visual recordings of war veterans186), 
still it is the case that by this stage the original reenactors are gone. The recordings and 
images which exist were all created long after the events being recreated. The reenactor 
who today strives to meet a sense of historical authenticity does so based not on any 
first-hand knowledge of how these things should be done but rather on a tradition 
handed down in a line back to people who, despite their own first-hand knowledge, 
chose to  recreate "a highly sentimentalized view of the war."187 Indeed the early re-
enactments partaken in by those veterans served an important purpose to them which 
has since by necessity been lost: they served to "affirm a sense of community all too 
lacking in more conventional social arrangements"188, a community specific to the 
soldiers who fought in that particular conflict.  
What role then has stepped in to replace it? Cullen offers a theory which he admits he 
writes "with some unease"189, and indeed the implications are controversial and need to 
be treated with some delicacy. He begins by noting the "gap between some professional 
historians, who have emphasised the importance of African American issues since the 
1960's, and the amateurs, who are generally willing to note (but not emphasize) the 
importance of the slavery issue in particular and the role of African Americans in 
general."190 He observes that "no person interviewed...would agree that slavery was 
 
186 See for instance the footage to be found of various soldiers as recently as the late 1930's that can be 
found in a youtube search - https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=civil+war+veteran (accessed 
18/9/2014), including demonstrations of the "rebel yell" battle cry used by the Confederate soldiers. 
187 Cullen, p. 182. 
188 Cullen, p. 182. 
189 Cullen, p. 199. 
190 Cullen, p. 197. 
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central to the conflict, and nobody seemed all that interested - or comfortable - talking 
about it"191 and that "explanations...common from the beginning"192 regarding an 
emphasis on the cause of the war being politics rather than slavery was generally put 
forth.  
 
This of course is a troublesome dichotomy on two levels, firstly that the issue of slavery 
was an inherently political one (it was political moves around the institution of slavery 
which was central to the troubles leading up to the Civil War), and secondly that we 
might claim that both slavery and politics, in the sense presumably intended by those 
interviewed, were central. Despite this, the insistence by the interviewees on separating 
the two is interesting in terms of how they chose to understand the events which formed 
an important cultural myth.   Cullen suggests that this “gap” may be in part a result of a 
rift between the academy and the reenactors - that "although hardly a perfectly 
integrated institution in any sense of that term, the ivory tower193 is much more varied 
in terms of race, class, gender, ethnicity, and politics than it ever was before"194 . Whilst 
the overwhelming tendency is for Civil War reenactors to be white. He offers the 
observation that the popularity of the Civil War in popular culture has generally been at 
its peak in times of "social or political stress that has shaken the confidence of the 
creators - and... the audiences - that the United States can offer the comfort and 
satisfaction stated or implied in its creation."195  
 
As a result, "the Civil War has become a banner around which millions can rally, a 
point of reference that can shore up a center that fears it may not hold."196 The sense of 
community found by the veterans then has become a different form of community 
sense: a community sense in finding support in the face of a political or social stress 
threatening the perception of what America stands for. Cullen's explanation as to what 
that stress may be might be both unsettling and fascinating in its implications: 
 
191 Cullen, p. 197. 
192 Cullen, p. 197. 
193 Cullen’s use of the term “ivory tower” here is an interesting one, implying as it does a level of disdain 
towards the academic practice of history whilst used within a context that seems very critical in its 
implications against the amateur view of history held by the re-enactors. Coming from an academic at a 
very well respected institution (Harvard University) such a bias may seem especially strange, and the 
implications are not entirely clear. 
194 Cullen, p. 197. 
195 Cullen, p. 199. 
196 Cullen, p. 199. 
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What is the source of unease in the case of reenactors? I believe that it 
is the fear that in this increasingly diverse society, events such as the 
Civil War (which so many European Americans hold near and dear to 
their hearts, and in which they have such personal, familial, or 
assimilationist interests) may become less relevant. In this light, 
reenacting becomes a ritual... by which a majoritarian United States 
reassures itself that it, too, has a past, and that that past is as dramatic, 
interesting, and important as the alternative, multicultural pasts that 
are increasingly competing with it.197  
A ritual created to reinforce a shared identity is a simple enough concept, but there is 
the danger to see this ritual as what Cullen calls "a veiled form of racism"198 when we 
try to place that identity as being one specifically of whiteness - how much more so 
when placed in the language of a "majoritarian United States"? The fact that the ritual is 
one specifically linked to the Civil War and the Confederacy, a conflict which within 
popular culture is strongly associated directly with the issue of the morality of slavery, 
only increases the thorniness of the issue: an uncomfortable parallel may be drawn 
between the idea of multicultural history being seen as pushing aside the established 
majoritarian white history, and the cries of “Northern aggression” used by the 
Confederate states to describe what was seen as the enforcing by the Union states of an 
elevation of the rights and innate dignity and humanity of their black slaves.  
 
In the continuing of this analysis then we must strongly emphasise that whilst an 
awareness of the underlying unfortunate implications exist there is no intent of 
judgment. Rather the concept of the Civil War re-enactment as a ritual intended to 
reinforce a narrative central to an identity will be examined in plain terms, whilst 
attempting to divorce it where possible from the contentious political issues involved. 
Further, let us consider a remark by Cullen that, in relation to historical fictions 
(including but not limited to re-enactments) regarding the civil war, “In an interesting 
way, such historical fictions resemble science fiction, where verisimilitude and fantasy 
also coexist to serve what might be considered a deeply human, anthropologised need 
for myth.”199  
 
 
197 Cullen, p. 199. 
198 Cullen, p. 199. 
199 Cullen, p. 196. 
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As has previously been mentioned, it can be said uncontroversially that every culture 
has its myths, and its rituals, allowing for the creation of identity. For the people of the 
American South, this identity can be seen as heavily wrapped up in the myth of the 
Confederacy – Horwitz records his visit to a meeting of the Children of the 
Confederacy, a group “designed to prep youngsters for Confederate citizenship in rather 
the same way that Future Farmers of America readied teenagers for agricultural life.”200  
 
At the meeting the children recited a pledge to “preserve pure ideals; to study and teach 
the truths of history (one of the most important of which is, that the War Between the 
States was not a REBELLION nor was its underlying cause to sustain slavery); and 
always to act in a manner that will reflect honour upon our noble and patriotic 
ancestors.”201 They then proceeded to recite a “catechism” designed to reflect a 
particular narrative of the South before and during the creation of the Confederacy (e.g. 
the claim that the slaves “were faithful and devoted and were always ready and willing 
to serve [their masters]”202) as well as “hew[ing] to traditional notions about Southern 
valor.”203 Horwitz’s reflection on the catechism is interesting, as he observes that he 
“began to hear echoes of defeated people’s I’d encountered overseas: Kurds, 
Armenians, Palestinians, Catholics in Northern Ireland. Like them, Southerners had 
kept fighting their war by other means.” The implications are fascinating – by creating a 
mythologised version of the confederacy which downplays the less savoury aspects and 
emphasises “pure ideals”, “honour”, “nobility”, “patriotism”, those promoting the myths 
allow a cultural identity steeped in a history that never was, to act as a guidepost to their 
approach to life.  Perhaps we might say that, for the Southerner, re-enactment is one of 
the more visible rituals of this myth, the recreation of an idealised civil war helping to 
“make real” the collection of historical facts and details existing otherwise simply as 
theory.204 
  
 
200 Horwitz, p. 36. 
201 Horwitz, p. 37. 
202 Horwitz, p. 37. 
203 Horwitz, p. 37. 
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Rebecca Schneider offers an analysis of civil war re-enactment which is both similar 
and in key points departs from that of Cullen and Horwitz. Schneider notes that “the 
battle of much re-enactment, in art and in war, is a battle concerning the future of the 
past”205, a sentiment seeming to echo Cullen’s observation of the fear amongst 
European Americans of their past losing its cultural relevance. Although whereas 
Cullen sees the political and racial issues around the civil war as being something which 
reenactors seemed uncomfortable with and keen to dismiss, Schneider notes that 
“Historian David Blight…sees the war as ongoing in that it is continuing to be fought 
through commemoration”206 with a specific focus on “the 1913 Gettysburg reunion as a 
battleground on which the fight for racial justice took a beating”207 – a reunion of white 
veterans “presided over by President Woodrow Wilson, a Southerner who had just fired 
a large number of black federal employees, imposed rigid policies of segregation on 
those that remained, and who would, in three years time, allow the showing of the racist 
film Birth of a Nation at the White house.”208 Such that “segregation was enacted as a 
policy in tandem with, if not by means of re-enactment”209.  
 
It is worth noting that in this discussion Schneider observes that “interestingly, Civil 
War reenactors often cite this reunion as the first re-enactment – when veterans 
approached each other from the positions they had occupied during the “real” battle, 
this time marching across the field to shake hands”210. This reading of the roots of Civil 
War re-enactment conflicts with Cullen’s characterisation of the practice having begun 
some three or more decades before, however if its citation is indeed widespread then it 
may be seen to represent a form of unifying creation myth within the re-enactment 
community, and thus the problematic aspects of the anniversary raised by Blight may 
indeed be well tied into the myth being ritualised. This discrepancy in narratives raises 
an important point which shall be returned to shortly.  
 
Schneider puts focus on the claim by one reenactor, Chuck Woodhead, that “the civil 
war isn’t over, and that’s why we fight.”211 She notes that 
 
205 Rebecca Schneider, Performing Remains: Art and War in Times of Theatrical Reenactment 
(Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 4. 
206 Schneider, p. 11. 
207 Schneider, p. 11. 
208 Schneider, p. 11. 
209 Schneider, p. 11. 
210 Schneider, p. 11. 
211 Schneider, p. 32. 
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Woodhead’s answer to “Why fight?” might at first seem to challenge 
the pastness of the past, if being “over” is one of the ways a secular, 
linear, or progress-oriented Enlightenment model of time disciplines 
our orientation to events that appear to precede the present. And yet, 
the quote might also suggest that it is the very pastness of the past that 
is never complete, never completely finished, but incomplete: cast into 
the future as a matter for ritual negotiation and as yet undecided 
interpretive acts of reworking. In this way, events are given to be past, 
or to become past, by virtue of both their ongoingness and their 
partialness, their incompleteness in the present.212 
  
This formulation, that the claim that the Civil War isn’t over implies not that the events 
of the past lack a “pastness” (or at least that the Civil War, as an ongoing war, cannot be 
described as a whole as having a pastness), but rather that “pastness” itself is an 
ongoing thing to be continually reworked and interpreted, would seem to strike at the 
heart of what is re-enactment within ritual. It is the nature of ritual that it allows the 
“ongoingness” of “pastness”, with each re-enactment being its own attempt at a 
hermeneutic reading, creating a statement or question regarding the event being re-
enacted. The suggestion that “events are given to be past…by virtue of both their 
ongoingness and their…incompleteness in the present” speaks to the importance of 
previous events and their interpretations to present an identity formed through repeated 
reference to, reiteration and reinterpretation of,  those events. Further, there is a 
phenomenological implication found as regards our relation to time: the past is not 
simply “that which happened”, but rather something with which we have an ongoing 
relationship, being constantly reiterated or reinterpreted as time goes on. Consequently 
through its ritualized re-enactment, the past becomes not events that statically happened 
but rather a changing narrative of those events and their relevance to the present: the 
civil war is not over, because its meaning is not finalised. Compare Horwitz’s 
discussion of the Civil War’s conflict being “continued by other means”, via a myth 
which downplays the unsavoury elements of the confederacy whilst highlighting certain 
traditional ideals – for Horwitz’s southerners, the Civil War is not over, and the fight 
occurs not through armed combat but through the rewriting of the historical narrative. 
    
I will now return to the question of the roots of re-enactment: as previously noted, 
Cullen suggests that Civil War re-enactments began with the gatherings of veterans 
immediately following the end of the war, whilst Schneider cites a popular view that the 
 
212 Schneider, p. 46. 
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“first re-enactment” occurred at an organized anniversary event in 1913. It may be 
suggested that there is a trap to be found here: the tendency of an academic analysis to 
focus on a particular narrative which will best fit the argument made, thus Cullen may 
not only suggest that re-enactment downplays issues of racism and slavery but may 
likely include Schneider’s commentary amongst the “professional historians” whom he 
places at odds with the “amateurs” engaging in re-enactment with an emphasis on wider 
political ideology. Likewise Schneider’s emphasis of re-enactment, as rooted in an 
event with overtly racist implications, results in a loss of the capacity to so easily 
separate re-enactors and their narratives from historical white supremacy. To observe 
this is not to say that either author is correct or wrong, or to accuse either of an active 
twisting of the narrative to better suit a predetermined theory. Rather, the point may be 
widened: that in those cases wherein the individual re-enactor actively associates a 
particular lineage and genealogy to his or her re-enactment, they are actively affecting 
the narrative behind the ritual and consequently the message that they are creating 
through its performance.  
 
¶3.Ritualised Mythology outside the Civil War 
Can the same observations be made from other forms of re-enactment? Ryan Hatch 
argues that in the United States medieval reenactors “seek to create an accurate, albeit 
artificial memory of a particular field of Pre-Modern history usually considered 
romance or even prehistory in the United States,”213 observing that the artificial nature 
of the memory in question is exacerbated as “the lack of medieval sites of 
consciousness or memory in the United States proves extremely problematic for any 
seeking to recreate European history before 1650. Without such a connection, a 
detached sense of romantic nostalgia colors the American perception of the Middle 
Ages.”214 In such a case the fictitious past being explored is a different one to the civil 
war, as it is a “pre-history” – the history not of the United States, the country to which 
the participants belong, but rather of Europe, the country of their distant ancestors. We 
might say then that such rituals exist as part of an unusual ancestral myth: lacking a 
deep and rich history of their own country, the individuals involved create a country for 
 
213 Ryan R. Hatch, ‘American Medievalism: Medieval Reenactment as Historical Interpretation in the 
United States’ (unpublished Master’s Thesis, ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY, 2015), p. 15 
<http://repository.asu.edu/attachments/158051/content/Hatch_asu_0010N_15263.pdf>. 
214 Hatch, p. 37. 
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their hypothetical ancestors to have inhabited, romanticised to allow an idealised past 
that will feed into the modern identity.  
 
What, however, of the European re-enactors? Certainly they partake in a performance 
based upon their own past, and yet unlike the Civil War there is no unbroken link to the 
original battles – indeed modern re-enactment can be traced largely to 19th century 
activities (although it is interesting to note that in the 17th century, English Civil War 
battles were being re-enacted even as the war was still ongoing.215) It might seem to be 
argued that this re-enactment serves a similar goal to that of the re-enactment taking 
place across the Atlantic: a performance of a romanticised mythological past from 
which the participants are largely divorced, allowing a reinforcing of a shared group 
identity by playing out its associated ideals in order to show them as being a strong part 
of its past, of which it can be proud and place on public display. 
 
I will turn now to another, much darker, form of re-enactment found in American 
culture in the late 19th and early 20th centuries: the lynching. Koritha Mitchell notes that 
“the nation accepted lynching as a valid scenario of exorcism”216, a term which in this 
context refers to what we have previously established to be a ritual. Mitchell notes that 
“racial violence was often interpreted as a legitimate scenario of exorcism because it 
contained what citizens had seen before: supposedly righteous white men casting out 
the evil forces that might threaten their wives and children.”217 The lynchings became 
“theatrical”, and followed “a familiar ceremony. A sort of script developed, which 
included obligatory accusation and forced confession, followed by mutilation and 
souvenir hunting”218, and in doing so helped to push an identity of white supremacy:  
Because black men were said to be natural rapists who targeted white 
women, lynching was hailed as a wave of avenging alleged rapes and 
preventing future ones… According to this reasoning, mobs performed 
an unpleasant but necessary exorcism. If blacks were immoral, they 
must be rooted out for the safety of white women, white families, and 
 
215 See Howard Giles, ‘A Brief History of Re-Enactment’ <http://www.eventplan.co.uk/page29.html> 
[accessed 28 October 2015]. 
216 Koritha Mitchell, Living with Lynching: African American Lynching Plays, Performance, and 
Citizenship, 1890-1930, The New Black Studies Series (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2011), p. 24. 
217 Mitchell, p. 24. 
218 Mitchell, p. 24. 
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the nation. As this rhetoric circulated through actions as well as words, 
it helped to restore a sense of superiority for whites whose self-
conceptions had been destabilized by the emancipation of slaves…if 
dark skin no longer automatically kept individuals from participating 
in society, blacks’ inferiority to whites needed to be marked more 
deliberately.219 
The rituals of the lynching may be called a re-enactment in part because of its theatrical 
nature: “spectators knew that they would see familiar characters…and that these 
characters would perform a predictable script of forced confession and mutilation”220, 
but there is also a second related re-enactment, which is more directly theatrical:  
During the same decades… African Americans wrote plays about mob 
violence that tell stories strikingly different from those suggested by 
lynching photography… while the mob’s efforts centred on black death, 
African American dramatists helped their communities to live, even 
while lynching remained a reality that would not magically disappear. 
In the process, these playwrights created the unique genre of lynching 
drama.221 
These “lynching dramas” might be described as re-enactments of the lynching a step 
removed from the original act of physical violence (although still directly steeped in the 
larger ongoing incidents of violence inextricably linked to that physical event). Indeed, 
“dramatists who lived and wrote in the midst of lynching often refused to feature 
physical violence; their scripts spotlight instead the black home and the impact that the 
mob’s outdoor activities have on the family.”222 Such a performance would, crucially, 
draw attention to the reality of the victim as victim, rather than the criminal portrayed in 
the lynching performance. The plays would often be single-act performances which 
would be performed in private venues, the scripts often published in magazines. 
Mitchell argues that “the content of the scripts provided a training manual for black 
communities, encouraging African Americans to rehearse an understanding of lynching 
that allowed them to mourn because it helped them to maintain a sense of themselves as 
upstanding citizens unjustly under siege.”223 We see then that the genre of the lynching 
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drama, whilst an actual theatrical production in contrast to the other case studies in this 
chapter, is notable as a ritual which would promote a sense of identity as citizens under 
siege by oppressors amongst African Americans, and that it is perhaps of interest that 
this was what may be deemed a counter-ritual: a re-enactment occurring in response to 
the ritual of the lynching, itself intended to reinforce a sense of identity amongst white 
Americans.  
 
There is perhaps a further interest in that these rituals themselves seem in part to have 
arisen from a sense of a lost identity resulting from political changes in the wider 
culture of the nation. Indeed these causes might be seen as similar to the suggested 
uncertainties to which Cullen suggests the seemingly more harmless (or at least less 
actively malicious) civil war re-enactors are reacting. 
 
§2. Political Re-Enactment 
Having examined the role that rituals play in the formation of identity within particular 
(sub)cultures, through overtly performed re-enactments,  in a manner which is in itself 
often infused with politics and political identity, I shall now examine such rituals as 
they appear in the distinctly political sphere. More specifically, I shall examine the 
American political process around the campaigning and elections for the office of 
President, as it has emerged within the television age through to the controversial events 
of the 2016 election of Donald Trump. Within this analysis we shall see that the 
Presidential campaigns have a tendency themselves towards re-enactment, ritual, and a 
heavy emphasis on performance. 
¶4. Kennedy vs Nixon 
President John F Kennedy is generally considered to have been the starting point for the 
central role of television in the American political process. The most notable event in 
this development was the series of televised “debates” between Kennedy and Richard 
Nixon broadcast in September and October 1960, to an estimated audience of between 
85 and 120 million.224 After Kennedy defeated Nixon in the election, the question was 
immediately raised as to the role the debates had played in the result. The answer to this 
question is not one which can be immediately answered, with a general consensus 
offered, for instance, by Lang & Lang: 
 
224 Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang, Politics and Television (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968), p. 
213. 
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The evidence from [various studies] shows that the first debate 
accelerated the movement toward Kennedy and strengthened pro-
Democratic commitments. Nevertheless, once cannot definitively 
conclude that these changes would not have occurred in any event, with 
or without the debates. Kennedy had already been making headway 
among voters, and it is possible that these votes would have crystalised 
as they did simply as a function of time. One thing is clear, however: 
the debates provided new arguments for supporting Kennedy and, 
therefore, strengthened convictions. The public, in particular, thought 
the debates the most important element that led to Kennedy’s victory. 
Perhaps the same amount of enthusiastic support for his campaign 
would not have been forthcoming without this dramatic confrontation 
between the two candidates. No one will ever be able to tell. 225 
 
An emphasis should be firmly placed here on the view of the public: whilst it is true that 
we will never be able to tell for certain if they were correct to place such high 
importance on the role of the debates, it is not up for debate that such importance was 
indeed placed. An understanding of why this might be the case might be found in part 
through an analysis of the debate as performance. Consider the following frame taken 
from the first debate, in which Nixon was decidedly less prepared for a television 
broadcast than in the subsequent meetings: 
 
225 Lang and Lang, p. 225. 
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Figure 1 Kennedy and Nixon during televised debate, available online at: 
https://www.cla.purdue.edu/history/course/debate/kennedynixon/publichistory.html (accessed September 
5 2018) 
Within this image we see what may be one of the essential factors within the 
performance of the debate: body language. Compare Kennedy, his demeanour confident 
and calm, with sweaty Nixon insecurely covering his mouth with his handkerchief, his 
shifty scowl projecting a level of distrust and insecurity toward his opponent.  In this 
performance the space is the television studio, or perhaps rather it is the area being 
broadcast at a particular time by the camera: the point of audience concentration. The 
action and the utterance are less clear, and perhaps there is overlap. Is Nixon’s body 
language a form of the utterance, or is it merely action to support the utterance? And 
what then is being uttered? It might seem the case that the performance here is 
occurring on two separate levels, as when we listen to simply the audio track we might 
well find ourselves believing that Nixon carried the debate well, and gave a strong 
performance. And yet when his appearance and mannerism is placed alongside that of 
Kennedy an entirely new picture emerges, his character seems to lose its authority. His 
behaviour is action which rather than supporting subverts the image he wishes to 
project, his words utter one thing but his face another. 
  
Perhaps another element of Kennedy’s performance that should be noted is his public 
image: Kennedy’s “image was simpler [than Nixon’s], but also more “personal”; it was 
less closely tied to his past political efforts, and so Kennedy, unlike Nixon, emerged 
more as a “man” then as a “political man.”” (ibid p.228) Consider in light of the above 
image the contrast of Kennedy the man vs Nixon the political man (or politician). 
Nixon’s sleazy appearance might on an unconscious level act as a confirmation of that 
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image. An action of reinforcement: reinforcing Nixon as a politician, reinforcing 
politicians as sweaty and shifty, reinforcing Nixon as embodying the negative traits of 
politicians, and so on. Likewise Kennedy’s confident persona lacks these negatives, and 
so his action helps to reinforce that he is not these things, that he is more regular man 
than political man, that he is not that which Nixon embodies in the most negative sense. 
This dichotomy between the regular man and the political man is one which we will see 
returned to in later political campaigns, just as the subject of debates and debate 
performances will re-occur.  
 
¶5. The Quadrennial re-enactment of the debate. 
Whilst the Kennedy-Nixon debate was the first to be televised, it was most certainly not 
the last debate and indeed since the 1976 election season the candidate debates have 
since become a standard element of the election campaigning process, with much media 
attention given and a great deal of analysis put forth after each debate by a range of 
people from expert analysts to general members of the public intent to weigh in on who 
won and why. Further, such has been the impact and importance of these debates that 
they have created a precedent for such debates to occur in the political process of other 
countries. The term “debate”, it may be noted, is perhaps not entirely accurate: the 
candidates are in turn asked questions on specific points of policy, to which they are 
given a set time to answer followed by a short response from their opponent. After the 
questions each candidate gives a closing statement. This format is essentially unchanged 
since 1960. The debate has become a ritual, a re-enactment of that first debate in which 
the opportunity is given for the American people to judge the candidates based, not 
merely upon their words and policies but, upon the performance, the behaviours and 
images put forth by the candidates to affect the audience response. 
  
Perhaps Kennedy is responsible for another ritual of re-enactment,that of the politician 
as man. Consider now Nixon playing his Piano Concerto #1 on live television: 
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Figure 2 Nixon plays Piano Concerto #1 Available online at: 
https://www.pinterest.co.uk/pin/405464772680389851/?lp=true (Accessed September 5 2018) 
 
The Nixon who plays his own composed piano piece is a very different Nixon to the 
one who seemed so decidedly political (in the most negative sense) on the televised 
debate. His facial expression suggests a level of serenity and being lost in his music, 
perhaps a level of being a sensitive or artistic soul. A love of music connects on a deep 
level, with the musical performance acting as a ritual which reinforces a new identity: 
this is a man who is at his heart just like any other man. Compare President Bill Clinton: 
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Figure 3 Bill Clinton plays the Saxophone. Image by Saxon Reed, used without permission 
Clinton’s saxophone playing is very different to Nixon’s piano, suggesting rather than 
middle-class sophistication an element of “cool”, associating with a more urban, lower 
class, underprivileged, segment of American society. Despite this difference the 
performance enacts essentially the same ritual: that Clinton despite his status as a 
politician has an image of being man out with the political. He is, we are to believe, one 
of the ordinary people. This image is one which was in some ways continued in 2016 
when Hillary Clinton, his wife, ran for the office of President: consider this image from 
Hillary Clinton’s being confirmed nominee at the Democratic National Convention: 
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Figure 4 Bill Clinton kicks balloons as Hillary Clinton laughs. Available online at: 
https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-07-29/tim-kaine-and-bill-clinton-loved-the-balloons-at-the-
dnc (accessed September 5 2018) 
 
 
 
Bill Clinton’s apparent concern with balloons during a major televised celebration is an 
incredibly humanising performance, and one which may well have been calculated: 
after all, the 2016 campaign was very notably one of a personal nature. Members of the 
public were asked to support not “Clinton” but “Hillary”, a sharp contrast to the 
“Trump” campaign led by her opponent. By basing the campaign around the candidate’s 
forename an element of familiarity was created, emphasising Mrs Clinton’s identity as a 
woman rather than a political woman, a move which, in other circumstances, might well 
have helped to secure an electoral victory. 
 
The opponent in this election, Donald Trump, may however have demonstrated the 
natural ultimate conclusion of this distinction: a candidate who is not only more man 
than political man, but who has no attachment to politics at all. This thread is one 
picked up by Naomi Klein, who claims that “Trump didn’t just enter politics as a so-
called outsider, somebody who doesn’t play by the rules. He entered politics playing by 
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a completely different set of rules – the rules of branding.”226 We shall return to the 
question of “branding” later, but for now consider the following. Prior to his running for 
office Trump was a real estate mogul and reality TV star, and so his campaign would be 
run on lines which would emphasise that his lack of political experience was what, in 
some bizarre manner, qualified him for the highest political office. The Trump 
campaign may be associated with a rise in populist politics, an emphasis on the 
politician as connected to the general populace, their desires and wants. His speeches 
were notable for being apparently ad libbed, short on substance and often making wild 
promises with no apparent thought placed behind the mechanics of their being carried 
out. We might suggest that the success of the Trump campaign was to extend the ritual 
of the candidate’s image as the not-political-man to encompass every action taken. 
Indeed as we shall see in ¶6, Trump’s behaviour and image may well have had an effect 
on how his campaign was perceived and indeed led to the underestimation by his 
opponents that led to his unexpected victory. 
 
¶6. The 2016 debates: A study in factors of ritual 
In January 2017, Her Opponent, an “ethnodramatic verbatim performance”227 conceived 
by Maria Guadalupe offered a unique exploration of the factors involved in the ritual of 
the presidential debate. Her Opponent saw actors attempt to recreate exactly selected 
segments from the three Clinton/Trump debates, with the same body language, actions, 
inflections, and words, but with the genders of the two participants reversed, replacing 
Clinton with “Jonathan Gordon” and opposing him to Brenda King: 
Maria Guadalupe, Professor at INSEAD, said: "Many commented 
before and after the 2016 U.S. presidential election how much gender 
was an issue in our perception of the two candidates. Would we feel the 
same about Donald Trump if he were a woman and about Secretary 
Clinton if she were a man? Is there anything in the way when they 
expressed themselves that make us like them more or less just because 
 
226 Naomi Klein, No Is Not Enough: Resisting Trump’s Shock Politics and Winning the World We Need. 
(S.l.: ALLEN LANE, 2017), p. 33. 
227 ‘“HER OPPONENT” RE-STAGES 2016 PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES WITH GENDER-
REVERSED CASTING’ <https://www.insead.edu/news/2017-presidential-debates-gender-reversed-
casting> [accessed 4 May 2017]. 
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of their gender? This work is an attempt at answering those questions 
through experiencing the two characters with genders reversed."228 
The results of the performance may have been more enlightening than expected, with 
co-creator Joe Salvatore remarking that, “At the time of the debates, I dismissed 
[Trump] as awkward, unskilled, untrained…Now I’m not so sure that I would do 
that”229 and that “We both thought that the inversion would confirm our liberal 
assumption – that no one would have accepted Trump’s behaviour from a woman, and 
that the male Clinton would seem like a much stronger candidate. But we kept checking 
in with each other and realised that this disruption –a major change in perception- was 
happening.“230 Likewise, after the live performance one reporter observed that  
Many were shocked to find that they couldn’t seem to find in Jonathan 
Gordon what they had admired in Hillary Clinton – or that Brenda 
King’s clever tactics seemed to shine in moments where they’d 
remembered Donald Trump flailing or lashing out. For those Clinton 
voters trying to make sense of the loss, it was by turns bewildering and 
instructive, raising as many questions about gender performance and 
effects of sexism as it answered.231 
Whilst many of the questions raised by Her Opponent involving gender, sexism, and so 
on may be incredibly difficult to answer in the short term, there are certainly a number 
of interesting factors to be considered for analysis in this case.  
 
To begin with, consider that this performance was a re-enactment in almost the most 
pure and literal sense, with an exacting reproduction of every element of the original 
performances – something which one does not generally expect to see in a regular 
theatrical production. It is however also a different sort of re-enactment to those which 
we have previously seen: whereas the ritualised re-enactment attempts to capture the 
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spirit of the thing in order to promote ideas, concepts, or identity, and indeed the debate 
being re-enacted is itself a re-enactment in those terms, this is a re-enactment in form, 
fully scripted and with no space for diversion and intended not to reinforce or create but 
rather to question and perhaps to comment.   
 
Of further interest are the “liberal assumptions” described by the creators, who were 
professional academics whilst the audience “appeared mostly drawn from academic 
circles”.232 Does it then follow that the responses to the performance suggest a fault in 
thinking prevalent in liberal academia, and if so is that fault regarding issues of gender 
or is it rather in having originally assumed those issues to be applicable to the defeat of 
a candidate who presumably would not have been given their support had she 
represented the opposing party? It would certainly be of interest to see how 
conservative-leaning academics interpreted the performance, and what if any of their 
assumptions were confirmed or disconfirmed (significantly, would a Trump supporter 
find King to be a less attractive speaker than Gordon?)  
 
It is worthy of note that “people thought that the male version of Clinton was feminine, 
and that was bad.”233 The implication here is there are feminine behaviours which, when 
displayed by male politicians, will sour an audience towards them, but what of the 
reverse? Although no comment is given in reports that the female version of Trump was 
seen to be overly masculine by any audience members, is there the possibility that to 
some, or perhaps to a hypothetical non-Liberal audience, such a position might have 
been spotted?  
 
The fact that the gender of the speakers does seem to have had an effect on the 
perception of the re-enactment by the audience is important as it emphasises that gender 
was indeed playing a role. Judith Butler’s work on gender and performativity offers an 
insight into this: to Butler, particular behaviours and actions are gendered. When she 
states that “gender proves to be performative – that is, constituting the identity it is 
purported to be”234, she reverses the view that “gendered” behaviours are thus because 
they stem from a particular biological make up, but rather that an individual’s perceived 
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gender identity is created by their carrying out those behaviours. Thus, it may follow 
that the appearance of a male “Hillary” as being “too feminine” stems from the 
characters behaviour being a performance which creates a feminine gender, even whilst 
otherwise presenting as a male. Revealed here is that the apparent “exact” re-enactment 
of behaviours, actions, and so on becomes, through the flipping of the participants’ 
biological sexes, becomes a subversive re-enactment: there is now an additional factor 
in the debate, as a dysphoric gendered performance not present in the original event is 
now revealed. In analysing the effects of this genderedness, it may be tempting to turn 
to Butler’s discussion of drag and cross-dressing, through which she argues “the notion 
of an original or primary identity is often parodied”235 however Her Opponent does not 
intentionally seek to parody: rather it attempts to imitate exactly particular actions the 
gendered aspects of which are an apparently unexpected side-effect. This is a departure 
from the notion of drawing overt attention to the markers of gender, yet it may be 
argued that when we become aware that those gendered markers exist awareness of 
them is nevertheless drawn by necessity. Salvatore’s initial hypothesis that a simple 
swap of physical gender would result in an almost binary change in perception (and one 
which it might be noted seems to have been based on changing the minds of 
conservatives – the claim made after all was that Trump’s behaviour would have been 
unacceptable from a woman and that a male Clinton would have seemed a stronger 
candidate) seems then to have been far too simple, viewing gender as existing in terms 
of the most obvious indicators rather than as a subtle whole. The simple gender binary 
is highlighted as insufficient: whether an argument is more convincing from a man than 
from a woman is replaced with the apparent weakness or strength of an argument from a 
feminine man or a masculine woman.  
   
Can an insight into why Trump was so appealing to his supporters really be gained 
given the fact that a “pure” re-enactment was not occurring, due to the effect of gender? 
Returning to Klein, the suggestion is made that “you can’t disentangle Trump the man 
from Trump the brand; those two entities merged long ago”236 and that “his brand is 
being the ultimate boss, the guy who is so rich he can do whatever he wants, whenever 
he wants, and to whomever he wants”237. 
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The concept of branding, as understood by Klein, may be a key factor in the evolution 
of the Presidential campaigning ritual: whilst Trump may be the first successful 
Presidential candidate to be entirely man-but-not-political-man, he also takes it one step 
further, being not political-man but rather brand. Klein describes the brand business 
model as follows: “Create a transcendent idea or brand surrounding your company. Use 
it to connect with consumers who share the values. Then charge a steep premium for 
products that are less about the objects themselves than about the profound human 
desire to be part of a tribe, a circle of belonging.”238 This sense of belonging is a sense 
of requiring an affirmation of identity, and so in a sense we can see loyalty to a brand 
become the performance of a ritual. In this case support of Trump may be seen as a 
ritual of identifying with the values of the “ultimate boss” – values which Klein notes 
have been reinforced through all sorts of brand-reinforcing performances on reality TV 
and in the realm of professional wrestling such that, in his election campaign, he was 
“using all the reality-simulation skills that he had picked up from years at the helm of a 
top-rated TV show.”239  
 
We can surmise the possibility of a further facet behind the surprise response to Her 
Opponent: that in the reproduction the debate is presented minus the brand. The Trump 
brand is one which will polarise – those who associate with it will place that identity 
over the product (policies), but likewise those who identify against the brand may place 
that identity over concern for product (performance). In removing the brand is the 
performance caused to be viewed based upon other factors/merits which were 
previously overlooked?  
 
This concept of brand may not be entirely new: it might be argued that the political 
parties have themselves become a form of brand, with many voters voting according to 
party loyalty rather than any innate interest in the differences politically between them. 
In this case what becomes new is rather the transfer of brand loyalty from party to 
candidate. We might also say that the concept of brand in this sense ties back to the 
primary theme of the §1 and the activities of historical reenactors: that of mythology. 
Just as the descendants of the Confederates base their identity around a history that does 
not really exist, with the idea of the Confederacy more important than the actual actions 
it carried out, so too do the voters following the Trump brand rally around an idea, a 
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living myth, rather than around the reality of Trump per se. As we move on to the final 
section of this chapter we shall see a continuance of this pattern. 
 
§3. Academia 
 
Let this section begin with a hypothetical question: Is academia a religion? It has its 
temples (the universities), its priests (the academics) and its congregants (the students), 
its founding myths (the “martyrdoms” of Socrates and Galileo), and it has of course its 
rituals. At their most obvious these rituals are grand and ornate, such as the robes and 
processions of the graduation ceremony, but in other cases they are commonplace. The 
ritual of the lecture, in which one learned figure speaks to a class of assembled learners. 
The tutorial, in which a smaller group of learners is guided in discussing the lecture. 
The conference, with its general unchanging structure – panels in which speakers read a 
paper for twenty minutes followed by ten minutes of questions, the keynote speaker, 
post-conference alcohol.  
 
Obviously the analogy is flawed and can only be taken so far – academia lacks major 
qualifiers of an actual religion, such as the worship of a supernatural element of reality, 
or indeed general agreement behind any particular core doctrines. We will note however 
that in posing such a thought experiment we see the threads of this chapter continue to 
stand out visibly. Academia has its myths and its rituals, what of its brands and its re-
enactments? The question which is now set before us for examination is: does academia 
also derive its identity from a myth, a brand? What are the facets of this myth that are 
placed on display through its rituals, and what is the role played by re-enacting within 
them, if any? 
  
¶7. The Conference and the Q&A 
In order to highlight one of the more major rituals of the academic calendar, that of the 
academic conference, I shall present as a case study what may be deemed a subversive 
ritual: the third biennial Performance Philosophy conference which took place in 
Prague in June 2017. According to the “manifesto” which was released in advance of 
the conference,  
The usual structure of academic conferences is frequently bemoaned, 
but there is often a lack of initiative or time to try out alternatives. 
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Performance philosophy seeks to offer a space in which, together, we 
experiment with new formats and thus train our sense-for-alternatives. 
It is in this spirit that the conference dramaturgy has been conceived 
as an experimental setting in which all participants are invited to 
experience as such, and engage with, over the course of the event. In 
order to help us become aware of our own blindnesses we call upon 
you to act as ethnographers yourselves and to engage with various 
parts of the conference as participant observers, with a view to 
exploring and describing the specific form of performativity at play in 
each instance.240  
 
One might question whether such grandiose claims are not overly pretentious, although 
the question may then be returned: is this not in part the purpose of a manifesto? It is the 
rhetorical power of the speech as much as the ideas within it that hold the attention of 
the audience and remain in memory – is the manifesto perhaps its own ritual then? 
Regardless, the manifesto contains interesting ideas, in particular the idea of “fields”:  
Each field opens with a lecture. The group in attendance then splits into 
two tracks. One half follows a more theoretical, the other a more 
practical trajectory…Afterwards, the whole group comes back together 
for a collective discussion about what happened (and what was missed) 
in each track.241  
 
The field differs from the standard panel in two ways: firstly and most obviously in the 
splitting of the group – some attending the “theoretical” side which resembled the 
standard panel, and others attending the “practical” which consisted generally of a 
workshop of some variety.  Secondly there was the “discussion” at the end – it was 
briefly noted at one field that there was disagreement between “discussion” or “talk” for 
this section, as in German the latter “sounded better – much more informal”. Indeed, the 
informality was emphasised with the talk beginning with a short “game” before moving 
into a free discussion between participants. The informality of the discussion itself acted 
as a powerful question on the purpose of conferences: as one participant in the final 
 
240 ‘Performance Philosophy Prague 2017 Manifest’ <http://web.flu.cas.cz/ppprague2017/manifest.html> 
[accessed 30 June 2017]. 
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session of the conference noted, “the standard game of asking questions at a conference 
is self-aggrandizing bullshit” – a game which is well summarised by Joseph Heath, who 
explains that, “Philosophy has what could best be described as an adversarial 
disciplinary culture, something that manifests itself most clearly in how the Q&A goes 
after a research talk. Basically, after people present their philosophical views, the 
audience members try to tear them apart. Every question is a variation on “here’s why I 
think you’re wrong…” It is not supportive.”242  
 
This lack of support, Heath believes, is important and necessary to academic 
philosophy, as “the only thing keeping us tethered to the world is the disciplinary 
culture, and the fact that we have to defend ourselves, in a room full of people who have 
spent decades listening to arguments and identifying bad ones.”243 This practice, he 
implies, goes all the way back to Socrates acting as an adversary to the people of Athens 
to whom he pitched his questions. Is the ritual of the Q&A then in some sense a twisted 
re-enactment of the Socratic dialogue? Certainly it could be said to be a continuous 
ritual confirming the alleged adversarial position of academic philosophers to their 
colleagues, but is it wrong to refer to this attitude as bullshit? The replacement of the 
Q&A with a group discussion could certainly be said to ask that exact question: the 
ritual of the Q&A exists in a certain form, its skeleton remaining, but the essence has 
been changed, a new ritual of questioning: “is the traditional way really what we as 
philosophers are?” Further, by bringing the concept of games to the forefront an even 
more subversive question is raised: “is it acceptable to have fun?” By bringing play to 
the forefront at a conference, a setting which is technically work and which as such 
should be expected to be dry and dull and a chore, a direct challenge is inescapably 
made to actively question the foundations of what is taken for granted as the 
standardised form/ritual of the conference. This was indeed further emphasised in the 
manner that chairs would explain structure (e.g “you can either stay here for some talks 
you know almost nothing about, or leave to go to a workshop you know almost nothing 
about.”)   
 
The aim of the conference to act as an experiment, then, was emphasised through its use 
of the introduction of play to established rituals, so as to act in a subversive questioning 
 
242 ‘Adversarialism in Philosophy: A Defence | In Due Course’ <http://induecourse.ca/adversarialism-in-
philosophy-a-defence/> [accessed 5 July 2017]. 
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manner. That the conference ended with socialising over wine suggests that some rituals 
at least are universal, but is even such a claim accurate? A conference taking place in 
for instance Saudi Arabia or Utah could reasonably be expected to lack alcohol, or in 
the latter case coffee amongst the available refreshments. How much can we remove 
from the ritual of the conference before it becomes unrecognisable? 
 
Heath’s description of the adversarial nature of philosophy is one which any academic 
philosopher will recognise as an accurate reflection of the field and yet that it can be 
removed from a conference environment whilst that environment remains recognisably 
one of academic philosophy, shows it to be non-essential. What else can we do to 
remove recognised and accepted elements of academia from academia whilst still 
retaining its essence? Or indeed does an essence actually exist? Is it the case perhaps 
that a defence of existing practices will be based on a defence not of the reality of what 
it is that makes the institution of academia but rather a loyalty to the academic brand, in 
which the rituals create a mythical Platonic form of the academy, an exclusive club for 
members to claim their identity around? 
 
¶8. The Academic Brand 
This academic brand is one worthy of consideration. We have previously noted with 
little overt criticism the pejorative label of the “ivory tower”, an implication that 
academia is somehow in a position of disconnect from the everyday activity of society; 
perhaps suggesting a monk-like separation from the carnal public, or the imagery of the 
tower bringing to mind an element of the “head in the clouds” stereotype that can be 
traced all the way back to criticism by his contemporaries of Socrates himself. Whilst 
we may rally against such a caricature, with most academics likely to insist on the work 
having some concrete value outside the walls of the classrooms and lecture theatres, is it 
the case that loyalty to the brand also risks encouraging the public to take such a view? 
When Heath tells us that “philosophers…never have any positive suggestions”244 and 
that “colleagues exist to tell you why you are wrong”245, is the layperson likely, when 
comparing to the sort of cultural environment they are familiar with in a non-academic 
workspace, to take it that philosophers are simply regular members of the public or to 
 
244 ‘Adversarialism in Philosophy’. 
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assume rather that on some level our activities are simply arguing for the sake of 
arguing, just as according to the stereotype? 
 
If the brand of academia is indeed the ivory tower, then we must recognise that there are 
two faces of the brand: those of the brand according to its followers and the brand as 
understood by “outsiders”. Returning to ¶6, in which it was proposed that the presence 
of the Trump brand may have affected reception to a political debate, we might also 
propose that many arguments taking place around the value of the academy, its purpose, 
and the methods employed within it are coloured by the manner in which its brand is 
perceived and followed. 
 
¶9. The Lecture  
Another obvious example of ritual within academia is that of the lecture: the setting in 
which an academic, who is an authority figure, imparts knowledge to a captive audience 
of students. The format of the lecture is of great interest in this discussion. William 
Clark notes that the medieval lecture was similar to a church sermon, in that note-taking 
was not the norm and indeed “medieval training focused on memory… and it remained 
mostly oral-aural”246. The lecturer would be speaking on the topic of a set book, which 
he “read aloud, digested, and commented on”247 whilst remaining “immobile and, 
eventually, elevated at a cathedra”248- a chair similar to that of a bishop which indicated 
that the lecturer had the right “to speak with authority on canonical academic texts, 
apropos his particular degree.”249 Clark further comments on the ritualistic nature of the 
lecture from the cathedra when he notes that “one must be authorised to perform the 
rite, and must do it in an authorised manner.”250 This sort of ritual, crucially, should 
have resulted in uniformity:  
a lecture in Paris should amount to the same as a lecture in Oxford or 
Bologna or elsewhere on the same topic…a master or doctor cast in 
Oxford or Bologna should be able to perform in the scholastic theatre 
 
246 William Clark, Academic Charisma and the Origins of the Research University (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2006), p. 71. 
247 Clark, p. 71. 
248 Clark, p. 72 (original emphasis). 
249 Clark, p. 72. 
250 Clark, p. 72. 
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as well as one cast in Paris since the same texts supposedly lorded over 
all.251  
It is perhaps interesting to note, for all that my question of academia as a religion was 
meant more for provocation than for a note of truth, the parallels drawn by Clark in 
regards to the medieval institution are stark: the lecturer speaking ex cathedra just as 
does the pontiff, the students in the pews as congregation, the expectation by both the 
audience and the institution that any lecture will follow the same dogma as regards to 
the canonical texts. This “liturgical academia”, along with the suggestion of the lecture 
as in some way a theatrical performance, survived according to Clark into the early 
modern period:  
Lecturing resembled acting, which, at least for some academics, was 
tied to the public persona associated with the chair. An academic who 
held a chair was required to enact a persona in a theatrical space, 
which, given low enrolments, might have meant playing to an empty 
hall, and all too often did. The system of semesters reinforced the 
liturgical aspect of lecturing. At least ideally, the same parts of an 
academic liturgy were repeated at the same time every year as part of 
the “biannual drama of the lecture” in which the professor played “his 
role.”252 
Has much changed? While exact details may not be identical there is still a similar 
theme running throughout the history of the lecture up until today – the lecture 
generally occurs within a space set aside for the purpose, the “liturgical” manner of 
having particular lectures occur on particular days still survives to an extent via the 
module specification and structure, although the exact placement of a particular module 
within the academic year may not be so fixed and thus the curriculum is less rigid than 
it may have been. The lecturer must put on a persona, that of the lecturing academic, 
even if the tying of that persona to a particular chair held by a given professor is less so 
much of a notable occurrence in most modern universities. This liturgical pattern of 
curriculum highlights that a given module is re-enacted regularly for each new class of 
students. Further those patterns and similarities which have survived from the medieval 
through to the university of today demonstrate the manner in which the lecture format 
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has remained a re-enactment throughout the centuries albeit which one which has 
evolved with the changing habits and needs of the ages.  
 
Summary 
In this chapter the theory put forward in chapters 1 and 2 has been extended into a 
concrete examination of re-enactments.  Central is the idea that our behaviours may be 
seen as rituals intended to state, question, or reinforce our sense of identity, and that 
these rituals occur within a theatrum mundi, wherein any location can become a stage of 
ritual as needed. We have seen this idea applied in multiple ways: in the rituals 
revolving around a specific cultural identity tied to geography and history, occurring in 
manners that are both highly obvious as performances and more mundane whilst still 
holding the qualities of ritual, in the rituals of the political process, and in the rituals of 
the academy. We have also attempted to introduce several new concepts: in particular 
the concept of the brand, and the manner in which it allows identity to be centred 
around an idea and the things that idea represents, often more than the reality behind it. 
 
One idea from earlier chapters which may be notable for its absence, however, is that of 
play. Whilst play was certainly discussed within the context of academia, what of 
elsewhere? We may consider for example the role of games in the political process: 
watching the political debates together as a group and predicting results, for instance, or 
the heated discussions that occur around poll results. Does this show a form of 
gamification of the political process, causing it to be approached in a similar manner to 
that in which the individual would approach, say, professional sports? Likewise in the 
context of the historical re-enaction, whilst a level of difference has been acknowledged 
between those who insist on absolute historic fidelity and those who are more concerned 
with what might be dubbed passable realism, what of the possibility of an individual 
attempting intentional anachronism? Can doing so be used to create a subversive ritual 
which throws questions directly to the heart of what exactly is occurring through casting 
a light upon that which is immediate enough to be considered invisible? Such questions 
may not have immediate answers as they suggest a level of awareness of the role of 
such activities which most participants are likely not to be in conscious possession of. 
Nevertheless they remain.  
 
In the following chapter, the role of performance in academia shall be narrowed down 
further, in order to focus on the single subject area of philosophy.  
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Chapter Four: Performance as First Philosophy 
In this chapter I will examine a specific example of performative ritual in action, that of 
performance as first philosophy. To make this claim, we must first ensure that we have 
an understanding of the question, what is first philosophy? In §1 this question will be 
explored in two ways. First, we will explore the simple meaning of ‘first philosophy’. 
Second, we will examine what exactly thinkers such as Aristotle, Edmund Husserl, and 
Emmanuel Levinas understood first philosophy to be (¶1). Having established this, I 
will then explain and unpack my thesis that first philosophy should be understood as 
being performance (¶2). Having done so I will address some possible criticisms which a 
hypothetical opponent may make toward this claim (¶3). In §2, I will then concentrate 
on the question of what it means for philosophy to be performed. This shall be done by 
first examining the ways in which various thinkers have “performed” their work (¶4), 
and then by taking a diversion into the procedure of writing itself, including my own 
methodology, in order to draw out the manner in which the very act of writing is a 
collection of performances (¶5).  
 
After doing this I will turn my attentions from direct performance to the question of 
those factors which act against a traditional view of philosophy as a pursuit of truth and 
reason (¶6-8). I propose that, when properly understood, these factors may be taken into 
account by the philosopher and combatted through carefully selected methodologies. I 
will then put forward a phenomenological account of emotions, based largely upon the 
work of Heidegger (¶9) for reasons which will be made apparent in §3. The final 
application of all of these ideas shall then be embarked upon in §3, where I will offer a 
direct means for the application of the newly suggested model of emotions, along with 
some suggested examples of how this model will work in practice. 
 
§1. First Philosophy 
 
¶1. What is First Philosophy? 
In Aristotle’s initial usage, first philosophy was synonymous with what we now refer to 
as metaphysics – in fact the book which we now refer to as the Metaphysics was given 
that title by a later compiler, and Aristotle himself referred to it simply as first 
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philosophy. An understanding of what he may have meant by this can be found in his 
discussion of metaphysics as a search for “first principles”, understood through his 
defining of beginning as “the first point from which a thing either is or comes to be or is 
known”.253 If first philosophy then is that through which philosophy is, or comes to be, 
or is known, then through its context as metaphysics, which is the philosophy of 
existence, of causes, and so on, we can understand that to Aristotle first philosophy is 
the philosophy upon which other philosophy must draw: it is in understanding the 
nature of things, their beginnings and causes, that we may then build up our 
understanding of how the other areas of philosophy fit together.  
 
Jeffner Allen, in his discussion of Husserl’s first philosophy, would seem to agree when 
he writes that “it is that philosophy which, among the various philosophies which 
comprise philosophy as a whole, is precisely the first.”254 It is, further, “the beginning of 
philosophy as such…a self-contained discipline, with its own problems concerning the 
beginning of philosophy.”255 Husserl makes clear his thoughts as to where such a 
discipline shall be found, declaring that “genuine philosophy, the idea of which is the 
actualising of absolute cognition, is rooted in pure phenomenology.”256  It behoves us  
to notice here that a linguistic jump has been made: whereas in Aristotle’s work ‘first 
philosophy’ was synonymous with metaphysics, we can no longer say that first 
philosophy is synonymous with a field – first philosophy has taken upon itself the 
meaning of “that which is primal in philosophy”, and whilst to Husserl phenomenology 
is first philosophy, that is not to say that first philosophy is phenomenology (that is that 
the two phrases can be made to represent the same concept).   
 
This change, if retroactively applied, will allow us to consider in a new light Rene 
Descartes’ Meditations in First Philosophy. The first philosophy of which Descartes 
speaks seems, on a simple reading, to be the same first philosophy as that of Aristotle. 
Descartes’ train of thought leads him to explore the basic metaphysical components of 
the world as he experiences it, beginning with certain a priori concepts (the cogito) 
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which he believes must come prior to everything else. Yet is the first philosophy of 
Descartes’ Meditations the same first philosophy which he is exploring? We might 
suggest otherwise. Descartes himself would seem to suggest that he takes epistemology 
to be first philosophy: the Meditations begin with the application of radical scepticism 
to the point of doubting everything beyond one’s own existence, and it is only after 
establishing the possibility of knowing things to be true that he is able to begin to build 
up his system of metaphysics. However, whilst he may claim that a part of his 
meditative approach is to question such things it would seem that the entire system is 
built upon a presupposition of the reliability of formal logic. 
   
So far we have seen three, if nor four, suggested ‘first philosophies’: Metaphysics, 
logic, perhaps epistemology, phenomenology. Is there another option that has been put 
forth? One answer to this question comes from Levinas, who declares that first 
philosophy is ethics.  But what does he mean by this? He declares that “the correlation 
between knowledge, understood as disinterested contemplation, and being, is, according 
to our philosophical tradition, the occurrence of meaning (sens). The comprehension of 
being – the semantic of this verb – would thus be the very possibility of or the occasion 
for wisdom and the wise and, as such, is first philosophy.”257  
 
Here we see, first and foremost, that Levinas continues in the tradition of Husserl, 
viewing first philosophy as primal (the “possibility of wisdom”). Indeed Levinas would 
have us agree that “Husserlian phenomenology…is one of the culminating points in 
Western philosophy”258 and it is through a lens of Husserl and Heidegger that he leads 
us to the conclusion that “This is the question of the meaning of being: not the ontology 
of the understanding of that particular verb, but the ethics of its justice…Not ‘Why 
being rather than nothing?’, but how being justifies itself.”259  
 
This is of course an interesting shift from Heidegger, who declares that “all ontology, 
no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, 
remains blind and perverted from its outmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified 
the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task”.260  
 
257 Emmanuel Lévinas, ‘Ethics as First Philosophy’, in The Levinas Reader, ed. by Seán Hand, Blackwell 
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122 
Levinas would appear to suggest that, contrary to the primality of the meaning of Being, 
rather the more important question which must be taken as central is one which 
Heidegger would consider a step removed – that of Da-Sein’s relation to the Other. This 
step is one which should not be overlooked in its importance, as Levinas is consciously 
taking a step in moving first philosophy from the realm of the entirely theoretical (the 
question of being, the phenomenological approach, systems of logic and so on) to the 
realm of the practical, a precedent which shall be fully embraced in this thesis, even as 
we take another step in changing the manner in which first philosophy is to be 
understood. 
 
¶2. Performance is First Philosophy 
As has already been noted the essential theme which holds together these existing views 
as to what consists first philosophy is its logical primality. First philosophy to these 
thinkers is that single area of philosophical enquiry which we must approach first in 
order to create the foundation upon which we will build all other points of enquiry. It 
makes sense then that they should be the most fundamental aspects: logic, the rules that 
hold together all our arguments and which theoretically transcends our existence and 
subjective experience and metaphysics, the question of what it means for a thing to exist 
and the nature of that existence. We have seen also that, in the examples given, first 
philosophy has been for the most part highly theoretical, with the obvious exception of 
the more “practical” first philosophy of Levinas.  
 
It would be trivial to remark that there can only be one true first philosophy, if indeed 
there is any, although we can certainly observe that to each philosopher his or her own 
view of first philosophy, when they choose to consciously acknowledge the existence of 
such a thing, does indeed take a primal position within their philosophical 
investigations. Taking this observation as a starting point we will make our first “step 
away”: we shall claim that exactly what it is that is taken as the single primal 
philosophical concept is of relevance largely only to the philosopher making the claim. 
 
Instead, for our purposes, first philosophy shall be taken to be a different thing, a 
primality to that which is primal, which acts not as a single point of exploration which 
will act as a foundation for all other investigations, but rather as the thing which all 
different philosophical investigations hold in common. When I make the claim that 
performance is first philosophy, then, I do not intend to suggest that the primality of 
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performance is such that we must put forth a complete and total theory of performance, 
or that there is some sort of “question of performance” which must be answered prior to 
any other questions or around which philosophy need revolve, but rather that in 
approaching philosophy at all we approach it in a performative manner; that philosophy 
must be understood as one ritual, or collection of rituals, amongst others. From this 
perspective it will be understood that to say “metaphysics is first philosophy” or “logic 
is first philosophy” or “ethics is first philosophy” is itself a performance. The arguments 
used to back up such a claim are likewise a performance, and even the manner in which 
the argument is presented is a performance. Thus, when I say that performance is first 
philosophy, I make the claim that performance is that thing which is shared by all 
philosophies put forth no matter how disparate, contradictory, or opposed they may 
seem. 
  
¶3. Objections to Performance as First Philosophy 
The critic may at this point interject, that I am making a false claim as to what it is that 
constitutes first philosophy. Consider for instance at this point Robert Sokolowski’s 
assessment of the manner in which Plato, Aristotle, and Husserl engage in the same 
exercise: 
In order to venture out on this study, Husserl needs to differentiate his 
inquiry from something less ultimate, just as Aristotle did. But Husserl 
does not distinguish his first philosophy from the study of physical 
things; in his day and age he needs especially to distinguish it from 
psychology, so a book containing Husserl’s first philosophy could 
appropriately have been entitled ta meta ta psychika or the 
“Metapsychics.”And just to round out this set of comparisons, we 
might also observe that Plato too moved into a first philosophy by 
contrasting it against a less ultimate science, and in his case it is 
mathematics. Plato’s first philosophy could appropriately have been 
called something like ta meta mathematika, or the Metamathematics.261  
The study mentioned by Sokolowski is Husserl’s phenomenology, which he dubs “the 
study of truth as truth.”262 In Sokolowski’s reading, the element that holds together the 
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first philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, Husserl, and we may assume others, is that they 
are firstly scientific and secondly, that they attempt to explore the nature of the truth by 
contrasting the science of philosophy with the dominant (yet less ultimate) scientific 
field of the day. Such a reading might well invalidate such claims to first philosophy as 
that put forward by Levinas, as well as my own which is patently lacking in the rigorous 
definition and preciseness required of a science in this current day. 
 
My response to this alternative view of first philosophy will be presented in three 
points. First, the view of first philosophy as an ultimate science. Certainly this is an 
interesting approach and is one that ties in with Husserl’s attempts to view 
phenomenology in terms of a science opposed to psychology. However the greater 
question must be raised as to whether it is necessary or merely coincidental to the 
overall use of first philosophy. Aristotle’s work was the Metaphysics, that which comes 
above or after physics, and it is certainly true that just as in his other works Aristotle 
approached the subject in a methodical manner, as much of a science as his Physics or 
indeed works such as the Poetics, Rhetoric, and so on. We may however risk 
overreaching here. The Metaphysics is so named because it was the book which came in 
the series of complete works after the Physics. Whilst Sokolowski is not incorrect to 
note that “the actual Metaphysics theorises truth; it is the theoria tes aletheias, and the 
human attainment of truth is an achievement that goes beyond any physical process”263, 
its position as a scientific text may be as much a product of the author’s approach to all 
of the subjects he taught as much as anything else, and the direct opposition to the 
Physics through its very title is not an originally intended part of that. 
  
Plato, likewise, is an author for whom we should be careful to avoid such leaps. 
Consider that there is much debate to be had as to the line between Plato’s own 
arguments in his dialogues and those of Socrates, as well as consideration of the 
development of his own thought in his works. Consider also Plato’s involvement with 
groups such as the Pythagoreans, whose religious devotion to mathematics may well 
have placed it far above the category of mere science. Indeed the near-religious 
elements found in Plato’s work especially amongst such subjects as the Forms may well 
be said to imply that the simple setting up of one science against another is a 
misrepresentation of his actual work. 
 
263 Sokolowski, CC, p. 6. 
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 As our second objection, we shall question the value of viewing first philosophy as a 
quest for truth. In this case, it may be more helpful to simply accept Sokolowski as 
correct – it does seem that the three philosophers mentioned were interested in a quest 
for truth. However, as we have previously claimed several jumps in the understanding 
of first philosophy let us add in another: we shall jump from first philosophy as being 
grounded in the analysis of truth to its simply having a hand in understanding the truth 
of the manner in which philosophy occurs – by placing performance as first philosophy 
we do away with any definite single examination of a truthful foundation in favour of an 
acknowledgment that all philosophy is performed. In doing so do we also perhaps 
suggest that truth is not central? This would not be an entirely original concept 
(consider the idea that Spinoza’s Ethics, a work which shall be discussed in more detail 
later in this chapter, exists primarily as a therapeutic text) but might well have value. 
  
In the third objection, Sokolowski may still be seen to trouble us as with his suggestion 
that Aristotle and Husserl are engaging in the same activity, which contradicts our 
earlier assertion of a change in what is meant by first philosophy, from Aristotle’s first 
philosophy as a specific field to Husserl’s first philosophy as an indicator of that which 
is primal. This contradiction, however, only exists on the surface, for if we consider for 
a moment we shall realise that he is in fact simply doing without the need for such a 
leap – to Sokolowski, Aristotle’s first philosophy is metaphysics whilst Husserl’s is 
metapsychics. The distinction between first philosophy as a field and first philosophy as 
a label for a particular field is thus already implied. He has in effect already 
retroactively applied Husserl’s leap. It is important however to note that this leap exists, 
as the move to performance as first philosophy should be seen as one leap in a series: 
the leap of Husserl of first philosophy from specific field to label for another field, of 
Levinas from theoretical to practical field, and now a third leap from specific field to 
wider phenomena linking a range of fields. 
 
In summarising this section: the concept of first philosophy is one which can be seen to 
have changed its understanding over time. Beginning with Aristotle we see first 
philosophy to be first principles – those things which act as a foundation upon which 
other things which we can examine are built. It was not, however, necessarily a starting 
point of investigation – the referring to first philosophy as metaphysics being a potential 
suggestion that the first principles should be approached only after those things built 
upon the foundation have been taught. Moving forward Husserl makes a change to this 
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approach, which we may retroactively apply, transforming first philosophy from first 
principles into that which is primal, being the area of philosophy that must be 
understood and accepted before one may embark on explorations of other areas. Levinas 
gives us a second and vital leap, which keeps first philosophy as primal whilst 
suggesting that rather than an area of theory it is in fact a practical aspect of 
philosophical investigation. Finally, it is proposed that a third leap is made which 
recognises that first philosophy is primal, practical, but also unlike in previous models 
not one single primal area of investigation but rather a concept which overlaps with all 
philosophy and indeed all areas of human behaviour, which is performance. Thus our 
first philosophy shall be a first philosophy which can be seen even within whichever 
area a given thinker will take as their own first philosophy, even if it is not given 
conscious exploration. 
  
In order to expand on the concept of performance as first philosophy we shall now 
explore the direct application of performance in Philosophy   
 
§2. Philosophy as it is Performed 
 
¶4. How is Philosophy Performed? 
What does it mean for philosophy to be performed? For one possible answer we shall 
return to JL Austin, looking this time not at his published work but rather at what we 
may deem his methodology and the claim put forth by Tawny Andersen that "in 
addition to producing an explicit theorization of the concept of performativity, Austin 
produced and disseminated his philosophy in a performative manner".264 Andersen 
begins this claim by turning to the accounts by Austin's students on the gatherings held 
by Austin in Oxford "in order to discuss various problems in philosophy"265, which he 
apparently saw as "a co-operative pursuit"266. According to  G.J. Warnock, who 
attended these meetings, "one had the feeling...that those meetings...were not occasions 
on which philosophy was talked about, or taught, or learned -they were occasions in 
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Performance Philosophy, 2.2 (2017), 189 (p. p193) <https://doi.org/10.21476/PP.2017.22102>. 
265 Andersen, p. 193. 
266 Andersen, p. 193. 
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which it was done, at which that actually happened".267  Andersen claims that this 
indicated that "in 'doing' the philosophy he was describing, Austin was enacting his 
own, original sense of the term performative... in articulating his ideas about 
philosophy, he was simultaneously enacting  them"268 and that further, the descriptions 
given by the attendees of the sessions give us "a glimpse of Austin performing 
philosophy as a social act."269  
 
As we have previously noted, the concept of performativity requires that for a speech 
act to be successful requires the performer to have authority – the wedding ceremony is 
illegitimate without the priest having the authority to legally declare the couple to be 
married, naming a boat is illegitimate unless the person doing the naming has the 
authority to do so – and it would appear from the writings of those attendees who drew 
attention to the air of authority which surrounded Austin such that "the physical and 
dialectical centre of gravity located itself, predictably, in the person of Austin”.270  
 
Austin's philosophy, then, in the context of those group discussions seems to have been 
performed - a ritual which makes philosophy, with Austin as the focal lead point of the 
ritual and the group members in supporting roles, both spectator and actor within the 
performance. It is interesting to note that this approach is very different to the broader 
claims about the discipline’s being based on an unsupportive antagonism, made by 
Heath: although antagonism may well be commonplace today, it is by no means 
something which is essential or necessary. 
  
If Austin's discussion groups were performed, Andersen encourages us to believe that 
so too were his written works: 
The text unfolds in the temporality of the now. Austin leads his readers 
through a series of methodological steps, often working by the process 
of exclusion in order to push an idea to its limits. We observe the 
philosopher thinking in the present tense, and we think alongside him 
 
267 G.J Warnock, J.L Austin, New York:Routledge(1989) p.45 cited in Andersen, p. 193. 
268 Andersen, p. 193. 
269 Andersen, p. 194. 
270  George Pitcher, ‘Austin: A personal memoir’ in Essays on J.L. Austin ed. By Isaiah Berlin, 
Oxford:Clarendon Press(1973), p.21 cited in Andersen, p. 194. 
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in real time. Throughout the exposition of his ideas, Austin repeatedly 
confronts impasses. We, as his readers, become spectators to the 
dramatization of both the construction of his ideas and their 
breakdown...since Austin had already worked through these logical 
processes before the lectures were given, he clearly chose to restage 
them for his audience.271 
A short consideration will lead us to conclude that a performative written work of this 
sort is not unique to Austin: Andersen remarks that "J. Hillis Miller calls attention to the 
fact that Austin's work is situated within a strong philosophical tradition, reminding us 
that Plato's Dialogues also continually end at impasses in which Socrates proposed that 
they must take up the subject again at a later time"272 but other writers can also be seen 
to match this description.  
 
Consider for example Descartes, who whilst attempting to give definitive answers to the 
questions he studies, can certainly be said to present a text in which, as Andersen says: 
"we observe the philosopher thinking in the present tense, and we think alongside him 
in real time".  The Mediations follow a simple pattern in which Descartes talks us 
through his thought processes as he attempts “to rid [himself] of all of all the opinions 
[he] had adopted up to then, and to begin afresh from the foundations.”273 Through the 
course of these meditations Descartes traces exactly the method of doubt used to 
question everything that would be held as self-evident – the reliability of the senses, the 
nature of mathematics, and so on until through an exercise in extreme scepticism he is 
left with the infamous conclusion that the only thing he can be sure about is his own 
existence.  
 
Similarly, Descartes proceeds to build anew a metaphysical system which allows for a 
new confidence in commonly held beliefs such as those he had previously doubted, 
based upon what he demonstrates through his working to be logical and sensible 
foundations. Although it is questionable whether he succeeds in the endeavour – in 
particular one might criticize his insistence on the existence of God to justify a belief in 
the trustworthiness of the senses, especially given the nature of the arguments for said 
existence – there is a clear pattern of working ongoing: throughout each of his 
 
271 Andersen, pp. 196–97. 
272 Andersen, p. 197. 
273 Rene Descartes, “Discourse on Method and The Meditations”, London: Penguin Classics(1968) p.95 
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meditations Descartes explains in detail his thought process, slowly working through 
each idea to come to what is seen to be a natural conclusion. 
We might then argue that philosophy, when it is done through a text rather than merely 
described, follows this pattern: both Austin and Descartes present their work in a 
manner which causes us to reason alongside them, to follow precisely a train of thought 
to its conclusion, such that with the conclusion comes, theoretically, a practical 
understanding. 
 
Consider, however, Spinoza's Ethics, a work written not in a format promoting a 
dramatization of ideas, but rather though the “geometrical order”. Borrowing from the 
mathematical writings of Euclid, Spinoza attempts to present his metaphysical system 
using, rather than the classical philosophical essay, a method in which, essentially, an 
argument is presented not by working through the thought process but instead by 
beginning with simple definitions and axioms which are taken to be self-evident and 
from there offering propositions and proofs which are seen to logically follow from said 
basic components. There will be no necessity for a working through in the Cartesian 
sense, as the method being employed is one which on the surface assumes that mistakes 
cannot be made. Indeed the reader might be tempted to think that the method is a 
detriment – for example Aaron V. Garrett suggests that his hypothetical reader may 
view the text as “an exemplar of a sort of philosophical formalism that places validity of 
argument far above the needs of the reader…a philosophy bound by the laws of 
mathematical deduction.”274  
 
This is of course only half of the story – like Austin, Spinoza’s major work was 
posthumously published. Edwin Curley notes however that “his work did circulate in 
manuscript form before it was published and received some very illuminating criticism 
from a young German nobleman, Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus, who carried on 
an extended correspondence with Spinoza, sometimes through their mutual friend, 
George Hermann Schuller.”275  Is it perhaps the case that it is in this correspondence 
that Spinoza’s philosophy is in fact “done”? We shall consider then two possibilities: 
that Spinoza does philosophy through his method, similarly and yet differently to the 
 
274 Aaron Garrett, Meaning in Spinoza’s Method (Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), p. 7. 
275 Translator’s introduction to Benedict Spinoza tr. By Edwin Curley, “A Spinoza Reader”, New 
Jersey:Princeton university Press(1994),p.xxxiii 
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manner in which philosophy is done by Descartes or Austin, or that instead 
philosophy’s “method”, if it may be called such, is simply a reporting of philosophy that 
was done through private correspondence, comparable perhaps to Austin’s discussion 
groups. We shall begin by considering the latter. 
 
One may begin by claiming that the geometrical method has a precedent as a “mere” 
reportage in a work published during Spinoza’s life, the Principles of Cartesian 
Philosophy.276 The Principles consists of an application of the geometric method to 
Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy, itself adapted from the Meditations and Discourse 
on Method. It is not, we might argue, an original work of philosophy so much as it is the 
taking of a work and clarifying it: a commentary through paraphrase, useful to clarify to 
the student of Descartes the points made when read alongside the original text. Likewise 
then The Ethics, we may argue, can be seen similarly: it represents a finished product, a 
report of ideas previously had, and, as it lacks a rigorous demonstration of thought 
process complete with wrong turnings and evolutions of thought when a previously held 
idea was proven fallacious or incomplete, it does not in itself aid understanding. This 
reading is not without precedent – Garrett observes that “some interpreters of Spinoza 
consider the [geometric method] to be primarily a teaching method used to dress up 
ideas acquired in some way independent of their geometrical presentation”277 and 
indeed that:  
there are very good reasons to interpret the geometrical method this 
way. Spinoza wrote the Principles of Descartes’ Philosophy to present 
Descartes’ works to a student not capable of fully grasping the ideas of 
the ethics…hence one of the functions of the Principles of Descartes’ 
Philosophy is to present previously discovered results…in accessible 
dress. As this is the function of the [geometrical method] in Spinoza’s 
Principles, it is likely also a function of the method in the Ethics.278  
If we are to follow this line of thought we may ultimately conclude that goal of the 
Ethics is a reportage of ideas and not an independent source of the understanding 
through thought process of those ideas.  
 
 
276 Spinoza tr. By Samuel Shirley, “Principles of Cartesian Philosophy with Metaphysical Thoughts”, 
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Rather the fuller understanding is understood in the context of the letters – for lacking 
the ability to converse with Spinoza himself directly we must rely instead on his 
responses to his critics. It is through seeing objections raised or clarifications requested, 
the manner in which Spinoza responded to them, and in some cases the examples of 
suggestions which came to be reflected in the final work, that a glimpse into the thought 
process going on behind the work was gained, and so likewise access is granted to a 
possibility of understanding. 
 
In contrast, we may note that, although it may have been spawned as a learning aid, 
Spinoza’s Principles is not merely a straight conversion to the geometric method: in 
places Spinoza will directly present Descartes’ definitions and axioms, in others he 
“either expands or supplements”279 them. The geometric method, then, in this case 
might be seen to add to the conversation, “doing” philosophy by not simply presenting 
Descartes’ arguments but presenting them in a manner which does not merely 
complement but rather enhances them, placing them in a new light and a new context. 
 
Although the work is not written in a manner in which we follow through a 
dramatization of ideas being formed and considered, the "geometrical order" 
presentation of the work results in the reader being carried through each and every 
logical step in the author's thought process, designed in such a way that, in agreeing to 
the relatively innocuous early definitions and premises, the reader will have little choice 
but to agree with the ultimate conclusions. Further, why should the reader not accept the 
initial definitions? In defining substance as “what is in itself and is conceived through 
itself”280 and attribute as “what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its 
essence”281 he remains firmly within common-sense Cartesian principles which might at 
the time have been readily accepted by his readers. 
 
The Ethics is not the Meditations, however, in more ways than simply the method of 
laying out the arguments. Spinoza was openly critical of Descartes, and his drawing 
upon Cartesian principles to reach entirely new and different conclusions may be seen 
 
279 Steven Barbone and Lee Rice, introduction to Spinoza, Principles p.xxi 
280 Benedictus de Spinoza, E. M. Curley, and Benedictus de Spinoza, ‘The Ethics’, in A Spinoza Reader: 
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132 
as a cunning method of critiquing what he viewed as subpar ideas. Things may be 
muddied even further when we take on board Garett’s suggestion that the specific goal 
of the Ethics is to be transformative of the reader: “Spinoza’s philosophy is kind of self-
clarification therapy for those capable of self-clarification”282 with self-clarification 
being here seen as a manner in which the clarifying of philosophical problems in 
general results in an improvement to the mental clarification of the individual. He notes 
that this reading follows within the general philosophical practice of the time. That 
“many of the best-known philosophers prior to the twentieth century were not primarily 
interested in providing ingenious arguments in response to outstanding problems or 
questions, but wanted to change readers, dialogue partners, or listeners, or to allow them 
to change themselves, in such a way that they might become happier and wiser.”283 
Spinoza in this reading may be seen to be simply following in the tradition of Socrates, 
the gadfly of Athens who would attempt to improve the minds of his dialogue partners 
through challenging those things they thought uncritically to be true. In interpreting the 
Ethics in this way we see a very clear laying forth of the answers to the biggest 
problems in philosophy – the nature of metaphysics, the correct way to live one’s life, 
and so on.  
 
Further, there is an issue here of what we may dub first philosophy. Descartes’ 
Meditations of course were in first philosophy, but what is his first philosophy? 
Certainly it is not logic, for the Meditations begin with its undermining, and likewise 
ethics makes no appearance. Rather Descartes’ first philosophy is metaphysics – it is 
upon, not logic but rather his own existence and that of God that he is able to create a 
foundation for further thought. Spinoza, meanwhile, does not take metaphysics to be 
first philosophy – although it is the primary subject of the Ethics and is the core focus of 
the initial chapters- rather the putting forward of his arguments are made on an 
assumption of the concrete trustworthiness of the logic which Descartes places such 
scepticism towards. Thus it is that we see why the Mediations cannot be in the 
geometrical method whilst the Ethics cannot truly be written in the narrative form of the 
armchair philosopher: each thinker takes as first philosophy what the other sees as 
secondary, and vice versa. 
 
 
282 Garrett, p. 7. 
283 Garrett, pp. 6–7. 
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 Andersen, it should be noted, would seem to disagree that too much of a similarity can 
be drawn between these thinkers and Austin: "despite his dogged pursuit of clarity, 
Austin clearly avoided traditional, formal, and logical structure. One could say that he 
never arrives at propounding an argument, per se, ending his lecture..."by offering to his 
readers 'the real fun of applying it in philosophy'(Austin 1975,164)"284. She further 
argues that Austin's ideas were developed over a long period of time, being refined over 
the course of multiple lectures, "each communication...like a public performance of a 
work in progress"285 and that even when the work was finally published, posthumously, 
"its final published form owes everything to its editors; the text we have today, in which 
we situate the origin of performativity, is in fact a highly hybrid object."286  
 
A hybrid object maybe, and yet there are important points which, I would argue, link 
the texts under scrutiny in such a way that minimises the problem that Austin's work 
might be distinguishable by a lack of philosophical rigour which the others may lay 
claim to. The most important of these is the previously mentioned issue of authority, 
and perhaps it is this which all philosophical works have in common in terms of their 
performance. 
 
It is generally accepted that it is a fallacy to argue that a particular argument gains its 
validity or truthfulness purely from having been made by someone who is perceived to 
be an authority. However in practice in choosing to approach an argument at all, either 
to agree or to rebut, we implicitly allow that the author has an authority of some sort -
indeed it may seem that such authority is implicit in the language being used: author and 
authority are not merely similar words but both rooted in the Latin augere, to originate 
or promote - which is the authority to put forward (promote) their point of view – 
indeed to reject an argument out of hand may be to reject that authority, and to deny any 
validity to the performance of the argument. Consider Jennifer Hornsby’s claim that “a 
group that is said to be ‘silenced’…is one whose members may be thought of as 
incapacitated as fully successful doers of some [speech] acts.”287 Hornsby argues that if 
a speech act such as a refusal of consent is ignored, then the individual has been 
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effectively silenced such that the proposed act was not merely ignored but in fact did 
not take place  
Similarly we might argue that by the denial of authority to the one putting forward a 
philosophical argument, we cause them to be silenced such that no argument has been 
made – rather than “doing philosophy” they have been reduced to a dead performance 
of discussion.288  
 
Are there multiple forms of authority at work here? To make an argument may imply 
the authority of promotion, but can we separate that from authority of origination? By 
making a distinction we draw a stark distinction between doing philosophy and merely 
discussing philosophy. Under this paradigm the doing of philosophy involves the 
originating of ideas through ritual. As these rituals are in some way performed by a 
group, with the authority as the central figure who directs and helps control the new 
ideas as they are disseminated to the other participants - it is a pedagogical exercise, 
with both types of authority resting in the lead figure(s). This philosophy that is done is 
distinct from the philosophy which has only promotion authority, which is philosophy 
that is not done but rather simply discussed. It is a dry and theoretical philosophy which 
does little to create in the participants new ideas, and yet it is still a ritual: a ritual of 
confirmation or reinforcement perhaps, rather than a ritual of creation or (re)definition. 
It is the philosophy which is done, which carries with it both forms of authority and 
which is, in some sense, alive that is of interest to this chapter.  
 
It is from here that I make the following crucial claim, that shall occupy the remainder 
of the thesis and that is central to the entire text: that what links Austin, Descartes, and 
Spinoza in their very distinctly different methods of presentation, and which also links 
them to all other thinkers when they actively “do” philosophy, is a shared first 
philosophy. Although it may seem that Descartes gave primacy to metaphysics, that 
Spinoza gave it to logic, in fact it is performance that is first philosophy.  
 
¶5. Writing 
I have suggested that the presentation, or in other words the methodology of an 
argument may be as important as the argument itself: that the reader may be more 
 
288 A more full discussion of the difference between live and dead philosophy shall follow shortly. 
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influenced not by what they read but by how it is written. To gain a fuller understanding 
of this we should ask the question, what is it to write? To ask this question of course 
implies that writing has some “essence” that we can examine, but is this the case?  
To understand the essence, if it exists, of writing we might look to writers for an 
answer. Such an approach may be understood as an extension of the phenomenological 
method: the writer is one whose primary activity is the act of writing, and so their 
comments on their vocation will be, in principal, an introspective analysis which will 
allow an insight more considered or in-depth than one to whom writing is a peripheral 
or incidental activity. George Orwell, for instance in his essay Why I write observes that 
“From a very early age…I knew that when I grew up I should be a writer. Between the 
ages of seventeen and twenty-four I tried to abandon this idea, but I did so with the 
consciousness that I was outraging my true nature and that sooner or later I should have 
to settle down and write books.”289 
  
With a lifetime of experience as one destined to be a writer, he claims that there are 
“four great motives for writing, at any rate for writing prose”290 and that these motives 
are “sheer egoism”, “aesthetic enthusiasm”, “historical impulse”, and “political 
purpose.”291 It is perhaps not coincidental that although the bulk of the essay is 
dedicated to the political purpose in his own work, Orwell dedicates more time to 
explaining the role of egoism than to the other three motives. Historical impulse (the 
“desire to see things as they are, to find out true facts and store them up for the use of 
posterity”292), meanwhile, is relegated to a mere sentence. The role of aesthetic 
enthusiasm is perhaps one which is of value to us: “the aesthetic motive is very feeble in 
a lot of writers”293, we are told, but yet “even a pamphleteer or writer of textbooks will 
have pet words and phrases which appeal to him for non-utilitarian reasons; or he may 
feel strongly about typography, width of margins, etc. Above the level of a railway 
guide, no book is quite free from aesthetic considerations”294.  This is a point to return 
to later: is word choice within writing a significant form of ritual?  
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The bulk of the essay is taken up by Orwell’s declaration that in his writing the primary 
motivation is politics: “Every line of serious work that I have written since 1936 has 
been written, directly or indirectly, against totalitarianism and for democratic socialism, 
as I understand it. It seems to me nonsense, in a period like our own, to think that one 
can avoid writing of such subjects. Everyone writes of them in one guise or another. It 
is simply a question of which side one takes and what approach one follows.”295 He also 
notes however that this concentration is a product of his time and circumstances rather 
than natural proclivity and that “In a peaceful age I might have written ornate or merely 
descriptive books, and might have remained almost unaware of my political loyalties. 
As it is I have been forced into becoming a sort of pamphleteer.”296 We might question 
whether this point is a tacit acknowledgment that his true primary motive is in fact that 
which he listed first – indeed in writing an essay entitled Why I Write the author places 
the I in a central position both figuratively and literally. The title, and indeed the 
concept are an exhibition of egoism. Thus when Orwell declares that “all writers are 
vain, selfish, and lazy"297 we can easily be tempted to see his words as a projection of 
his own experience on to all other writers. Nonetheless, as we shall see, there is some 
truth here. 
 
While Orwell theorises on the deeper motives of the writing process, Stephen King 
states that “most books about writing are filled with bullshit”298 and that “fiction writers 
– present company included – don’t understand very much about what they do – not 
why it works when it’s good, not why it doesn’t when it’s bad.”299 King’s use of bullshit 
is interesting – the word is one which is notoriously one which we hear used on a 
regular basis but which most might find difficulty in defining. Perhaps the best 
interpretation is given, and one which is valuable here, is in Frankfurt’s On Bullshit, in 
which bullshit is seen to be a form of misrepresentation, regarding “neither the state of 
the affairs to which it refers nor the beliefs of the speaker concerning that state of 
affairs”300 but rather “what [the bullshitter] is up to”301. Frankfurt contends that “the fact 
about himself that the bullshitter hides…is that the truth-values of his statements are of 
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no central interest to him…he does not care whether the things he says describe reality 
correctly. He just picks them out, or makes them up, to suit his purpose.”302 Perhaps 
most pertinently to King’s statement, Frankfurt notes that “bullshit is unavoidable 
whenever circumstances require someone to talk without knowing what he is talking 
about”303 – exactly the situation conjured by the claim that most writers lack an 
understanding of writing.  
  
This raises a potential problem of course: if fiction writers are predisposed to bullshit 
when discussing writing, why should writers of non-fiction necessarily be immune? 
Orwell’s introspective analysis may well contain truth, but also an element of ideas 
which exist as much to serve his egoist purpose of sharing that self-analysis with his 
public. Does this study of writing also risk falling into the trap of being mostly bullshit? 
The answer is that such a risk does exist and that we must be aware of it. However it 
may (hopefully) be avoided, or at least mitigated, by maintaining throughout an 
awareness that this is not an attempt per se to answer a question of what it is to write, 
but rather to frame the exercise of writing within the wider context of performance in its 
role as first philosophy. 
 
King goes on to declare that writing is “telepathy, of course!”304 Placing the writer in 
the role of transmitter and the reader as receiver, he asks us to “assume that you’re in 
your favourite receiving place just as I am in the place where I do my best transmitting. 
We’ll have to perform our mentalist routine not just over distance but over time as well, 
yet that prevents no real problem; if we can still read Dickens, Shakespeare, and (with 
the help of a foot note or two) Herodotus, I think we can manage the gap between 1997 
and 2000.“ Two effects are immediately achieved here: firstly that reading and writing 
are set up as two roles in the same activity, with the one being dependent upon the other 
to find meaning, and secondly a setup has apparently been created for the demonstration 
that is to follow, although as shall be seen the setup may be seen as part of the 
demonstration. 
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King moves on to the overt demonstration. He describes a scene involving a rabbit in a 
cage and observes that although the details may be different the reader will still 
visualise the essential details: “we’re having a meeting of minds.”305 This meeting of 
minds may be of value: let us turn to Wittgenstein. In his discussion of reading in the 
Philosophical Investigations he presents us with some invented symbols. Concentrating 
on one particular symbol, “i” which, due to its lack of availability on a word processor, 
will be replaced in this context with the equally arbitrary ₪. He proposes that we 
“compare an individual letter with such a squiggle…it does of course make a difference 
whether I say “i” when I see “i” or when I see “₪”. The difference is, roughly, that 
when I see the letter, it’s automatic for me inwardly to hear the sound “i”, even against 
my will, and that I pronounce the letter with less effort when I read it than when I am 
looking at “₪”.306   
 
This observation would seem to tie in to King’s: just as it is the case that seeing a letter 
will bring to mind the sound with which we have been trained to associate it, and 
likewise the combination of letters will form words, so on a more abstracted scale the 
putting of those symbols into particular orders to describe a scene can cause an image to 
be brought forth into mind – of course as demonstrated by the discussion of “₪”, the 
symbols themselves are somewhat arbitrary – the letters used in the writing of this 
thesis for instance are largely used by the chance of my first language being one which 
uses the Latin alphabet and in another place could as easily be Cyrillic, Arabic, Kanji, 
etc. 
  
Considering this relative arbitrariness of letter systems, and with the telepathy 
illustration which provides an interesting model for consideration, should we perhaps 
place reading and writing as two sides of the same coin, with the one being pointless 
without the existence of the other? Are there multiple categories of writing to consider? 
We might categorise them first as those writings which are for the benefit of the writer 
and those which are written with another audience in mind. For the latter there are those 
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writings which are to be read and those which are to be performed in another manner307. 
Within this there may also be progressions. Consider the diary, which will often exist in 
multiple forms: the author’s original writings, often a collection of thoughts written 
largely for their own benefit (although in some cases an intention to publish may be 
there from the start), the author’s second version revised and edited with publication in 
mind, the editor’s version, and finally many years later an edition containing all three 
published together for scholars.   
 
This brings us back to a previous observation: the role of word-choice. Orwell has 
observed that word choice may come from a sense of aesthetic appreciation but let us 
suggest that further, the choice of aesthetic is a ritual which, just as with the choice of 
subject, theme, or a different behaviour entirely, acts to question or empathise identity 
and, in the case of the meeting-of-minds ritual of writing, may play a role in 
demonstrating with the reader some form of shared or opposed identity. Alternatively 
could it be that there is what we may deem a bullshit-ritual, which intends to 
demonstrate a shared identity which does not exist, and in doing so is in fact a ritual of 
determining oneself to be a bullshitter? 
 
I will now indulge in a light form of self-psychoanalysis in an attempt to further draw 
out these distinctions. Consider first this piece of text: as with any other academic text 
intended to be read by another, the process of crafting it is slow and drawn out, with 
constant backspacing and rewriting of passages that do not scan well or that went off on 
an unwanted chain of thought. As much time is potentially spent on the consideration of 
what to write as on the actual writing. The writing style tends towards being 
conversational-yet-academic, with technical terms and esoteric concepts used with an 
assumption that the reader has a certain level of familiarity with the field. For a contrast 
we might turn to the travel diary which accompanies me wherever I go: a cheap-
looking, thin brown leather cover into the spine of which are attached elastic ties which 
hold in place three thin Moleskine notebooks with cardboard covers (does the choice of 
Moleskin, a brand which markets itself as having a direct association with Van Gogh 
and Hemingway, act as a ritual itself?) 
 
307 An interesting point arises: are those texts written to be read aloud classed amongst those to be read, or 
those to be performed? Already we see that these rough categories are guidelines rather than absolutes. 
Indeed it might seem that to perform still requires to read, and thus perhaps the wording here is 
unsatisfactory. 
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The left-most of these notebooks is a so-called “bullet journal”, with most pages a list of 
dates with daily tasks (as well as the scores for baseball games played by the 
Philadelphia Phillies…) written in.Although an occasional page will contain some other 
jotted content (a brief design for a board game, a recipe for masala chai). Each morning 
I carry out the daily ritual of copying the day’s tasks from my academic planner, and 
they are short and to the point – the intention being to make a note of what has been 
done, rather than to be of any particular interest.  
The middle notebook is used for academic work and contains a mixture of content. 
Primarily, there are rough drafts of paragraphs which I have written out by hand before 
typing them up, as a way to collect thoughts in a manner allowing for more thought and 
less room to endlessly delete and retype than using a word processor allows. These 
sections are written to be read, and genuinely are almost identical to the final versions 
which end up on the page. Secondly there will be quotes from books, written out 
verbatim along with a page reference. These will genuinely be written out whilst 
reading a work either for research or occasionally for pleasure. Thirdly there are notes 
taken during presentations – these are often memory aids which are not intended for 
reading by anyone other than myself and resultantly are often clipped and of little value 
without context (“Identity politics lost sight of class”, “the avant-garde comes from the 
dictatorship of the proletariat”, “Kafka once arranged a hook-up using ‘sign 
language’”).  
 
Standing out within the notebook is what might be described as a diary entry, marked 
June 26th 10:47 AM, describing my thoughts whilst standing at the grave of Franz 
Kafka at the New Jewish Cemetery in Prague. Written over two and a half pages, the 
language used is simplistic and down to earth, in a personal first-person style and 
contains both empirical observation and reflections on my own thoughts at visiting the 
final resting place of a favourite writer. What is its purpose? It is certainly out of place 
in the notebook and would have perhaps made more sense placed on a page in the bullet 
journal. At the time of writing there was certainly a thought of the possibility that it 
might find its way onto a page intended for dissemination, and it is perhaps under that 
understanding that it found its way to accompany rough chapter drafts and research 
notes.  
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Notebook number three is a comedy notebook, used to jot down potential jokes for 
standup routines. Most of the notes are even more cryptic than those in the second 
notebook (“Bunking off to do sight-seeing during conferences”, “Philosophical tools – 
what are they? Not Brian Leiter!”, “Academic guilt”), being intended often to spark an 
idea as much as anything, whereas in other cases there are short paragraphs sketching 
out the basics of a joke, or a section of a routine. Whether or not a joke is fleshed out on 
paper or not there will generally not be a full writing down of the final version, which is 
created through a spoken process of repetition and experimentation and memorised as it 
is written/rehearsed.  
We see above three different writings, separated handily into categories by their being 
in three different books. The three have similarities – all three contain notes intended for 
an audience of one and which are naturally cryptic and unuseful – but also differences 
marked down specifically by their intended use and target audience. The differences 
may yet highlight a commonality in the rituals of writing, however: consider for 
instance that the academic and comedic notebooks both contain both scribbled notes 
and longer extracts which form the basis of a final written product. In both cases what is 
written is evolved -in the former case through rewriting and redrafting, and in the latter 
through repetition and rehearsal. Further, academic work can also find its way into a 
spoken presentation form, as for instance in a conference presentation. Although the 
methodology will be different, there is still much similarity: the presentation will be 
worked through on paper through writing, rewriting, and memorisation/rehearsal rather 
than through a largely oral development, perhaps, but still there can be seen a root 
process. 
 
What is the significance of this excursion into writing? Methodology and writing would 
seem to be heavily intertwined, but as we have seen this means much more than simply 
a style of writing or a procedure. Writing, Orwell suggests, carries with it motive. It is 
also, as Orwell and King both seem to agree, to some extent a performance (either in 
terms of aiming for an aesthetic quality, or in the nature of what it is that the process of 
writing/reading does). This performance is one which, as King suggests, may be 
intertwined with the "performance" of reading – even if the only reader is the original 
writer, still writing is a transmission of ideas, and reading a reception of the same. 
 
An important factor in this analysis has been that in the case of both Orwell and King, 
the opinions put forth were as part of an introspection into their own writing. By 
142 
embarking in a similar manner upon an examination of my own writing process I have 
revealed, if not an exact insight into my methodology or the manner in which the style 
and format of this thesis serves to act in a manner similar to those I have ascribed to 
others, certainly a view of some of the everyday rituals which the behaviours around my 
own writing process enact. This serves to complete a pattern: Orwell offers insight into 
the why of writing, King gives a performative illustration of the what, but the question 
of how – the methods around writing – are surely ones which will not be universal.  To 
analyse one's own writing, then, is surely of more interest than to simply ruminate on 
the self-analysis of an Other. The individual writer will have their own set of rituals, 
choice of notebooks or writing implements, points of aesthetic interest, and so on. What 
will be common amongst all these things is the existence of rituals. The writer is a 
ritualist, and their rituals will all have potential, in some manner, to feed into the final 
performance transmitted to the reader. 
 
By understanding writing/reading as a linked ritual we should find ourselves able to 
further understand exactly what is going on when a particular writing methodology is 
used, in terms of its performance, and so from there we should be able to apply the 
principles gleaned to new methodologies in line with our proposed claims of the ability 
to create a ritual which will allow an argument to be approached on merit. 
 
¶6. Implicit Bias 
It is a point of almost universal acceptance amongst philosophers of a certain kind that 
the answers to many questions may be found logically. Consider the statement by Quine 
that “Logic… has its business in the pursuit of truth. What are true are certain 
statements; and the pursuit of truth is the endeavour to sort out the true statements from 
the other, which are false”.308 The pursuit of truth as simply the separating of true 
statements from false seems a fairly simple one, and we will not even find cause to 
disagree, on the face of it, when he goes on to declare that “All that counts, when a 
statement is logically true, is its structure in terms of logical words. Thus it is that 
logical truths are commonly said to be true by virtue merely of the meanings of the 
logical words.”309 Such sentiments are found even in less complex texts, such as 
 
308 Willard Van Orman Quine, Methods of Logic (london: Routledge, 1962), p. xi. 
309 Quine. 
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introductory textbooks: “A valid deductive argument is an argument in which it is 
impossible for the conclusion to be false given that the premises are true.310”.  
 
The implication in such statements is that the place of first philosophy is taken by logic 
– we need simply find the statements about the world that are deductively valid and 
therefore true, and we will have the groundings of reality. However, we may easily see 
the flaw in this approach when applying it to the real world: the fact that so many 
different viewpoints, opinions, philosophies exist offers us the observation that logical 
validity is not all that is required to convince one of a viewpoint. We shall suggest then 
that there are several factors, which shall be explored shortly, that get in the way of 
rational discussion. We shall refer to them as implicit biases, and we shall situate them 
as being in several groups – firstly those which are related to the person making the 
argument, the circumstances in which it is presented, and so on (which we shall call  
external factors) and secondly those related to the person who is receiving the argument, 
which include emotional factors, spiritual factors, and factors involving the degree of 
difference between accepted beliefs and those that are being presented (which we shall 
dub internal factors). After examining these factors, we shall attempt to suggest a 
manner in which, by placing performance as primal within philosophy, we can find 
methods in which to mitigate them based in part on an understanding of 
emotions/existential moods based on the writings of Martin Heidegger. 
 
An implicit bias may be defined in several different yet essentially similar ways, such as 
“a term of art referring to relatively unconscious and relatively automatic features of 
prejudiced judgment and social behaviour”311, “the bias in judgment and/or behaviour 
that results from subtle cognitive processes (e.g., implicit attitudes and implicit 
stereotypes) that often operate at a level below conscious awareness and without 
intentional control”312, or “the attitudes or stereotypes that affect our understanding, 
actions, and decisions in an unconscious manner.”313 In essence an implicit bias then is 
 
310 Patrick J. Hurley, A Concise Introduction to Logic, 8th ed (Australia ; Belmont, CA: 
Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2003), p. 41. 
311 Michael Brownstein, ‘Implicit Bias’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N. 
Zalta, Spring 2017 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2017) 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/implicit-bias/> [accessed 4 April 2017]. 
312 ‘Implicit Bias FAQs Rev.Pdf’ 
<http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Gender%20and%20Racial%20Fairness/Implicit%20Bia
s%20FAQs%20rev.ashx> [accessed 4 April 2017]. 
313 ‘Understanding Implicit Bias’ <http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/research/understanding-implicit-bias/> 
[accessed 4 April 2017]. 
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a form of discriminatory attitude which happens at a level below that of conscious 
belief: for example an individual may be essentially egalitarian, believing in full gender 
equality and yet at an unconscious level associate women as less capable of certain 
forms of work or activities, thus resulting in an unrealised automatic discrimination 
such as taking the same work less seriously if it is undertaken by a woman than by a 
man, even with identical outcomes.  
 
¶7. External Factors 
A practical example in action on a more subtle scale may be the previously discussed 
example of the Trump-Clinton political debates which were re-enacted with the 
participants’ genders switched in a production arranged by New York academics (see 
Chapter 4). That an audience predisposed to see Donald Trump’s debate performance as 
decidedly lacking would find that the identical performance was exceedingly 
convincing when coming from a woman raises a variety of questions, most obviously 
the nature of the biases that exist on gendered grounds but perhaps also on the nature of 
biases coming from knowledge of the presenter: to what extent can the change in 
response be said to come not from the change in gender but rather the change entirely in 
presenter? Do Trump’s arguments seem more convincing when coming from a woman, 
or is it rather the case that the viewer who is familiar with Trump’s behaviour prior to 
the debate will allow that behaviour on a subconscious level to interfere with the 
manner in which the debate performance was received? Likewise is it the case that 
Hillary Clinton’s performance seems less effective coming from a man, or is it that 
receipt of the argument would be affected by factors such as her reputation from her 
ongoing political career and previous role as First Lady, by her having been the first 
female Presidential nominee from a major party, and so on?  
 
This raising of questions leads to a further point which is of great importance to the later 
parts of this chapter. Consider the case of Martin Heidegger, a philosopher who 
famously was not merely a member of the Nazi party but an enthusiastic supporter who 
never publicly repented. Whilst always a controversial figure, the debate over 
Heidegger’s value was recently reopened with the publication of the so-called “Black 
Notebooks”, in which it is alleged that proof exists that Heidegger’s philosophy cannot 
be separated from his politics, and that a level of extreme antisemitism can be found. To 
an individual so predisposed to such a viewpoint, will my use of Heidegger as a basis 
for a model of emotion risk being found intolerable? And if so is there the possibility 
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that such an individual might then decide, even if at a subconscious level, that the work 
cannot be taken seriously or should be treated to a less charitable reading than is 
deserved? Such questions should be extended outwards to other philosophical works as 
a whole: do implicit biases result in Heidegger being treated unsympathetically? What 
of other philosophers? Perhaps the most obvious application is in the alleged division 
between “analytic” and “continental” philosophy – do thinkers who align themselves to 
one or the other side of the divide risk approaching thinkers of the other with 
uncharitable biases?  
 
Likewise biases may exist due to factors immediate during the presentation of the 
argument: consider for example, if one were to attend a presentation of a paper at a 
major event held at a prestigious academic institution and the presenter arrives late 
wearing an Adidas tracksuit and Burberry tartan baseball cap as well as having an 
obscene word written on their forehead. An extreme and unlikely example perhaps, but 
it is probable that in seeing the speaker to be such an exact match to the stereotype of 
the undereducated working class teenage thug members of the audience may become 
predisposed to viewing the paper through a lens of being presented by just such an 
individual. The use of this example in itself may even be fraught with issue – does 
discussing the negative implications behind such a stereotype suggest a level of 
judgmental criticism of the working class being implied, and if so does this open me up 
to valid criticism? Such questions do not have a straight and easy answer, I suggest, 
precisely because the perspective taken will depend upon the implicit biases of the 
reader. 
 
¶8. Internal Factors 
Leon Festinger’s When Prophecy Fails, a study on cognitive bias amongst groups 
which were subjected to very clearly failed prophecies, begins with the following 
observation; 
 
A man with a conviction is a hard man to change.  Tell him you 
disagree and he turns away.  Show him facts or figures and he 
questions your sources.  Appeal to logic and he fails to see your point. 
We have all experienced the futility of trying to change a strong 
conviction, especially if the convinced person has some investment in 
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his belief.  We are familiar with the variety of ingenious defences with 
which people protect their convictions, managing to keep them 
unscathed through the most devastating attacks.314 
 
This quote may be said in many ways to summarise the heart of the internal factors of 
implicit bias: that an individual, when presented with an argument which would seem to 
contradict those beliefs which they hold with some particular conviction, will often 
choose to reject the argument and indeed even the evidence (as can often be seen in the 
political arena when discussing major issues concerned both with the expert consensus 
around particular issues of policy and on issues such as the personal behaviour, 
characteristics, or even parentage of particular individuals.)  
 
This may be seen to happen for various different reasons, perhaps the most obvious of 
which can be seen in the very presence of conviction. When we use the term conviction, 
there is often carried, above the simple plain definition of a firmly held belief, an 
implication that the belief in question is one on which the believer places great stock, 
and may to some extent place great value. Indeed convictions we may say are those 
beliefs which are most often played out in rituals of identity. There is a great emotional 
investment in our convictions as we regularly play them out as a signifier of who we 
believe ourselves to be. Extending further then we should find it reasonable to suggest 
that one will be more likely to accept an argument which is in full agreement with their 
convictions, whilst an argument which is the polar opposite of that conviction will be 
rejected harshly. It may then be suggested that we can expect an argument to be more or 
less accepted by an individual depending upon the degree to which it differs from 
existing convictions, with those which are closer, or bear more similarity, being the 
more acceptable. We would perhaps be wise to listen to Nietzsche’s claim that 
“convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies”315, a claim which may be 
seen to echo in the 20th century development in psychology of the theory of cognitive 
dissonance, which “centres around the idea that if a person knows various things that 
are not psychologically consistent with one another, he will, in a variety of ways, try to 
 
314 Taken from an extract at ‘When Prophecy Fails’ <http://www.whenprophecyfails.info/> [accessed 12 
April 2017]. 
315 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human All-Too-Human Part 1, trans. by Helen Zimmern, The Complete Works 
of Friedrich Nietzsche (New York: Russell & Russell, 1964), VI, p. 355. 
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make them more consistent”316 and notes that “sometimes it may be very difficult or 
even impossible to change behaviour or opinions that are involved in dissonant 
relations.”317  
 
Another facet of the internal factors must also be mentioned, which is that of spiritual 
experience. In discussing spiritual experience it is not an intention to discuss necessarily 
the nature or truth-validity of such experiences, but rather to note that to many people 
spiritual experiences are a very real and actual occurrence, and that in such cases these 
experiences may play a strong role in their belief in a particular conviction (consider the 
stereotypical believer in a particular religion based up on faith despite evidence). 
William James, for instance, notes that “feeling is the deeper source of religion, and that 
philosophic and theological formulas are secondary products”318 such that he would 
“doubt if dispassionate intellectual contemplation of the universe, apart from inner 
unhappiness and need of deliverance on the one hand and mystical emotion on the 
other, would ever have resulted in religious philosophies such as we now possess.”319 
 
This is a clear placement of feelings as prior to logic, and offers a gateway into the 
possibility of a new first philosophy other than the ones which we previously observed: 
a first philosophy which is not, however, feelings but as we shall see something else. Is 
it spirituality? This is also a seemingly obvious candidate but one which shall also be 
rejected. Rather this new first philosophy is revelation. That is to say that to the 
religious or spiritual mind that which comes prior to all other assumptions is the 
individual’s connection to supernatural knowledge. This might be best understood 
through the analysis that has been made by religious philosophers.  
 
To begin with, Alvin Plantinga in his Warrant series discusses what he refers to as the 
“Aquinas/Calvin (or A/C) model”320 which states that “there is a kind of faculty or a 
cognitive mechanism, what Calvin calls a sensus divinatis or a sense of divinity, which 
 
316 Leon Festinger, ‘Cognitive Dissonance’, Scientific American, 207.4 (1962), 93–102 (p. 3). 
317 Festinger, p. 4. 
318 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature, ed. by Martin E. 
Marty, The Penguin American Library (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England ; New York, N.Y: Penguin 
Books, 1982), p. 431. 
319 James, p. 431. 
320 Alvin Plantinga, ‘Warranted Christian Belief - Oxford Scholarship’, 2000 
<http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195131932.001.0001/acprof-9780195131932> 
[accessed 24 October 2017]. 
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in a wide variety of circumstances produces in us beliefs about God.”321 Thanks to this 
sensus divinatis, “we don’t consciously choose to have those beliefs. Instead, we find 
ourselves with them, just as we find ourselves with perceptual and memory beliefs.”322 
We might say then that in this position revelation is seen as beliefs regarding the 
spiritual which are simply placed within us by God, just as though they were come upon 
through the senses. Spiritual beliefs then are grounded in their having been placed by an 
outside factor.  
 
Meanwhile, if we return to Levinas we may find an alternative view of revelation, this 
one taken from a Jewish perspective. Levinas begins his essay Revelation in the Jewish 
tradition by describing “the Revelation” (revelation being presented as a singular proper 
noun already seeming to offer at least on the surface a major importance) as “an 
abnormal and extraordinary relationship, able to connect the world we inhabit to 
something which is no longer of this world.”323 This would seem already to give us 
echoes of Plantinga’s A/C model, as the idea of a linking between the inhabited world 
and the unworldly could just as easily describe the sensus divinatis. Likewise Levinas 
seems to be aiming towards similar conclusions when he asks, “how can we make sense 
of the ‘exteriority’ of the truths and signs of the Revelation which strike the human 
faculty known as reason? It is a faculty which, despite its ‘interiority’, is equal to 
whatever the world confronts it with. But how can these truths and signs strike out 
reason if they are not even of this world?”324  
 
Rather than point merely to a sensus divanatis however, Levinas points to the Jewish 
oral law, the Talmud, and to the practice of rabbinic discussion and interpretation such 
that “the Revelation is [a] continual process of hermeneutics, discovering new 
landscapes in the written or oral Word, uncovering problems and truths locked within 
each other.”325 This is tempered by the observation that “in principle, the human mind is 
inherently open to inspiration and that man is inherently able to become a prophet…the 
receptivity of the prophet already lies within the human soul.”326 What we then are 
looking at is, within at least the context of the Judeo-Christian approach to revelation, a 
 
321 Plantinga. 
322 Plantinga. 
323 Emmanuel Lévinas, ‘Revelation in the Jewish Tradition’, in The Levinas Reader, ed. by Seán Hand, 
Blackwell Readers (Oxford, UK ; Cambridge, MA, USA: B. Blackwell, 1989), p. 191. 
324 Lévinas, ‘Revelation in the Jewish Tradition’, p. 192. 
325 Lévinas, ‘Revelation in the Jewish Tradition’, p. 199. 
326 Lévinas, ‘Revelation in the Jewish Tradition’, p. 204. 
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belief by which the individual has an in-dwelling faculty which, under the correct 
circumstances, will allow them to bypass reason in order to receive knowledge directly 
from an external supernatural source. Revelation as first philosophy, then, is the placing 
of “spiritual” experience in a position of priority over reason. This becomes more 
immediately obvious in its relevance when we see the declaration by Levinas that “the 
entire Revelation is bound up with the ritual practices of each day”327 thus creating a 
direct link between the religious mind’s first philosophy and the performances carried 
out by the individual which, in the specific examples brought to mind by Levinas (those 
of Jewish practice as prescribed from the Talmud) are very blatantly tied in with 
expression and reinforcement of personal identity. 
  
At this point we should ask the question: have we in fact attempted to make two 
separate concepts factors of one another? Whilst the external factors are certainly a 
discussion of implicit bias, it would seem that our internal factors are largely all related 
to concepts of cognitive dissonance in some manner. Cognitive dissonance is however a 
wide-ranging phenomenon in itself and to reduce it to a factor of implicit bias may be 
problematic. As a result it may in fact be more correct for us to argue from this point: 
that of the factors which must be overcome in the communication of an idea, there are 
those factors which we shall dub external and which may be viewed as the domain of 
implicit bias, and those which are internal and which deal rather with the domain of 
cognitive dissonance. 
 
¶9. On Emotions 
My proposed solution to these problems lies in an understanding of performance as first 
philosophy but, to understand the manner in which it is so, we must first visit a concept 
of emotions based on a synthesis of two thinkers, Martin Heidegger and Robert C 
Solomon. We shall first explore Heidegger and his concept of Befindlichkeit, an often 
confusing idea which is sometimes conflated with emotion, although in fact it is best 
understood as a sort of existential state. Macquarrie and Robinson in what is the most 
standard English-language version of Being and Time translate Befindlichkeit as “state-
of-mind”328 although a more literal translation would be roughly “the state in which one 
 
327 Lévinas, ‘Revelation in the Jewish Tradition’, p. 204. 
328 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 172. 
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may be found.” Ratcliffe meanwhile describes Befindlichkeit as “the characteristic of 
finding oneself in a world through a mood”329 whilst Inwood notes that the word 
“combines the ideas of ‘situatedness’ and of ‘feeling/faring somehow’, of where and 
how one finds oneself.”330 Befindlichkeit may be understood in a sense as the lens 
through which the world is disclosed to the individual. Heidegger claims for instance 
that “only something which is in the Befindlichkeit331 of fearing (or fearlessness) can 
discover that what is environmentally ready-to-hand is threatening.”332 As has been 
said, Befindlichkeit is sometimes conflated with emotion but is this conflation justified? 
If so, why does Heidegger neglect the German Gefül, meaning emotion, choosing 
instead to link Befindlichkeit with mood (Stimmung)?  
 
An element of difficulty can be found in this discussion in part because Heidegger does 
not seem to give any direct attention to the issue of emotions, which may lead us to 
question whether they even have a place in his philosophy, with mood taking their place 
entirely. Commentators have differing interpretations. Kaelin for instance states that “a 
human being is always in some mood; happy or gay (merry), sad or in a blue funk, even 
only bored. In its moods, the human being feels how it is, or knows how “things” are 
going: well or badly.”333 This would seem to conflate mood and emotion together – 
moods to be seen as emotional states which act to filter the manner in which received 
phenomena are interpreted. That is to say that for instance to be happy is to be in a 
happy mood, or to be sad is to be in a sad mood. Dreyfus on the other hand stresses that 
we must “divorce moods from feelings colouring [one’s] world”334, implying that a 
separation is needed - indeed it might almost seem that there is a suggestion that 
feelings (or emotions) not mood create the lens. Is emotion then Befindlichkeit? Dreyfus 
takes his argument from Heidegger’s apparent claim that “the public too can have 
moods”335 in a discussion in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics on what 
Dreyfus refers to as “social moods”: 
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“A human being who… is in good humour brings a lively atmosphere with them. Do 
they, in so doing, bring about an emotional experience [Drefyus: “produces in himself a 
psychic experience”] which is then transmitted to others, in the manner in which 
infectious germs wander back and forth from one organism to another? We do indeed 
say that…mood is infectious. Or another human being is with us… who through their 
manner of being makes everything depressing and puts a damper on everything; nobody 
steps out of their shell. What does this tell us? Attunements [Dreyfus: “moods”] are not 
side-effects [Dreyfus: “not accompanying phenomena”], but are something which in 
advance determine our being with one another. It seems as though an attunement is in 
each case already there, so to speak, like an atmosphere in which we first immerse 
ourselves in each case and in which then attunes us through and through [Dreyfus: “by 
which we are thoroughly determined”]. It does not merely seem so, it is so; and, faced 
with this fact, we must dismiss the psychology of feelings, experience, and 
consciousness.”336 
 
Heidegger’s demand that we “dismiss the psychology of feelings” backs up the divorce 
of mood from feeling, however note also that what Dreyfus translates as “psychic 
experience”, McNeill and Walker call “emotional experience”. Under the latter, these 
social moods are social emotions.  
 
Robert Solomon’s cognitive theory of emotions declares that “emotions are 
judgments”337 whilst “tak[ing] judgment in a way that is not episodic…[and] not 
necessarily articulate or, for that matter, conscious.”338 That is to say the supposed 
judgments being made are occurring at an automatic and subconscious level, at least 
most of the time. These judgments are incredibly complex: 
Each emotion…is a specifiable set of judgments constituting a specific scenario. Anger, 
for example, is to be analysed in terms of a quasi-courtroom scenario, in which one 
takes the role of judge, jury, prosecuting attorney, and, on occasion, executioner…The 
object of anger is the accused, the crime is an offense, and the overall scenario is one of 
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William McNeill and Nicholas Walker, Studies in Continental Thought (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1995), pp. 66–67; Dreyfus, p. 171. 
337 Robert C. Solomon, Not Passion’s Slave: Emotions and Choice, The Passionate Life (Oxford ; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. vii. 
338 Solomon, pp. 186–87. 
 
152 
judgmental self-righteousness… The scenario helps to explain, among other matters, the 
tendency to self-righteousness in anger, which in turn can be used to explain the 
motivation of petty anger and “bad tempers” and provide, in general, the beginning of a 
functional account of emotions.339 
 
In the example case given, we see essentially that anger should be understood as a 
judgment having been made of offence committed against one’s person, with an 
element of self-righteousness. Solomon is sure to emphasise the personal element of the 
judgment: “One might make a judgment – or even much of a set of judgments – in an 
impersonal and uninvolved way, without caring one way or the other. Compare “What 
he said to me was offensive” (but I don’t care what he thinks) and “He offended me!” 
Only the latter is constitutive of anger. (The first is a judgment about the perlocutionary 
act potential of a certain utterance; the latter is, in part, a judgment about my own self 
esteem.”340 
  
This, we may see, ties in to Solomon’s second major slogan, that “we choose our 
emotions.”341 We must emphasise that Solomon does not intend to suggest a level of 
complete control over our emotions, but rather that although “it would be nonsense to 
insist that, regarding our emotional lives, we are ‘the masters of our fate,’ … 
nevertheless we are the oarsman.”342 He remarks that whilst “one cannot simply 
“decide” to have an emotion[…] one can…decide to do any number of things – enter 
into a situation, not take one’s medication, think about a situation in a different way, 
“set oneself up” for a fall – that will bring about the emotion. Or one might act as if one 
has an emotion, act angrily for instance, from which genuine anger may follow.”343 
  
We may certainly understand that this linking of behaviour to emotional reaction is a 
fair one – one may work oneself into a frothing fury by intentionally dwelling upon or 
aggressively spouting off against a potentially offensive trigger – whether “rising to the 
bait” or for intentional dramatic purpose. The naturally shy individual engaging in 
public speaking or performance may “work themselves up” to overcome their natural 
 
339 Solomon, pp. 20–21. 
340 Solomon, p. 21. 
341 Solomon, p. vii. 
342 Solomon, p. 194. 
343 Solomon, p. 193. 
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stage fright. On the opposite end of the scale, one pursing a stoic approach to life may 
temper their emotional reactions by intentionally cultivating an attitude of detachment. 
   
Taken at face value we may think that these two theories are incompatible: Heidegger in 
his discussion of mood and Befindlichkeit attempts to reject the psychology of feelings 
and experiences, however Solomon concentrates specifically on those psychologies. To 
Heidegger, mood is primal in the manner that the world is disclosed, but to Solomon 
emotion is a reaction to a previously-disclosed world. Despite this, I offer the following 
thesis as expressed previously in my dissertation for the degree of Master of Letters: 
“When in a mood, which is a mode of Befindlichkeit, the world is revealed in particular 
ways. Following Solomon, there are emotional states which we shall term derivative of 
the primal emotional states referred to as moods, and which are the result of a 
judgment based on the world as disclosed by that mood.”344 
 
 How we are to understand this, is that we should create a distinction between two 
different types of emotion, which we may refer to as EmotionA and EmotionB. 
EmotionA will refer to those moods or emotions which are primal: those which qua 
Heidegger reveal the world in a certain manner. EmotionB, meanwhile, will refer to 
those which are not primal but rather arise from the primal. If “fear is a mode of 
Befindlichkeit”345 then there is a primal fearful mood which reveals the world in a 
threatening manner and allows us to see the world as threatening. Heidegger’s fear is 
EmotionA, but from it might arise EmotionB, whatever we may call it – in a scenario 
which places judgment upon those things which our fearful mood accuses, we might 
make a judgment of confirmation (an emotional reaction of horror perhaps, or if a 
judgment is made to conflate threat with offense one of anger. Indeed anger and horror 
may often coincide), or rather we might judge that the revealing of a thing as fearsome 
is incorrect and to be disregarded (an emotional reaction of relief). 
 
 
344 Stephen Whitehead, ‘The Philosophy of Horror: A Phenomenological Approach’ (unpublished 
Dissertation, University of Dundee, 2014), p. 26. 
345 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1962), p. 181. 
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§3. Application. 
 
¶10. Emotions 
What is the value of this model of emotion? Consider the following: 
1. EmotionB may arise as a natural reaction to an argument which one might 
encounter. 
2. An emotional reaction to an argument is one which will cloud one’s ability to 
respond in fully rational/logical manner. 
3. EmotionB arises whilst in a state of EmotionA. 
4. We may understand the claim that “we choose our emotions” in part to refer to 
our ability to, through particular actions, moderate the EmotionA state that we 
are currently in and, consequently, the filter through which we understand the 
world. 
5. Performances may alter the EmotionA state of the individual. 
Statement 5 is perhaps controversial and in need of further justification – why should 
we claim that a performance can alter one’s mood, and that any emotional response to a 
performance is not merely an EmotionB response arising from a judgment on the merits 
of the performance? The exact mechanism may well be beyond the scope of this thesis, 
however I would suggest that there are good reasons to believe that such an effect is 
well within the scope of reasonable belief. It certainly seems to be the case that mood 
can be changed as a result of environmental factors – Heidegger does after all suggest 
that mood can be infectious within the confines of a crowd of people. The strength of a 
good book, film, or play, is often that it draws forth an emotional response that was not 
necessarily expected by the audience: a sudden change in mood or tone, say from 
optimism to pessimism or to fear can result in, to use a cliché, an emotional 
rollercoaster. Indeed the cathartic effect of many great works lies precisely in the ability 
to so effect an audience. Let us suggest then that one of the effects that ritual may have 
is in changing the mood of the participants, that as such the manner in which a 
philosophical argument is performed may affect the way in which the argument is 
disclosed to the audience member and so change the judgments that may be made 
towards it. 
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From here we may say that a goal of philosophy is to perform one’s argument in such a 
way that the judgments made of the work are based on the merits of the argument, and 
not on a perceived slight leading to a response that it overly clouded by emotion. The 
manner in which this may be done is a question for further study, which would begin 
with an exploration of how exactly it is that performance affects EmotionA. 
 
Whilst such a study is out with the limits of the current thesis, we might at this juncture 
consider the following: we have seen in our discussion of first philosophy a general 
development in thought, and resultantly in new ways of approaching the world 
philosophically. Indeed we might argue that the general history of philosophy follows 
such patterns, with new thinkers who react to previous thought in order to reveal new 
ways of viewing the same subjects (indeed were this not so, academic philosophy would 
quickly stagnate). Philosophy then may be seen as engaged with the creation of new 
tools for the analysis of the world,346 with those that are given the most attention being 
those which have a value in their current time and context and with some having a 
longer or shorter shelf-life than others.347 With our focus on the role of performance as 
first philosophy we may be opening an opportunity for philosophy to develop those 
tools in new and exciting directions: namely those which move out with the paradigm of 
linguistic communication. Consider the discussion in chapter 2 of utterance and signed 
languages. We have already envisioned a context in which communication can be found 
out with the box into which it is usually found – a language which is primarily 
tactile/visual rather than oral/aural carries with it assumptions regarding factors such as 
privacy, community, and so on which would be alien to the majority of Hearing 
persons.  
 
Moving beyond languages entirely though, examine the following image: 
 
346 To be understood here in a Heideggerian sense of the entire immediate phenomenological environment 
in which Da-Sein exists. 
347 See also Deleuze’s claim that ‘a book of philosophy should be a particular species of detective novel 
[in which] concepts, with their zones of presence, should intervene to resolve local situations. They 
themselves change along with the problems.’ in Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, Continuum 
Impacts Changing Minds, Repr. with corr (London: Continuum, 2011), p. xix. 
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Figure 5 Photograph of youths apparently relaxing whilst the WTC burns in the background. Photograph 
by Thomas Hoepker, originally published in David Friend, Watching the World Change: The Stories 
behind the Images of 9/11 (New York; Godalming: Picador, 2007) an 
Even to one who has never seen this image before, the context is quite clear: the 
photograph was taken on September 11th 2001. In the background we can see smoke 
billowing from the site of the terrorist attacks, a blot on an otherwise peaceful 
landscape. In the foreground, across the bay in Brooklyn a group of five individuals sit 
on the shoreline apparently socialising and relaxing in a state of disregard towards the 
horrors occurring a few miles away. The image is of course one open for debate: are we 
viewing an act of callousness, in which the ongoing events are quickly forgotten about 
and allowed to pass into the background? Or if the photograph had been taken a few 
moments before or after would we have seen an entirely different apparent response to 
the attack? Whilst these questions are important, they do not come until after the 
immediate emotional response to the image. Removed from any sort of context, or 
dependent upon the context it is placed in, the image could be used to communicate to 
the viewer a commentary on the American culture. A more recent photograph 
demonstrates a similar point: 
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Figure 6 Photograph taken in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on Westminster bridge. Photograph by 
Jamie Lorriman and reproduced without permission. 
 
 
The photograph was taken in the direct aftermath of another terrorist attack, this time in 
London on March 23rd 2017. Central and in the background of the photograph this time 
is a victim of the attack, critically injured after having been hit by a vehicle. Whilst a 
group of people stands around in shock, two of them on their knees apparently 
attempting to offer first aid and presumably contact an ambulance, the woman in the 
foreground appears to be walking past and ignoring the scene, instead checking her 
phone. Whilst within the wider context it is known that no such callous behaviour was 
in fact taking place, the image on its own can be seen to give a different story. The 
woman’s dress and skin tone, and the context of a terrorist attack in post-9/11 Britain 
where a high level of distrust against Muslims can be found in some segments of the 
population, allows this picture to be used to communicate without words a dangerous 
message. Just as the group relaxing in Brooklyn might communicate an indictment of 
young Americans, so might this image be used to communicate an indictment of 
Muslims, the subjects of the photographs acting as representatives for their wider 
groups.  
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An image is not in itself a performance, but the displaying and viewing of the image, 
within particular contexts and with or without commentary, as well as the response 
given by the viewer, most certainly is. The photographs discussed above utter comment 
upon the segments of society represented in the frame, a performance which uses an 
image-based “language” outside of what may be conventionally understood in order to 
communicate its message. Rancière draws attention to “the poster showing an anorexic 
young woman naked and wasting away, put up throughout Italy during Milan Fashion 
Week in 2007”348 which acted as “an exhibition of the truth of the spectacle”349 – a 
slightly different working of photography, as its power comes not from the image 
giving an impression which context would reveal to be false but rather from being 
placed within a context which forces the reality behind the performance of the fashion 
industry to be made central in the viewer’s awareness. 
 
A study of such performances should be able then to lead to new tools being created by 
philosophy, tools which allow us to question and understand the world through 
intentionally-choreographed unspoken performances, non-linguistic rituals of 
philosophical questioning. Socrates drinking his hemlock may become not merely a 
demonstration of the conclusion of the philosophically good life, but take on itself a 
new life and a perhaps even a system of philosophy itself. What is proposed is not the 
demolition or removal of language, but rather the expansion of its boundaries. 
 
  
 
348 Rancière, p. 83. 
349 Rancière, p. 83. 
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Chapter Five 
In this final chapter I will provide a demonstration of the ideas discussed in the previous 
chapter, through the medium of a case study on a theoretical theatrical performance. 
This performance would consist of three acts, centred around the exegesis and 
discussion of the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre. Act one shall consist of Sartre’s most 
famous play, No Exit, with Act 2 consisting of David K. O’Hara’s 2012 rebuttal The 
Upstairs Room. The first sections of this chapter will examine in detail these plays, their 
themes, and the manner of their interaction. The theoretical “Act 3” will then be 
discussed, with the bulk of the questioning being what it might consist of and why, and 
the way in which it can be used to maximally push forward an argument or further 
questioning upon the interaction of Acts 1 and 2. Finally I will discuss more fully the 
manner in which this case study relates to the previously laid down framework. This 
third section may be of particular interest, due to the manner in which this thesis has 
progressed: whilst overtly theatrical products have been previously mentioned, and the 
metaphor of theatre has been present throughout the discussion of what constitutes 
performance etc. (especially the metaphor of the theatrum mundi), our focus thus far has 
been on “improvised” and non-theatrical performance, indeed when the previous 
chapter ended we seemed to be focussed on the performance of the communication of 
ideas. The sudden move then to a performance occurring on stage is one which may 
take the reader by surprise. This apparent incongruity shall therefore be addressed in 
detail. 
 
The question may be raised as to why the choice of a theoretical performance is made 
here, rather than focussing a case study on an existing performance. There are two 
reasons: firstly, that the existence of these two plays provided for an exciting point of 
analysis and that unfortunately to the best of my knowledge no performance of the two 
together has at the time of writing been attempted. Secondly, given that no such 
performance has occurred it is my hope that this case study may at some future point be 
used as a starting point for the production of the performance described. 
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§1. No Exit and The Upstairs Room 
¶1. No Exit 
No Exit, first performed in 1944, is a play about three people in hell. Even at this most 
superficial level it can be said to offer a powerful philosophical statement, with the 
famous proclamation that “hell is other people”350 often (mis-)used in popular culture. 
In the play’s scenario three individuals, Garcin, Inez, and Estelle, are placed together in 
a room for eternity and will act as each other’s torturers: Inez, a lesbian, is to be tortured 
by her unrequited attraction to Estelle, whilst Estelle will be similarly tortured by 
Garcin. Garcin, meanwhile, wishes to be recognised as a hero and not as a coward after 
being executed for desertion from the army and recognises that only Inez has the 
necessary insight into human nature to truthfully declare him such, something she 
refuses to do. 
  
For those familiar with Sartre’s work, the torture goes beyond this mere surface level. 
An initial clue exists in the play’s French title, Huis Clos, which is equivalent to the 
legal term In Camera, referring roughly to “closed” proceedings which occur out of the 
public eye. Likewise the characters in No Exit are away from the public gaze, and 
indeed to any gaze other than that of each other – Garcin notes initially that there are 
“no mirrors, I notice. No windows…and nothing breakable”351 such that the torture 
victims are essentially invisible to themselves. This can be seen to tie in to Sartre’s 
concept of being objectified by the gaze of the other (“for the Other I have stripped 
myself of my transcendence”352, he declares, suggesting that one is generally aware of 
one’s self and one’s actions only as an extension of one’s consciousness when alone, 
with the gaze of another causing one to be aware that one exists physically, being 
viewed by the Other as an object), and the “bad faith” of allowing oneself to be defined 
by the other’s gaze (indeed it is precisely the being defined by one another that causes 
their entrapment – Garcin requires Inez to define him as he wishes to see himself, 
Estelle wishes to be defined as an object of attraction by a man, whilst Inez wishes 
Estelle to see her as attractive).  Hell then is not so much other people as it is the “gaze” 
of others, and more precisely that gaze for eternity: the tortured souls are together in one 
room, with no night time and no loss of lights, they do not sleep or blink and cannot die 
 
350 Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘No Exit’, in No Exit, and Three Other Plays, Vintage International ed (New York: 
Vintage International, 1989), pp. 1–46 (p. 45). 
351 Sartre, ‘No Exit’, p. 4. 
352 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology (London: 
Routledge, 2006), p. 286. 
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again. There is no escaping the gaze of the Other even for an instant (indeed implicitly 
for the duration of the play at least, there was no such escape even in the initial 
moments of Garcin’s being alone in the room and would be none even if the three 
characters where to close their eyes or look away from each other, thanks to the gaze of 
the audience from beyond the fourth wall). Contextually this play was originally 
performed in Paris during the occupation by the Nazis and thus the fear of constant 
observation by an enemy “Other” would hold a special resonance to the audience of the 
time, with an implied political commentary occurring. 
   
¶2. The Upstairs Room 
In The Upstairs Room hell is not other people. Indeed, hell is not overtly referenced, 
and there is no direct statement that the characters are in the afterlife (by the conclusion 
only one is directly and unambiguously stated to be dead.) There is however an 
implication of intersubjectivity as a positive force: whereas Inez toward the end of No 
Exit bemoans that “here we are, forever”353, the protagonist of The Upstairs Room, 
Gordon, describes the room in which the play takes place as “a holding place, sort of. A 
stop gap, for those of us seeking a way out. If we make the right connections, see, we 
can escape. We can just go.”354 Gordon, an American writer, finds himself in an upstairs 
attic in a post-apocalyptic London, waiting allegedly for the paperwork required to 
escape on a ferry to America. He is later joined by Stella, an apparent victim of “the 
underground”, with whom he begins a sexual relationship, and then the mysterious Iris 
who forces a revelation of the suppressed truth: that Gordon and Stella were married 
until Stella’s suicide and that he fled to London to find a connection to his lost wife. At 
the play’s conclusion “Stella is gone”355 and the fate of Gordon and Iris is left 
ambiguous, but on a hopeful note.  
 
As with No Exit, the choice of title is an interestingly multi-layered one – the obvious 
meaning is that the events of the play occur in a room on the top floor of a boarding 
house, but there are other possibilities also within. An initial association that one might 
make may be a biblical one – the “upper room” is a common name given to the Cenacle 
in Jerusalem, traditionally held to be the room where many New Testament events 
including the last supper (according to Mark 14:15) and Pentecost occurred. The 
 
353 Sartre, ‘No Exit’, p. 46. 
354 David K. O’Hara, The Upstairs Room (London: Methuen Drama, 2012), p. 22. 
355 O’Hara, p. 54. 
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contribution of such an allusion to the story does not however seem particularly 
obvious, aside from the possibility that the events occur in a form of purgatory. A more 
overt and definite meaning appears initially in scene 3, when Stella is discussing her 
childhood home and reveals that “there was this mysterious upstairs room I discovered 
one day and turned into my own.”356 The story that Stella then tells of the room 
highlights the primary themes of the play regarding interactions with others. As a lonely 
child, Stella would write letters to imagined recipients: 
I wanted to write poetry, you know…but I felt, I always felt, I should be 
sending these to someone. Even the most intimate of intimate details. I 
had to make believe I was sharing with somebody: imaginary sisters, 
imaginary man. All of them living in far away locales.357  
These letters once written were hidden beneath the floorboards and forgotten. Years 
later she returns to the room with a neighbour with whom she is implied to have begun 
a romantic relationship. Having lost the “sense of carefulness”358 which led to hiding 
the letters, she pulls them back out and burns them.  Later, Iris tells a story which is 
revealed to have been one of the ones which Stella wrote in her letters, designed to 
make her feel better in her loneliness. In the story, a lonely owl who is scared of the 
dark flies to a pond every evening to greet her reflection, “pretending…that it’s 
somebody else there keeping her company in the dark.”359 After thousands of such 
nights she meets a fish in the pond, who explains that  
For the longest time, I’ve been down here afraid of the water. So afraid, 
in fact, that I’ve been coming to this side of the pond every night, just 
so I can look up at the moonlight and listen to your voice. Just so I 
could feel I had some company here in this lonely pond.360  
This upstairs room and its stories highlights the play’s themes and response to Sartre: 
that the story involves the creation of an Other through the use of reflections in order to 
fill a gap left by loneliness, emphasises the importance of connection.  
As with Sartre, O’Hara has filled his play with philosophical references of interest to 
those who are looking. Early on, for instance, direct reference is made to both Sartre 
 
356 O’Hara, p. 26. 
357 O’Hara, p. 27. 
358 O’Hara, p. 28. 
359 O’Hara, p. 42. 
360 O’Hara, p. 42. 
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and his critics – searching for paper to feed into his typewriter, Gordon stumbles upon a 
copy of Merealu-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception. Placing it aside, he embarks 
first upon a spate of writing which appears to be intended to shed light on the themes of 
the play:  
The truth. Yes, the truth of writing functions as a life raft. Life-
preserver, I should have said. ‘Truth means Liberation. Fighting for 
absolute clarity and…facticity. Lifting us up from the icy depths. All 
that suffocating fear and darkness.361  
 This is followed up, in the context of Gordon wearing a false beard, by what may seem 
to be a direct reference to No Exit in the form of a reference to the lack of sources of 
reflection, although in this case tagged to an implication that the suffering brought there 
in comes not from a being defined by others but rather the hellishness of solitude and 
the need for others to help create one’s definition:  
Gordon A Mirror. Have-you-gotta-have mirrors for 
this?...Really?...Maybe just a window pane. No? Or a shard 
of…Neither paper not reflections…Really nothing?...A room, a 
situation, sans reflection…He will have to trust himself. Alone. And not 
for the first time. [...]Man alone in the universe, must manage…his own 
disguises. Guard his otherness above all others.362 
At the conclusion of this rant, Gordon notes the possibility of “perhaps a deus ex 
machina to dangle down, mercifully, to him in this shameful self-predicament of his, 
underlining, absolutely, above all, that hell is without a doubt…’ What-was-it-
again?...yeah, ‘other people…’”363 thus placing front-and-centre Sartre’s thesis, which 
the play will rebut.  
 
The talk of the guarding of otherness and managing of disguises is an interesting one, in 
light of Stella’s story later in the play regarding her own upstairs room. Note the loss of 
“carefulness” that came about when she was no longer alone in the room. The existence 
of an actual connection has removed the need for a careful guarding of intimate 
writings, the “poetic licentiousness”364 of imaging the reading of private thoughts gone 
 
361 O’Hara, p. 13. 
362 O’Hara, p. 13. 
363 O’Hara, p. 14. 
364 O’Hara, p. 27. 
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and replaced with a liberating carelessness: “the last thing I wanted was to remember 
what I’d written, hidden so bloody bloody carefully all those years ago. We got ashes 
everywhere, literally everywhere, in our hair, on our skin…Naked, rolling 
around…Careless.365” In the upstairs room, connection with others helps to remove care 
– care for hidden thoughts and desires, care for fear (absurdly of night for the owl and 
of water for the fish), but yet it is facing those careful things that have been forgotten 
which the connections between the cast allow to be fostered.  
Merleau-Ponty re-emerges in scene four: 
Gordon Listen to this instead. ‘The existence,’ it says here. ’The 
existence of other people is a difficulty and an outrage.’ How d’you like 
them (Bad French.) sentiments? 
Iris (to Gordon) But it’s a surprise too, isn’t it? Really at the end of the 
day- 
Stella Pay no attention to him. 
Iris (to Gordon) It’s like, I surprise you and you surprise me.366 
The quote is incomplete – the full line declares that “the existence of other people is a 
difficulty and an outrage for objective thought.“367 The suggestion however of the 
“surprise” element is an interesting one – where Gordon could be seen to be supporting 
Sartre through his quote-mining, Iris turns the idea on its head, suggesting that whilst 
the existence of others may well be a difficulty and an outrage it is also a positive thing, 
a constant “surprising” through interaction with the other. This may seem to be 
reinforced by the final line of the play being Gordon’s expression of gratitude: “Thank 
you, Iris…thank you for coming.”368  
 
 
365 O’Hara, p. 28. 
366 O’Hara, p. 41. 
367 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. by Colin Smith (London: Routledge, 
2005), p. 406. 
368 O’Hara, p. 55. 
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¶3. Two plays ideal for a back to back performance? 
The Upstairs Room exists as a direct rebuttal to No Exit.369 To fully appreciate a rebuttal 
however one must be familiar with the work which is being rebutted.  This creates a 
potential problem: is it fair to expect the audience to be familiar with Sartre’s work 
before seeing the response? Whilst such an understanding is not needed to enjoy the 
play, it is certainly fruitful if one wishes to understand the full breadth of the references 
made. Given that both plays consist of a single act a little over an hour in length, we 
may allow for an interesting solution: performing the two back to back, to ensure that 
the audience not only has the necessary context but has Sartre’s work fresh in mind 
when presented with O’Hara’s rebuttal. O’Hara’s having written the play specifically to 
replace a production of No Exit makes this especially convenient due to the shared 
elements – both have a cast of two male and two female characters 
(Valet/Garcin/Estelle/Inez|Manager/Gordon/Stella/Iris), and similar sets (“A drawing 
room in the Second Empire Style”370 featuring three couches, one of which is green and 
another red|”A dingy attic space, something akin to Alberto Giacometti’s Paris 
Studio…Two couches (one green, one red) have been placed centrally”371).   
 
Further, O’Hara has intentionally included various references to Sartre: the most 
obvious perhaps is the previously mentioned call-out to the famous “hell is other 
people” but others are more subtle. The reference to the dead as “absentees”, for 
instance – in No Exit this usage is clear: after Garcia specifically notes that they are 
dead, Estelle responds with “please, don’t use that word…I suggest we call ourselves –
wait!- absentees.”372 In the Upstairs Room however the usage is more subtle, with 
Gordon’s ontological status kept vague and only hinted at: 
Gordon Can I ask how…How many people have you, uh, successfully, 
you know…spirited away here? 
Manager Absentees, you mean? 
 
369 See O’Hara’s description in an interview of the play as ‘a response to what Sartre was grumbling 
about’ at ‘Rebecca Emin: Interview with David K. O’Hara, Novelist and Playwright’ 
<http://ramblingsofarustywriter.blogspot.co.uk/2012/01/interview-with-david-k-ohara-novelist.html> 
[accessed 7 March 2018]. 
370 Sartre, ‘No Exit’, p. 3. 
371 O’Hara, p. 3. 
372 Sartre, ‘No Exit’, p. 12. 
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Gordon If…that’s the name they’re giving it now. Yeah. Absentees. 
Absentee-ism-373 
Likewise, the aforementioned lack of reflections, and the existence of an unreliable 
bell/intercom to contact the manager/valet (in no Exit, “there’s something wrong with 
the wiring and it doesn’t always work”374 whilst in The Upstairs Room although the 
intercom works perfectly “it’s a special system we have. You must, never…use this 
intercom…Not unless you first get the signal.”375) 
 
A further reason to perform the two plays together is one of interest:  No Exit, it might 
be argued, is on its own a relatively uninteresting play, carrying its single message with 
all the subtlety of a hammer, and featuring largely unsympathetic characters whose 
interactions largely consist of discussing exactly how unlikeable each of them is. The 
scope for literary analysis, as a result, is narrow and limited largely to a few set lines. 
The Upstairs Room, meanwhile, is interesting largely because of its relation to Sartre’s 
work – as a piece on its own the play is arguably not well written, with reviewers who 
described it as “self-indulgent” and “too absurd even for Camus”376 as well as being 
guilty of “losing [the] audience in an(sic) sea of confusion.”377 It is for these reasons 
that the most fruitful analysis of the two plays for this chapter has come about precisely 
in examining the manner in which they relate to one another, rather than as individual 
works. It is this intertextual relationship which causes O’Hara’s play to be elevated 
from an obscure and somewhat marginal piece to one of great scholarly interest. 
 
A question to be considered here is the casting: should each performance have a 
different cast, or should the same actors be used in both. The similarity within the two 
lists of characters would allow for the same four actors to be used in each, either with a 
direct swap to equivalent characters, or with a rotation of roles within (i.e. having one 
actor play Garcin/manager etc.) A partial cast swap may also be an interesting 
proposition in order to emphasise a level of connection, carried out by having the main 
cast change but maintaining the same actor for the relatively minor roles of the 
 
373 O’Hara, p. 8. 
374 Sartre, ‘No Exit’, p. 7. 
375 O’Hara, p. 10. 
376 ‘Too Absurd: The Upstairs Room at the King’s Head Theatre’, One Stop Arts, 2012 
<http://onestoparts.com/review-upstairs-room-kings-head-theatre> [accessed 4 April 2018]. 
377 ‘West End Wilma – The Upstairs Room’ <http://www.westendwilma.com/the-upstairs-room/> 
[accessed 4 April 2018]. 
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valet/manager. As shall be noted in §3. This choice may have an effect also in the 
possibilities of the third “act” of the overall performance.  
 
¶4. A note on staging 
Whilst attention has been given to the setup of the scenery and property on stage, which 
we have seen have distinct shared elements across both performances, the nature of the 
stage for the performances may also be of interest. Generally, theatrical productions are 
performed on a so-called proscenium stage, set out with the audience viewing from one 
side – the metaphorical “fourth wall”, and No Exit was first performed at the Théâtre du 
Vieux-Colombier in Paris, on just such a stage. As an alternative staging however 
consider the “theatre in the round” – an arena style staging in which the stage is central 
and surrounded on all sides by audience members.  If such a stage setup was used for 
No Exit, it could potentially be harnessed in order to draw a further comment on the role 
of the Other’s gaze per Sartre – not only are the characters diegetically unable to escape 
from each other’s gaze due to the constant light and lack of sleep or blinking, non-
diegetically they are under constant surveillance from all angles by the audience, thus 
there is no place they can hide. Such a scenario may seem familiar if we hark back to 
the concept of the co-opticon as discussed in the first chapter. Whilst the scenario is not 
necessarily a true co-opticon (for the audience are not watching one another and may be 
protected from the gaze of the characters by the fourth wall), it is nonetheless one in 
which within the realm of the story there is an effect of all constantly watching, 
viewing, and performing for all. An interesting effect might be achieved through an 
allowance of the fourth wall being broken in order to cause a true co-optical effect. 
 
There are two problems with this staging: the first is that both No Exit and The Upstairs 
Room call for a door through which characters enter and leave. This would be 
impractical without some means of passage between the stage and the area which would 
be conventionally dubbed “backstage”, and further the passage of off-scene actors 
through the audience area could be naturally viewed as a part of the performance. 
Secondly, The Upstairs Room calls specifically for the use of a slide projector, which is 
used to project (although it is unstated onto where) images of Gordon and Stella during 
their marriage. The surrounded stage, lacking a physical wall or any given direction in 
which all the audience will be facing, presents a potential problem for this as there is no 
suitable location for the image to be projected (with the exception perhaps of the roof, 
although as the script specifically notes the existence of a skylight this presents a further 
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issue of immersion-breaking – one which perhaps would be interesting to explore a la 
Brecht…) The projector is essential to the play and cannot be reasonably removed – 
indeed it offers a major thematic point in that it introduces a manner in which Gordon 
and Stella, although robbed of mirrors, may actually view themselves (albeit as figures 
of their past, rather than immediately). Would it be possible to introduce the projector 
into No Exit also? There are points in the play in which the cast discuss what is 
occurring in their absence back in the land of the living, and it would perhaps be 
interesting to project images of such scenes, or indeed of the characters’ pasts at the 
times they discuss them, albeit in a manner implied to be non-diegetic. 
  
Allowing for a moment a more imaginative level of staging consideration (assuming a 
limitless budget both monetarily and in terms of space), a further interesting solution 
may in fact be to stage the two plays in different areas – perhaps by placing No Exit in 
the round theatre whilst The Upstairs Room occurs by necessity of the projector on a 
second, more traditional stage. This opens us up to various possibilities – are the two 
plays still performed one after the other? Alternatively, do we offer two simultaneous 
performances, allowing the audience to purchase a ticket which will allow an entrance 
to each, in whichever order they prefer? Or perhaps allow free movement between the 
two performance spaces, a la Sleep No More.  
 
Can we allow our ambitions to run ever more wild, creating some level of extra 
performance in the same manner, perhaps bringing in the activities of the manager and 
his family, the valet and his uncle (and the other valets?), or even other inhabitants of 
the land of the dead? Perhaps as in Koji Suzuki’s Watercolours, in which an acting 
troupe performs a play taking place across multiple verticals at once, such that the 
audience must view each separately. The separate activities could be stacked one atop 
another, with simultaneous performances linking together in a manner that can only be 
understood after seeing all the separate levels performed. 
 
§2. Act III 
What will our theoretical third act resemble? There are several options which present 
themselves, the most obvious answer being a third play. Even if such a simple solution 
were taken (assuming it to be the best possible option), however, we would still be left 
with the question as to what such a play would be like. I shall now examine in broad 
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strokes various possibilities, both for the format of an original companion piece and for 
other options. 
 
¶5. Denying the Self 
A possible broad interpretation of the two plays is that they centre on conflicting views 
of the nature of the self. In this view to Sartre the self is separated from the other, with 
the individual defining their own essence through their own actions, whilst to O’Hara 
the self is tied up in social interaction, with who one is being defined by and through 
their relation to others.378 A third play might comment on this with a suggestion that the 
self simply does not exist in such terms – presenting the characters as having 
personalities which exist within some sort of flux, perhaps, or in some other way 
drawing upon an emphasis that there is not an ongoing continuation (perhaps by taking 
O’Hara’s narrative tool of partial amnesia exhibited by certain characters and replacing 
it with a total amnesia by all?)  
 
¶6. Sartre’s Response? 
It would be interesting to know how Sartre might respond to O’Hara – unfortunately 
with his having died more than thirty years previously we can only surmise based on his 
existing work how he may have felt. Despite this setback it may be interesting as a 
thought experiment to present a possible response as our third act. Such a response 
would most likely address the issue of bad faith (French: “mauvaise foi”), a key concept 
of Sartre’s philosophy best understood as inauthentic behaviour brought about through 
conformity to external forces. The classic and often referenced example Sartre puts 
forth is that of “a woman who has consented to go out with a particular man for the first 
time”379 and who acts in such a way as to deny her partner’s carnal intentions: “she does 
not want to see the possibilities of temporal development which his conduct 
represents…she refuses to apprehend the desire for what it is; she does not even give it 
a name; she recognises it only to the extent that it transcends itself toward admiration, 
esteem, respect and that it is wholly absorbed in the more refined forms which it 
 
378 This interpretation is offered for instance by Katherine Gregor at ‘Theatre: “The Upstairs Room” – We 
Are Who We Are Not in Spite but Because of Others. | Scribe Doll’s Musings’ 
<https://scribedoll.wordpress.com/2012/11/07/theatre-the-upstairs-room-we-are-who-we-are-not-in-spite-
but-because-of-others/> [accessed 19 March 2018]. 
379 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 78. 
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produces, to the extent of no longer figuring anymore but as a sort of warmth and 
density.”380  
 
In doing this, Sartre wishes to claim that she is effectively denying temporarily her 
physical nature, taking the compliments given purely at face-value removed from their 
subtext and directing them purely at herself as a consciousness. Sartre later notes that 
“bad faith is not restricted to denying the qualities which I possess, to not seeing the 
being which I am. It attempts also to constitute myself as being what I am not.”381 Bad 
faith, in other words, consists of inauthenticity through denying or inventing aspects of 
oneself. It is at heart a rejection of the total freedom which Sartre believes we possess, 
in favour of conforming to some false idea.  
 
O’Hara can most certainly be accused of promoting bad faith behaviour (indeed if the 
interpretation that his message is that we are who we are precisely because of our 
interaction with others is correct, a rejection of the concept of bad faith and an 
embracing of that which would fall under it is central: it is a rejecting one’s freedom to 
authenticity in exchange for a form of determinism). Given that O’Hara has ended on a 
note of hope for the victims, perhaps the response might involve a solution to allow for 
the possibility of hope without falling into bad faith, if such were possible. A potential 
problem of course with this approach is that it places O’Hara in the role of foil to Sartre: 
in this case the production will become one which is specifically geared toward a 
Sartrean analysis. Whilst this is not in itself a negative point is in some way limiting in 
comparison to a performance intended to explore the conversation in a more neutral of 
expansive manner. 
 
¶.7 Merging Plays 
Rather than an entirely new play, an alternative option will be to explore possible 
worlds related to those of the two established plays. We might for instance have our 
performance ask the question of what would happen should the characters in the two 
meet (in such a circumstance the question as to the cast size would again arise – a cast 
of seven or eight will allow for a more interesting on-stage mix of characters. This 
scenario might allow for an examination of personal relationships outside of the 
 
380 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp. 78–79. 
381 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 90. 
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boundaries established originally – will Sartre’s characters be removed from hell with 
the addition of those not chosen to torture them? How will the addition of characters not 
already linked to them affect O’Hara’s? As an alternative could act three involve 
swapping the environments in which the characters are placed, to give a brief 
exploration of how the changed scenario might affect their survival?   
As a more ambitious form of merging, and one which would perhaps be more suited 
towards the 4-actor model, we might attempt to combine the two plays, covering key 
scenes together which slide between the two scripts at key moments in order to create a 
continuity which highlights and emphasises points of connection and similarity between 
the two plays.                      
 
¶8. The Merleau-Ponty Connection 
Merleau-Ponty has previously been cited as a reference, if not a definite important 
influence. A third act might explore further his theories. Consider the following 
passage: 
Until the final coma, the dying man is inhabited by a consciousness, he 
is all that he sees, and enjoys that much of an outlet. Consciousness can 
never objectify itself into invalid-consciousness or cripple 
consciousness, and even if the old man complains of his age or the 
cripple of his deformity, they can do so only by comparing themselves 
with others, or seeing themselves through the eyes of others”.382 
 They key message to be taken here concerns that as one experiences the world 
particular labels do not exist phenomenologically – rather they are only understood 
from viewing oneself from the other’s perspective. This differs from Sartre in that he 
understands one’s essence to be created by one’s behaviour, whereas Merleau-Ponty 
seems to be suggesting, rather, that such concepts stem from how those actions are 
perceived within a social framework. Our third act might find a way to explore this 
concept in a more explicit manner than the oblique referencing provided by O’Hara. 
 
§3. A Deleuzian approach? 
A further and perhaps important insight into this theatrical performance may be found in 
the work of Gilles Deleuze, particularly within the context of his discussion of what has 
 
382 Merleau-Ponty, p. 504. 
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been dubbed by commentators “minor theatre”. This concept is found primarily within 
Deleuze’s 1978 essay One Manifesto Less, originally published alongside Carmelo 
Bene’s script for Richard III: or, The Horrible Night of a man of War as a volume 
entitled Superpositions. It should be noted that this publication together does raise a 
serious challenge: the essay cannot be divorced entirely from its original context, as if it 
can be read independently to glean a particular truth or rule. Parts III and IV in 
particular contain close analysis of the actions occurring on stage in Bene’s play whilst 
a familiarity in general of his wider works and events related to him such as the politics 
surrounding the initial production of S.A.D.E is presupposed of the reader. Despite this, 
an English-language version of Superpositions, or of the script for Richard III, is not 
readily available – rather One manifesto Less is found separately and translated 
specifically for the 1993 collection of essays entitled The Deleuze Reader. Despite this, 
there are principles which we shall find may be of direct application to No Exit and The 
Upstairs Room. 
 
¶9. “Minor Theatre” 
Deleuze begins by telling us that Bene proclaims his work to be “a critical essay on 
Shakespeare”383, albeit a critical essay which is immediately unusual as it “is in itself a 
piece of theatre”384 – a play as a critique of a play. This criticism is further unusual in 
that it does not, so to speak, add literature to the play in the manner of an essay written 
to be read alongside the original and thus somehow shed light upon it. Rather, the 
criticism is enacted by “subtract[ing] the literature, for example [subtracting] the text, a 
part of the text, and [seeing] what happens.”385 This subtraction is not random however: 
rather, “it is the elements of power, the elements that make up or represent a system of 
power, which are subtracted, amputated, or neutralized.”386 Why the elements of power? 
Because “the elements of power in the theatre are those which assure at once the 
coherence of the subject dealt with and the coherence of the representation on stage”387 
This removal acts to allow Bene to create entirely new stories out of original works, and 
further “it is not only the theatrical material that he changes, it is also the form of the 
 
383 Gilles Deleuze, ‘One Manifesto Less’, in The Deleuze Reader, ed. by Constantin V. Boundas (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 204–22 (p. 204). 
384 Deleuze, ‘One Manifesto Less’, p. 204. 
385 Deleuze, ‘One Manifesto Less’, p. 205. 
386 Deleuze, ‘One Manifesto Less’, pp. 206–7. 
387 Deleuze, ‘One Manifesto Less’, p. 207. 
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theatre… which releases…a nonrepresentational force always in disequilibrium.”388 It is 
this nonrepresentational force which will later be given the title of “minor theatre” by 
those commenting upon it. 
 
The concept of the minor theatre as interpreted from Deleuze is one which, as the name 
suggests, is based on the concept of minority, specifically as relates to the use of 
language. Discussing the concept of a “minor” language, Deleuze proclaims that “major 
and minor do not so much qualify different languages as different uses of the same 
language”389 and that the minor use of language is one characterised by “immanent, 
continuous, and regulated variation.”390 This variation is described as “the theatre of 
language”391 and it is this variation that is seen to be central to the concept of minor 
theatre. For instance Cull argues that “Deleuze’s essay…articulate[s] a…methodology 
for creating a theatre of ‘non-representative force”.392 Cull further suggests, referencing 
Todd May, that the variation is synonymous with the “difference-in-itself that, for 
Deleuze, constitutes the real”.393 This variation, Deleuze claims, exists in all language to 
some extent as “you will not arrive at a homogenous system that is not still worked on 
by immanent, continuous, and regulated variation: this is what defines every language 
by its minor use; a broadened chromaticism. a black English for every language.”394 If 
“major languages are languages of power”395 then the minor use of a language is the 
way in which the powerless minorities work upon it (the “black English” found in 
certain communities in America being highlighted by Deleuze perhaps because it is the 
most notable example within popular culture)396 – this may be compared to Deleuze & 
Guattari’s commentary on Kafka in which they observe that “a minor literature doesn’t 
come from a minor language; it is rather that which a minority constructs within a major 
language.”397 This concept is interlinked with the claim that a hallmark of a minor 
 
388 Deleuze, ‘One Manifesto Less’, p. 207. 
389 Deleuze, ‘One Manifesto Less’, p. 210. 
390 Deleuze, ‘One Manifesto Less’, p. 210. 
391 Deleuze, ‘One Manifesto Less’, p. 210. 
392 Laura Cull, ‘Introduction’, in Deleuze and Performance, ed. by Laura Cull, Deleuze Connections 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), pp. 1–21 (p. 5). 
393 Cull, p. 5. 
394 Deleuze, ‘One Manifesto Less’, p. 210. 
395 Deleuze, ‘One Manifesto Less’, p. 209. 
396 One wonders how Deleuze would respond to the rise of hip-hop culture in today’s society – would 
such musicians be viewed as performing a type of minor literature? 
397 Gilles Deleuze, ‘Minor Literature: Kafka’, in The Deleuze Reader, ed. by Constantin V. Boundas 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 152–64 (p. 152). 
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language is in its “deterritorialization” – that the members of the minority group “live in 
a language that is not their own…or no longer…know their own and know poorly the 
major language they are forced to serve”398 and that, as such, their usage of the language 
will be highlighted by its being different to the “major” or standard usage, marking 
them out as a minority.  
 
Whilst the minority of the language in question is emphasised in the explanation of 
minor theatre, there is a second minority at work: that of the author. Just as the minor 
literature is written in a minor language, so too it is written by a minority. The criteria of 
the minor author is that he is “untimely”399 – that whereas the major author writes works 
that are relevant to the present in which he or she is writing (that is to say, the major 
author interprets his time), the minor author is “without future or past, she has only a 
becoming, a middle, by which she communicates with other times, other spaces.”400 
This criteria of untimeliness is important as it highlights Bene’s use of the works of 
others in his role as minor author – to Deleuze any work can be made major through its 
being “normalised”401 and made relevant to the current time in which it is performed.  
 
This effect is seen in Shakespeare when his work “is subjected to the traditional theatre, 
his magnification-normalisation”402 and yet it is perfectly possible to “conceive of the 
reverse… to impose a minor or minimising treatment in order to extricate becomings 
from history, lives from culture, thoughts from doctrine, grace or disgrace from 
dogma”403 and that it is such a procedure which Bene performs in order to “rediscover 
in him this active minoritarian force.”404 If the mark of the minor author is that he 
speaks in a minor language, then the mark of the minor theatre when applied to a major 
author is it moving of the language from major to minor. 
    
It is here that we return to Deleuze’s opening discussion of Bene’s “Critical operation”: 
just as the major language is a language of power and the minor is one which subverts 
the major, so the amputation of power through “the subtraction of stable components of 
 
398 Deleuze, ‘Minor Literature: Kafka’, p. 156. 
399 Deleuze, ‘One Manifesto Less’, p. 208. 
400 Deleuze, ‘One Manifesto Less’, p. 208. 
401 Deleuze, ‘One Manifesto Less’, p. 208. 
402 Deleuze, ‘One Manifesto Less’, p. 208. 
403 Deleuze, ‘One Manifesto Less’, p. 208. 
404 Deleuze, ‘One Manifesto Less’, p. 208. 
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power”405 with the result of “a nonrepresentational force always in disequilibrium.”406 is 
at the heart of minor theatre. Deleuze shows two ways in which this is done:  
 
The first is specific to Bene in his adaptations of the works of others, and is the removal 
of those characters from the performance who “make up or represent a system of 
power”407 such as “Romeo [from Romeo and Juliet] as representative of the power of 
families; the master [from S.A.D.E?] as representative of sexual power; the kings and 
princes [from Richard III] as representatives of the power of the State.”408. It is this that 
allows the minor theatre to be a theatre of becoming – the concept that the interesting 
part of the story is not how it ends but rather what happens to get there. The removal of 
elements of power results in a concentration on the becoming-other of the characters 
who remain – Mercutio in Romeo & Juliet, the slave in S.A.D.E and the titular character 
of Richard III.  
 
The second is in the aforementioned “theatre of language” – it is the causing of 
language to “stammer”. How this is achieved may vary – In the case of Bene, “an 
assemblage of overlapping recorded and live voices in a complex score”409 is used in 
order to create what Deleuze dubs “a kind of Sprechgesang”410, but Deleuze does not 
intend to prescribe any exact method for the creating of a stammer other than that of 
“impos[ing] on the language…the work of continuous variation.”411. With no 
prescription given, we find ourselves faced with the question unanswered as to how the 
performing of language may be affected.  Whilst clues to this question are to be found 
elsewhere in Deleuze’s writing, in particular The Exhausted, Deleuze’s 1992 afterword 
to a collection of teleplays by Samuel Beckett, such a direction risks creating a 
distraction from the main topic at hand, and as such I will now turn to examine the 
application of the concepts so far discussed to the topic of Sartre and O’Hara. 
 
 
405 Deleuze, ‘One Manifesto Less’, p. 207. 
406 Deleuze, ‘One Manifesto Less’, p. 207. 
407 Deleuze, ‘One Manifesto Less’, p. 206. 
408 Deleuze, ‘One Manifesto Less’, p. 207. 
409 Cull, p. 10. 
410 Deleuze, ‘One Manifesto Less’, p. 211 Original emphasis. 
411 Deleuze, ‘One Manifesto Less’, p. 213. 
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¶10a. “His critical essay is in itself a piece of theatre.”412 
If O’Hara’s play is a response to Sartre’s, can it then be viewed as a “critical essay”? It 
is perhaps a stretch to suggest that it serves this function in the same manner as Bene’s 
production serves according to Deleuze, however the familiarity of elements between 
the two plays does suggest that there is perhaps some credibility: whilst O’Hara’s 
characters are not Sartre’s, they carry surface similarities as regards their names and 
genders. The setting likewise carries its similarity as well as its stark differences. Even 
certain story beats can be seen to coincide. At a stretch we might even suggest that 
O’Hara has, intentionally or unwittingly, emulated the subtraction of the elements of 
power: whilst No Exit reminds us throughout that overlords of hell are ultimately 
responsible for the fates of the cast, going so far as to actively toy with them (the 
opening door to freedom at the climax of the play), in The Upstairs Room there is a 
noticeable absence of any higher (lower?) power.  The location is unexplained, as is the 
ultimate fate of Stella when she leaves the upstairs room. 
 
¶10b. “The play ends with the constitution of the character”413 
Alongside this apparent amputation of power, is there also a theatre of becoming-other? 
Again it may be stretching somewhat to make such claims, however, there is certainly a 
“becoming” involved: as has been already stated the apparent theme that O’Hara wishes 
to explore is one which suggests that the self is constituted by exposure to the Other, 
and to this extent we see the characters develop and to some extent change in their self-
understanding through their interactions and the climactic revelation of the truth.  We 
might even suggest that the revelation is interesting precisely because it returns a level 
of power that has been temporarily amputated through the characters’ amnesia: the 
forces imposed by the marriage relationship, by the implied social pressures and mental 
health issues which led to Stella’s suicide, and so on. 
¶10c. “How are we to understand this relationship…between the original play and the 
one derived from it?”414 
Deleuze sees in Bene’s critique an amputation of power not only from within the play 
but from the theatre itself: 
 
412 Deleuze, ‘One Manifesto Less’, p. 204. 
413 Deleuze, ‘One Manifesto Less’, p. 206. 
414 Deleuze, ‘One Manifesto Less’, p. 204. 
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Now the elements of power in the theatre are those which assure at 
once the coherence of the subject and the coherence of the 
representation on stage. It is at the same time the power of that which 
is represented and the power of the theatre itself. In this sense the 
traditional actor has an ancient complicity with princes and kings – the 
theatre, with power: thus Napoleon and Talma…When [CB] chooses 
to amputate the components of power, it is not only the theatrical 
material he changes, it is also the form of the theatre, which ceases to 
be “representation” at the same time that the actor ceases to be an 
actor….And the originality of his approach, the ensemble of his 
procedures, seems to us to consist first of all in this: the subtraction of 
stable components of power, which releases a new potentiality of 
theatre, a nonrepresentational force always in disequilibrium.415 
This concept of a non-representational theatre is one which O’Hara does not approach: 
there is no removal of the “elements of power” from the theatre and indeed the 
production is scripted very much in the traditional manner. The role of our “third act” 
may be to find a manner in which to implement such a subtraction. To do this in a 
manner emulating Bene – with the use of combined live speech and “lip-synch” for 
instance – puts a risk of lacking originality, however it does open to interesting thought 
– what happens for instance when the productions of the two plays are allowed to 
overlap and interfere with one another, thus breaking the sanctity of the magic circle in 
which the performance occurs – if the play as performed by rote is near-ritualistic then 
the introduction of such disequilibrium via the simultaneous performance of two 
different plays attacks the power of the theatre by breaking its sanctity.416 
 
§4. Wider Context 
What is the purpose of this excursion into theatre, and how does it fit in to the wider 
arguments of this thesis? In the previous chapter I suggested (§3) that “a goal of 
philosophy is to perform one’s argument in such a way that the judgments made of the 
work are based on the merits of the argument”, that “philosophy may be seen as 
 
415 Deleuze, ‘One Manifesto Less’, p. 207. 
416 A similarity can perhaps be found in the productions of “Shitfaced Shakespeare” annually performed 
at the Edinburgh Fringe Festival, in which a Shakespeare play is performed with the twist that a randomly 
selected cast member is subjected to the consumption of vast quantities of alcohol immediately before the 
performance – a disruption resulting in truly unpredictable consequences! 
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engaged with the creation of new tools for the analysis of the world”, and that the 
boundaries of language may be expanded outside of those which are conventionally 
understood and into the realm of “intentionally-choreographed unspoken performances, 
non-linguistic rituals of philosophical questioning.” It may seem at first that these 
claims have little to do with the preceding case study – are theatrical performances not 
after all ones in which the arguments are not so overt as they are implied, and is theatre 
not one of the oldest tools of analysis, and is the performance in question not, on a 
surface reading, one which is decidedly lacking in a move out with conventional 
language boundaries? For the rest of this section I will examine each of the three points 
in order to rebut the objections, and then argue for the lessons learned here to be applied 
to other, non-theatrical, performances. 
¶11. Problem: That “a goal of philosophy is to perform one’s argument in such a way 
that the judgments made of the work are based on the merits of the argument”, yet in 
theatrical performances arguments are generally implied rather than boldly stated. 
A theatrical performance is not one which is conventionally considered as having an 
argument as central to its purpose. Even in the case of No Exit, in which the overriding 
theme is explicitly declared by a character in the closing moments, the themes are 
largely implied rather than stated. In this particular case study, things become more 
complicated – what is the argument? Both plays carry their own arguments (or one an 
argument and the other a counter argument), and the performance of act 3 will likewise 
carry one, but is any of the three arguments the overall argument being made, or is there 
a fourth unspoken argument occurring in the interaction?  
To understand the answer, we must first ask what exactly the purpose is of this 
performance, to which there are two possible answers. It is either one of using the two 
existing plays as a tool for advancing a third argument, or it is to showcase the two 
plays in order to emphasise the dialogue occurring between them. In either case the 
overall argument of the performance as a whole is not to be found within any single 
script, but rather exists intertextually – a point which will be directly relevant to ¶13. If 
the role of the performance in this case is to hinge upon the merit of the argument rather 
than any factors around it, then perhaps it is to be said that the previously mentioned 
“boring” and “overt” nature of No Exit as a play is a merit here – the play being of small 
literary interest allows an emphasis to be placed upon the themes in the dialogue, and 
with the correct use of staging and relating of the plays to one another, we should be 
able to draw attention away from the plays as literature and on to the performance as 
conversation. 
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¶12.  Problem: That “philosophy may be seen as engaged with the creation of new tools 
for the analysis of the world”, yet theatre is an incredibly old tool. 
This problem might be taken further, with the observation that the issues explored by 
Sartre and O’Hara are also old and well-discussed issues, that there is no real 
philosophical or academic novelty involved, other than the format of the performance 
being an unusual one.  In response to this criticism, however, it should be noted that the 
tool in question is not the type of performance in itself but rather the combination of 
variables – we should not view this performance in terms of its components (theatrical 
performance, the two different plays, the themes and messages of the plays, and so on) 
but rather the whole that is created, such that this particular performance not only stands 
alone but also each possible variation of scenes and of stagings has the potential to be a 
new tool of illumination through the uncovered themes and ideas.  
 
¶13. Problem: That our interest is in “intentionally-choreographed unspoken 
performances, non-linguistic rituals of philosophical questioning”, yet this performance 
is decidedly and clearly within traditional linguistic and spoken boundaries. 
Let us return to the point raised in ¶11 that the overall message of the performance is 
contained intertextually – that is, it is not so much an overly broadcast or spoken point, 
but rather a message communicated to the audience through the unspoken links and 
relations between the different performances which make up the three acts. These links 
and relations may be seen as comparable to the discussion of photographs and images 
raised in the previous chapter (§3). The goal then of this performance will be in part to 
focus when selecting elements of staging, costume, format, etc. on the unspoken 
message which may be transmitted through their interaction, and how this will allow the 
audience to analyse and consider the arguments given, placed into their own merit. 
 
¶14. Fitting it all together 
From a goal of understanding the communication of philosophy through its 
performance we moved in this chapter to an analysis of a theoretical performance of 
two or three plays. I have offered rebuttals to three objections which might have placed 
this case study into a category of irrelevant to our overall goal, how then shall the case 
study be applied? The answer may be found in §4: does Deleuze offer us a bridge 
between theatre and straight philosophy? There is already a breaking-down that has 
180 
been revealed: the play as “critical essay”, the “non-representative” nature of the 
performance (although we must tread carefully in this area: for have we not committed 
to the idea that ritual is in some way tied up in representation of a sort? If the roles of 
rituals are to either present or question identity then it would seem that only one form of 
performance, that which questions rather than asserts, can fall into the non-
representational category herein discussed.)  
 
Deleuze offers for consideration towards the close of One Manifesto Less a broader 
meaning of minority, that of a universal “becoming in which one is engaged”417 and 
borrowing this concept we might declare the “minor performance” to be one concerned 
with a becoming of who one is, removed from the definitions imposed by others – the 
ritual which designates one’s identity or the ritual which questions it may both be 
brought together as the ritual which causes one to become that which one is constantly 
asserting through one’s own rituals, rather than how one is described by external 
authorities. 
 
In the theatrical performance as critical essay, just as in the lecture as critical essay or 
the critical essay written down as critical essay, there will be laid out both overtly and 
covertly certain mannerisms, references, particular uses of language and so on which 
will be suggestive of ritual, which speak to the viewer/listener/reader in such a way as 
to challenge or speak to pre-set ideas. No Exit alongside and interlaced with The 
Upstairs Room provokes us to bring about new perspectives and understandings of 
both, which may not have been obvious separately, and which the standard essay may 
not be able to draw out with such distinction. Is it perhaps the case that it is in 
provoking our performance as it originally existed to stammer that we are freed to the 
possibilities to change that performance, with that change in itself being a ritual of 
questioning and altering?  
  
 
417 Deleuze, ‘One Manifesto Less’, p. 221. 
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Conclusion 
 
Jan Snoek, in his discussion of the initiation rituals of Continental Freemasonry, gives 
the following description: 
During the opening ceremony, the basically ordinary room to be used 
for the ritual is transformed into a sacred space by first verifying if the 
room is guarded against outsiders getting in and if all present have the 
degree which will be worked in, and then marking the ritual space and 
time, proper for performing the ritual. Once this is done, a performative 
speech act, such as the Master of the lodge pronouncing the words 
“Brethren, in the name of the Great Architect of the Universe, I declare 
the Lodge duly open for the purposes of Freemasonry in the First 
Degree” (Emulation ritual, ed. 1976), followed by knocks with a 
hammer by the Master and the two Wardens, effectuates the 
transformation. Now the initiation ritual properly can be performed. 
The closing ceremony finally inverses the transformation, usually 
again with a performative speech act, this time by one of the Wardens, 
such as “Brethren, in the name of the Great Architect of the Universe, 
and by command of the W[orshipful] M[aster], I close the Lodge” 
(Emulation ritual, ed. 1976), accompanied by the usual knocks.418 
These rituals, he further notes, “exhibit the characteristics of initiation rituals as found 
throughout the ages in all cultures all over the world.”419 Certainly within this simple 
description we see clearly marked out the elements of performance discussed in this 
thesis. There is a set “sacred space” in which the ritual will be performed: it is a space 
which can, as in Brook’s stage, be any ordinary room but which is specially set aside for 
purpose through its use in the rituals. Further, the space becomes the stage of 
performance through its combination with actions (the “marking…proper for the ritual”, 
the use of “knocks with a hammer”) and utterance which acts performatively through its 
 
418 Jan A.M Snoek, ‘Masonic Rituals of Initiation’, in Handbook of Freemasonry, ed. by Jan A.M. Snoek 
and Henrik Bogdan, Brill Handbooks on Contemporary Religion, volume 8 (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2014), 
pp. 321–27 (p. 322). 
419 Snoek, p. 326. 
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being uttered by those with the authority make the required declarations. Whilst the 
opening and closing ceremonies and the ritual are described in such a way as to give the 
impression of being three separate occurrences happening sequentially, they are the acts 
of a single performance, with a clearly delineated beginning and end. It can however be 
noted that within this performance there are separate rituals occurring: for the initiate, 
the important ritual is the initiation which grants a new identity as part of a group, 
whilst for the other participants there is a ritual of confirmation – a re-enactment of sorts 
which reinforces an identity into which they are already initiated. The element of re-
enactment becomes most clear in the initiation of the degree of Master Mason, in which 
the myth of the death of Hiram Abiff is “simultaneously retold, and performed with the 
candidate in the role of Hiram”420. 
 
 
Throughout this thesis, several threads have intertwined. In choosing this particular 
ritual as an example to begin my conclusion, I perceive that they are visibly highlighted 
within: the first thread, Befindlichkeit, as discussed in Chapter Four, refers to a 
particular mood which the opening and closing ritual creates. The other threads are 
introduced in Chapter One: Ritual speaks for itself, whilst the role of playful and 
unplayful approaches are down to the individual and are perhaps available to little direct 
analysis other than the acknowledgment that, like all rituals, they will occur. 
Performativity’s place is clearly stated by Snoeak: the speech act is performative in a 
classic Austinian sense of an utterance which causes an effect on the world whilst the 
actions of the hammer and so on may also be said to take a performative role. Finally 
the theatrum mundi and the co-opticon exist in the background, inasmuch as they 
describe the wider meta-setting of the ritual. 
 
Thread One: Befindlichkeit 
In Chapter One ( 2), I referred to Sicart’s assertion that play is a mode of being. The 
language used, describing play as “a form of understanding what surrounds us and who 
we are, and a way of engaging with others”421 bears a striking similarity to Heidegger’s 
concepts of Befindlichkeit, or attunement, as discussed in chapter 4 (¶11). Heidegger, in 
 
420 Snoek, p. 326. 
421 Miguel Sicart, Play Matters, Playful Thinking (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2014), p. 6. 
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introducing the term, notes that “what we indicate ontologically by the term 
[befindlichkeit] is ontically the most familiar and everyday sort of thing; our mood, our 
Being-attuned.”422  Macquarrie and Robinson, as has been noted, translate befindlichkeit 
as state-of-mind although in doing so they also observe that “it should be made clear 
that the ‘of-mind’ belongs to English idiom, has no literal counterpart in the structure of 
the German word, and fails to bring out the important connotation of finding 
oneself.”423  
 
I would like to draw attention to another unseen point in the translation. The phrase 
translated our “mood, our being attuned” is in the original German, “die Stimmung, das 
Gestimmtsein”424. Gestimmtsein is a compound verb consisting of two verbs: the ever-
present Seinen (to be), and Stimmen. Stimmen refers to the tuning of a musical 
instrument such that we might understand Gestimmsein in a sense of being-(musically)-
tuned, a sense which is lost in the translation to English, wherein attunement is often 
used in a sense with no implied musical connection. Within this context, it is perhaps 
not coincidental that alongside mood, Stimmung may carry the meaning of an 
instrument’s tuning425. For the purposes of this thesis, then, we might say that 
befindlichkeit is ontically the most familiar and everyday sort of thing: the process of 
tuning and the state of being tuned. Tuning may be said to be one of the most basic 
stages in the performance of playing an instrument: although it is often not witnessed by 
the audience, it is in many ways the most important and primal component, insofar as 
the tuning will affect the sounding of the notes all throughout the performance.  
 
Likewise, if we are to understand befindlichkeit in terms of the tuning component of the 
ritual then it is to be said that one’s mode of being is what will resonate and affect the 
entirety of the ritual’s form. In the context of play as an example of befindlichkeit, this 
allows us a return to our original setting out of ritual as being divided into those that 
occur within a playful befindlichkeit and those which occur within an unplayful 
 
422 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 172. 
423 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 172 Translator’s footnote. 
424 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 19. Aufl., unveränd. Nachdr. der 15., an Hand der Gesamtausg. 
durchges. Aufl. mit den Randbemerkungen aus dem Handex. des Autors im Anh (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 
2006), p. 134. 
425 This connection has also been noted by Erik Wallrup, who discusses the concept of Stimmung in 
detail, including Heidegger’s treatment, in Being Musically Attuned: The Act of Listening to Music 
(Farnham, Surrey, UK, England ; Ashgate Publishing Company : Burlington, VT, USA: Ashgate Pub. 
Limited, 2015). 
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befindlichkeit. From here the discussion of emotion in Chapter 4 (¶12) may be seen as 
being also a discussion of how rituals occur within a particular tuning and how through 
the performance of rituals an act of tuning the spectator (and perhaps the performer) 
may occur. 
  
Thread Two: Rituals at Play 
The second thread is the model of the intersection of play and ritual, as discussed in 
chapter I. All actions, I suggested, occur whilst in a certain mode of being, which should 
be understood as the previously discussed concept of Befindlichkeit: manners by which 
one is tuned for their performance within the world. Sicart suggests that play is a mode 
of being. Taking this contention as a starting point, I have argued that Befindlichkeit and 
play are intimately connected. Rituals, I claim, may be performed in a playful or an 
unplayful tuning wherein the difference marks the difference between a “live” and a 
“dead” ritual; that is, one which is performed with active engagement and one which is 
performed simply by rote with no real engagement or understanding (this raises an 
interesting point as to whether the performing of a ritual in a dead manner is nonetheless 
a meta-ritual of its own, suggesting a level of unquestioningness in one’s identity).  
 
I further stated that the most interesting rituals are those which occur when there is an 
element of mixed approach between the participants – those who are aware of the 
playful nature of the ritual and those who are not. Those rituals are stated to be the ones 
which rather than a statement of identity may lead to a questioning and potential 
changing of identity.  
 
In the second division of this thesis, each of the case studies demonstrated a ritual. The 
rituals of chapter 3 were for the most part specifically those of re-enacted myth. 
Historical re-enactment was shown as a performance designed to reinforce a cultural 
identity by recreating in a controlled setting the theoretical actions of one’s ancestors. 
Within this there were distinct groups who may be suggested to demonstrate the range 
of playful and unplayful activity within ritual: the so-called hardcores with their 
emphasis on historical fidelity at all costs would seem to sit comfortably in the latter. 
Within the former, those who favour less historical fidelity and so therefore will be 
more inclined to take liberties may have a higher access to a playful approach: consider 
for example the following image: 
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Figure 7Historical re-enactors during downtime at an event in Methil, Scotland. Image copyright 
unknown, and used without permission. 
It will be immediately apparent that historical fealty is not a priority to the re-enactors in 
question – the mix-match of armour, weapons, and clothing are representative of 
various time periods and geographic locations. Further, some of the clothes worn are of 
obvious modern manufacture. Such elements of playfulness may allow for the ritual to 
take on new meanings: not only defining oneself in relation to a mythic ancestry, but 
also questioning and creating identity facets in relation to one’s hobby of re-enactment. 
The referencing to the “lynching plays” in Chapter Three as re-enactment of myth 
following on from the same description as applied to Civil War re-enactment is, on first 
glance, an exception: the plays discussed very real and immediate on-going events and 
did not contain some obvious element of sentimental avoiding of uncomfortable truths, 
romanticizing, or supernatural intervention. Consider, however, that the focus of such 
plays was not on the lynching per se but rather on the affected persons and their 
responses to the events which occurred to and around them. It may be said then that 
these events are “myths” in that they are stories rooted in real events and designed to 
have a role in group identity and the processing of and coping with traumatic ongoing 
experiences. These rituals are decidedly “alive” – in particular because they were 
reacting to immediate events, and because of their pedagogic intent. 
  
The political re-enactments, meanwhile, are more interesting: the ritual in itself may as 
practised be “dead”, a largely cynical and unplayful performance of humanising and 
personalising, but are there exceptions? Trump’s Presidential campaign may certainly 
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be seen as a potential source of “play”, as Trump consistently and knowingly broke 
rules again and again in relation to how one is supposed to run a political campaign. The 
example of the Her Opponent performance, gender-swapping but otherwise exactly 
replicating events, can also be seen as an example of a playful re-enactment, albeit one 
which came with very serious overtones – an example perhaps of dark play in action. 
 
What of the rituals of academia? It has certainly been demonstrated that while the 
formats have evolved they have at the same time retained an element of continuity 
throughout; that there is a ritualised performance ongoing in the lecture and the seminar. 
Whether there is the presence of a myth of sorts is in doubt – if it does exist out with the 
content of what is being taught, then it is perhaps the myth of the academy as being a 
particularly privileged and hallowed place elevated above the uneducated masses. There 
is of course space for playfulness within the rituals of academia: new pedagogic 
techniques may be tested and trialled. The traditional structure, once understood, may 
be edited and played with by the instructor for effect. To some extent the act of learning 
to participate as instructor must be done in a playful manner – it is by experimenting 
and risking failing that the instructor gains an understanding of what will and will not 
work, of how and why the accepted methods are accepted. 
 
The rituals of Chapter Four concerned how philosophy is performed. This was of course 
the area in which Befindlichkeit features most prominently, with the discussion given as 
to how the manner in which an individual finds themselves attuned will reflect on how 
an argument is received and processed. If said individual is to be understood as a co-
participant in a ritual, then the role of the ritual in making a persuasive argument is one 
in which the participants are put into a particular mood – one which is playful, thus 
allowing for the serious consideration of a change in ideas and perspectives.  
 
In chapter Five when a discussion was made regarding a theatrical performance, we 
may suggest that that discussion was itself playful: various possibilities were put forth 
for how the same basic script might be performed although ultimately none were 
chosen. Plays which were written for a particular purpose were placed into a different 
purpose and context in order to create new meaning. From such a playful discussion, it 
should then be possible to create a playful performance: using such groundworks to 
situate the theatrical performance in new ways, and to build upon those ideas put forth 
by earlier theorists. 
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Thread Three: Performativity  
The concept of performativity, central to this thesis, was introduced in chapter 1 in 
relation to Austin’s prescription of the performative as those utterances which constitute 
actions. To Austin an utterance becomes an action when it is performed in the correct 
manner and circumstances, and by one who is recognised as having the authority to 
perform it – thus it may be seen in many ways to be an oral ritual of sorts. Within 
chapter 2 utterance was also noted, with a new meaning given which would subtly alter 
our understanding of performativity: as well as moving utterance out of the realm of 
language, allowing for non-verbal utterance, I defined it to mean a communitive gesture 
which makes known the meaning of an action in relation to the performer’s identity. 
Judith Butler, meanwhile, declares that “performativity is not just about speech acts. It 
is about bodily acts.”426 The referring to bodily acts as performative is interesting, tying 
in to the idea that an utterance may be non-verbal – that our behaviour may impart 
meaning just as speech does.  
At this juncture, it is interesting to note that in recent months the term “performative” 
has taken on a popular usage in common discourse as an adjective referring to actions 
which serve to draw attention to the individual performing them whilst failing to 
actually contribute to the stated goal: performative friendship, performative activism, 
performative allyship etc427. On a surface level, this may seem to be a meaning of 
performative which is separate from the meaning considered by Austin: whereas 
Austin’s performatives cause something to happen, the modern lexicon performative is 
a point of criticism, appended to an activity in order to indicate that it does nothing that 
the activity is traditionally meant to do (the performative activist is essentially the so-
called virtue signaller: their supposed activism consists largely of making a vocal 
display of their support for the chosen cause). In fact, according to the understanding of 
performativity that we have been exploring we see that these activities are very much 
 
426 Butler, Undoing Gender, p. 198. 
427 See for example discussions in Jasmine Hart, ‘Are You Practicing Performative Allyship?’, Affinity 
Magazine, 2017 <http://affinitymagazine.us/2017/07/09/are-you-practicing-performative-allyship/> 
[accessed 15 August 2018]; Stuart Heritage, ‘How to Spot a “Performative” Friend, from Taylor Swift to 
The Rock’, The Guardian, 23 July 2018, section Life and style 
<https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/shortcuts/2018/jul/23/how-to-spot-a-performative-friend-
taylor-swift-rock> [accessed 15 August 2018]; ‘Performative Wokeness Needs to Stop’, Varsity Online 
<https://www.varsity.co.uk/violet/14313> [accessed 15 August 2018]- it is perhaps interesting to note 
that in most sources discussing these concepts, there seems to be an assumption that the reader is 
already familiar with the term, as though it developed fully formed in the colloquial consciousness and 
does not require definition. 
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performative in the sense that they act as rituals which affirm the manner in which the 
individual wishes to be identified/to identify themselves: the performative activist 
loudly and visibly identifies the cause with which they wish to be associated whilst 
demonstrating ritually their commitment to that cause in the same action. 
 
Thread Four: The Co-Opticon and the Theatrum Mundi 
These two concepts, as discussed in the introduction, have been central to the 
understanding of performance throughout the thesis. They are the “where” of everyday 
performance, the stage created of “empty space” described by Brook. The concept is 
simple to understand: the rituals which have been examined throughout the thesis occur 
in a “theatre of the world”, such that they create for themselves a stage on which to 
occur spontaneously as needed. The performances are co-optical: the participants are 
simultaneously performer and audience, all constantly viewing one another and being 
viewed, performing for all including themselves. 
  
Consider, for example, the modern day circus arena: the professional sports game. On 
one level there is a basic division between the performers (the players on the field), and 
the spectators (the fans). In fact a few moments thought reveals that this is rarely the 
case. The fans will often create their own additional performances – the songs sung in 
the terraces, or less jovially the abuse hurled at the referee, or the players, or the 
opposing fans. In some cases the existence of the media may play into the 
performances, with fans attempting to draw attention to the cameras in order that they 
may be displayed on the jumbotron or even the television broadcast – and sometimes 
these performances might be picked up and specifically commented on by the 
commentators or pundits. This creates a perfect co-opitcal theatrum mundi in 
microcosm: the players perform for the fans as the fans perform for the fans and in 
some cases capture also the attention of the players, in some cases even gaining 
interaction. Everyone is both potential spectator and potential actor in the performances 
carried out on the stages created within the designated space within the designated time 
period set aside for the sport. This same effect, out with the designated space and time, 
can be found outside such arenas. 
 
A weaving together of threads 
Returning for the moment to the end of Chapter Five, I proposed that Deleuze’s concept 
of minor theatre offers an insight into how a performance can be caused to assist in the 
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communication of ideas. The concept focussed on was that of the theatrical performance 
as a critical essay, provoking an established performance to “stammer” in such a way as 
to open up possibilities of new performance styles or variations. Such a provocation will 
allow the subject matter, the theme and messages communicated, to be viewed in new 
ways. On one level it might be suggested that this is a mundane and banal observation: 
is not the role of the director in part to find new variations of a performance in order to 
better highlight themes hidden in the text? Whilst this is true, the concept of stammering 
as taken from Deleuze seems to imply something further than a straight performance 
with decisions made regarding staging, costume, acting methods and so on. Rather, 
Deleuze talks of a change to the theatre itself through the amputation of power and of 
representation.  
 
The key in the stammer in this analysis is that it moves into the realms of change: on 
some level a ritual of questioning and altering is performed upon an existing ritual in 
order to cause it to become something both new and the same. The ritual of the 
persuasive lecture, for instance, becomes not merely a relaying of information and 
argument but a relaying of information and argument plus something else – a ritual of 
attunement which invites the audience to act in their role as an active participant in the 
ritual and to perform in a particular manner – to become attuned to consider the 
arguments made upon their own merit. The threads that have run through this thesis 
combine together to show the ways in which this stammering should be effective, and 
the areas in which the stammer may take effect. 
 
What is it that stammers? It is a co-optical ritual which takes place upon the stage of the 
theatrum mundi. The stammering may be of the ritual’s actions, its utterances, even the 
manner in which it manipulates the space which it commandeers for its use. The 
stammering may in part relate to the mood or attunement in which the participants of 
the rituals perform: is it playful or unplayful? The stammer may cause whichever is the 
default to change for some or all participants. This attunement may, through the 
stammering, be caused to spread amongst the participants in order to reveal to them new 
meanings within the ritual, or allow the form of the ritual to change from having one 
particular effect or purpose to another. The Befindlichkeit concept becomes one which 
can refer in part to the type of ritual that is occurring – one might be in a Befindlichkeit 
of questioning, of affirming, of rejecting and so on.  
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Scope for Further Research 
There are several areas which may be of interest for further research. These range from 
what might be deemed in the line of “traditional” philosophical enquiry to more 
practice-based interdisciplinary investigation, likely involving a level of collaboration 
with other scholars/practitioners. Ideally this research will lead to several publications 
including at least one book as well as a number of peer-reviewed journal articles. 
One project which springs immediately to mind would be in relation to non-Western 
philosophical traditions and their approach to ritual/performance. Consider, for instance, 
the philosophy of Confucianism, in which ritual behaviour is given a strong emphasis. 
Given the claim I put forward in chapter one that the concepts which have been 
examined in this thesis are in some manner universal, the fact that the philosophers I 
have drawn upon have been almost universally from Western traditions might be 
levelled against my approach as a criticism. By examining the role of ritual in 
philosophical traditions from China and India, for instance, a firm test may be made 
regarding the validity of my assertions as well as the question of whether such 
assertions must be updated in light of currently not realised concepts. Such an 
examination might, given the common influence of what may be deemed 
spiritual/religious traditions on much of ancient non-Western philosophy, find itself 
assisted by a particular concentration in the area of comparative religion. This might 
involve looking at  similarities and differences in ritual traditions in particular (indeed 
the “westernisation” of certain religious traditions which originated outside of the West 
may provide valuable insight into cross-cultural links and similarities), and would build 
in particular on the research that has been done regarding Girard, and the views on 
revelation and spiritual experience put forth by James (The Varieties of Religious 
Experience), Plantinga (Warranted Christian Belief), and Levinas (Revelation in the 
Jewish Tradition). 
 
The proposed performance discussed in Chapter Five is also an area of potential most 
obviously in its potential to actually be performed in order to test the proposed theories 
in action. Using that performance as a launch pad, it may be interesting also to examine 
other performances with particular interest put on theories put forward by thinkers such 
as Deleuze, Brecht, Boal, etc. and built upon in order to draw out new and interesting 
derivative theories and practices. Overlapping with the previously discussed interest in 
non-western performance and ritual, it may be of interest to introduce concepts taken 
from non-western theatre practices (for instance Kabuki theatre, as briefly mentioned in 
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Puchner’s discussion of site-centred performances). Further, Puchner’s discussion in 
The Drama of Ideas regarding the history and practice of the Socrates play might 
provide an interesting and philosophically-grounded source of derivation. 
 
An emphasis on games and play might lead to two interesting avenues of research. One 
of them is drawing from research which I originally embarked on in my undergraduate 
dissertation, examining the concept of the “roleplaying game”, in which participants act 
out the parts of characters in a story whilst following the constraints of pre-written rules 
governing success and failure of actions. Of particular interest is the so-called “Live-
action roleplay”, or LARP, in which rather than being played whilst sat around a table 
as in the traditional game participants dress up in costumes and interact in the real 
world, often with imitation weapons and crude special effects. The similarity between 
LARP and re-enactment is undoubtedly clear, with the primary difference being that the 
former is based in fantasy and invented stories and characters whilst the latter carries a 
veneer of historical basis. The usage of such rituals in terms of identity and the 
explorations of themes on a more immediate and first-person basis than in a general 
observation could be a ripe source for research.  
 
The second point of interest in terms of games and play is the internet, in particular the 
realm of “internet memes” – that is, the use of in-jokes and captioned graphics often 
used to communicate ideas and concepts. Many memes go through cycles of use and 
reuse in playfully edited manners, often in ways which reference each other or non-
meme subjects, which are currently popular. As such they may be viewed as an image-
based performance designed to understand or comment on the world, popular culture, 
current affairs, and so on. 
 
Final Words 
The most central theme to this thesis has been that of the nature of performativity within 
the context of ritual performances: it is the performative, the causing of something to 
“happen”, whether that be a change of status as in the marriage or initiation ritual, or a 
more general ongoing taken-for-granted such as in Butler’s view of gender, that marks 
the performance as more than simply a series of arbitrary words and/or actions. In 
Chapter Four the concept of First Philosophy, understood as the concept that 
performance is that which is primal to the study of philosophical matters, was 
introduced. I suggested that before we begin the actual act of “doing philosophy”, we 
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cause that doing to occur as part of a performance, within particular space and given 
particular contexts and meanings to our choice of words, format, particular ideas or 
sources privileged or snubbed, and so on. In this sense then, what is the performativity 
of philosophy? The answer would seem to be that there is perhaps some special 
construct of methods, specialist language, mediums, etc. which creates for the reader a 
sense that a particular work belongs to the constructed category that is “philosophy”. 
 
 What is the first philosophy of this thesis? More importantly, can such a question be 
consciously asked by the author of the thesis or is the wider context something which 
can only be examined from a more detached and objective standpoint than is perhaps 
possible – certainly at the time of writing, such detachment is more difficult than would 
be the case weeks or months later.  
 
At the conclusion of a conference presentation, Beyond the Preposition, upon which a 
large section of Chapter Four was based, I asked the rhetorical question as to whether a 
presentation on performance being first philosophy was self-demonstrating. If the same 
rhetorical question were proposed towards this thesis as a whole then the answer may 
seem to be more clear-cut: for the most part this thesis has not strayed so far from the 
traditional boundaries and format to be considered to constitute a notably subversive 
performance. On the other hand, one might propose that the conscious decision not to 
break from such rules is itself an informed performance: whilst the confusing and poetic 
writings of Deleuze/Guattari, Nietzsche, etc. are certainly interesting and fine examples 
of philosophy as an overt performance, they are not examples of a PhD thesis. Is then 
the root performance of this work one of acknowledging and re-enacting a long-running 
academic ritual of assessed work?  
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